Youth Investment and Community Reconstruction: Street Lessons on Drugs and Crime by Foundation, The Milton S. Eisenhower
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 5
Issue 2 Symposium on Serious Juvenile Crime Article 12
February 2014
Youth Investment and Community
Reconstruction: Street Lessons on Drugs and
Crime
The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information,
please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
The Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, Youth Investment and Community Reconstruction: Street Lessons on Drugs and Crime, 5 Notre
Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 504 (1991).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol5/iss2/12
YOUTH INVESTMENT AND COMMUNITY
RECONSTRUCTION: STREET LESSONS ON
DRUGS AND CRIME
THE MILTON S. EISENHOWER FOUNDATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE: VICTORY AND DESPAIR ........................ 505
1. MORE SEPARATE, LESS EQUAL ....................... 508
Individual and Community Development ............... 509
2. EARLY INFLUENCES: ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS FOR
THE TAXPAYER'S DOLLAR ............................ 511
Head Start and Day Care ............................. 512
Job Corps ........................................... 512
Centro Sister Isolina Ferre ............................. 513
Fairview Homes ...................................... 515
The Argus Community ................................ 517
The House of Umoja ................................. 518
Underlying Principles and Cost-Effectiveness Compared to
Prison .............................................. 519
3. NEIGHBORHOOD PROGRAM .......................... 520
The Planning Process ................................. 521
The Locally Created Programs ......................... 523
The Evaluation Outcomes ............................. 525
4. YOUTH INVESTMENT IN ACTION: A CLOSER LOOK .... 528
ACW Individual and Community Change Through
Enterprise ................... 529
DYC: Working Hands-On with Troubled Youth..........534
5. PRACTICAL STREET LEVEL LESSONS .................. 540
Inner City Non Profits Can Be Efficient as Lead Institutions 541
Technical Assistance Increases the Odds for Success ........ 542
It Is Folly to Expect Success Without Adequate Resources
and Facilities ........................................ 544
Volunteerism is Being Oversold in the Inner City .......... 546
Public Sector Agencies, Including the Police, Have a Crucial
Role... ...................................... 548
"Block Watch," "Neighborhood Watch" and Other Conven-
tional Tactics are Sharply Limited ...................... 553
6. THE NEXT GENERATION OF EISENHOWER PROGRAMS.. 558
Accumulating Evidence ................................ 558
Some Common Elements ............................... 561
Eisenhower Demonstrations for the 1990s ............... 562
1991] YOUTH INVESTMENT AND COMMUNITY RECONSTRUCTION 505
Examples of Second Generation Programs ............... 566
7. A NATIONAL POLICY OF YOUTH INVESTMENT AND
COMMUNITY RECONSTRUCTION ...................... 571
Deterioration ........................................ 572
Policy Failure ........................................ 573
Early Intervention and Urban School Reform ............ 575
The Youth Investment Corporation ....................... 577
Reforming Existing School-to- Work Training and Placement 583
A "Community Enterprise" Development Strategy for the
Inner City ........................................... 587
Drug Abuse Prevention, Drug Treatment and National
H ealth Policy ........................................ 592
8. FINANCING POLITICALLY FEASIBLE INVESTMENTS IN
YOUTH AND THE ECONOMY .......................... 596
Local and State Investment ............................ 596
Federal Investment ................................... 597
A $10 Billion Per Year, Ten Year Federal Budget ........ 598
Understanding the Federal Budget Deficit ................ 599
Reducing Defense Expenditures ......................... 599
Redirecting the Military-Industrial Complex to Empower the
Disadvantaged ....................................... 602
Retargetting Federal Domestic Programs ................. 603
Raising New Revenue ................................ 604
The Economic Argument is Also a Moral Argument ....... 605
Youth Investment and Community Reconstruction are Politi-
cally Feasible ........................................ 605
Visual Imagery and Youth Investment ................... 608
Leadership, Not Small Scale Dreams .................... 609
The Two Societies Mirror Challenges From Within ........ 609
THE YOUTH INVESTMENT ACT OF 1992 .................. 611
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................... 615
PREFACE: VICTORY AND DESPAIR
Flora Lewis has observed in the New York Times that capital-
ism and freedom have triumphed over European commu-
nism-but that American society hardly can rest on its laurels:
The scourge of drugs should suggest much more
than inadequate law enforcement, greed, failed family
responsibility. It has to mean that there is something
missing, something our society is failing to provide in its
basic promise of community.
We are producing not only youths with inferior edu-
cation and desire to learn, we are producing crack babies
who may be ineducable because of birth defects. We are
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producing homeless who live on park benches and streets
in the midst of empty buildings where they cannot afford
space. We let developers blow up old buildings that
could be repaired so they can invest in expensive new
ones, another part of the H.U.D. scandal.
We have the capacity and the social system to do
better....
Well aware of our capacity, many of America's North
Atlantic allies have despaired over how the seeming European
victory over Communism has not been accompanied by simi-
larly effective domestic polices in the U.S.
At the recent European and North American Conference
on Urban Safety and Crime Prevention, an American big city
mayor told his peers in a major address that deprivation, pov-
erty, drugs and crime were unrelated. He advocated tough law
and order, prison building and greatly enhanced border
interdiction of drugs.
But Europeans and Canadians at the Conference were crit-
ical. On border interdiction as an American priority, a British
delegate observed, "As if you enterprising Americans would
not be smart enough to produce drugs inside the United States
if the imports were stopped." A questioner from France
politely reminded Americans that the United States already had
spent billions on prisons and they had not been successful in
reducing crime. A Dutch representative working on prisons
and parole said, "You Americans pursue a strategy, it doesn't
work, so you double your efforts and pour obscene amounts of
money into the same strategy. It doesn't seem to occur to you
to retreat and try a new tack." The Mayor of Toronto
expressed dismay at the failure of the United States to see
employment in the inner city as key. Other Canadians
observed that the U.S. was "dealing with the iceberg by rear-
ranging the deck chairs." The Secretary General of the Coun-
cil of Europe encouraged the world community to reject
American solutions and deal with crime at its roots. In France,
this means local social development through coordinated
employment, education, neighborhood services and policing.
With a concern similar to Flora Lewis', one former U.S.
trade negotiator has concluded that our trade deficit springs
from "the same willful disregard of reality and self-delusion as
the decay of our central cities, the permeation of our society
with drugs, and the decline of the educational system."
These concerns are not new. They have been shared by
many Americans for more than two decades.
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Twenty years ago, the bipartisan President's National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commis-
sion) concluded, "Our nation is moving toward two societies,
one black, one white-separate and unequal."
Shortly thereafter, the bipartisan National Commission on
the Causes and Prevention of Violence (the Eisenhower Vio-
lence Commission), surveying the carnage in many American
cities in the wake of the ghetto riots and rising crime rates of
the late 1960s, declared that "safety in our cities requires noth-
ing less than progress in reconstructing urban life."
As the private sector re-creation of these Commissions, the
-Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation has worked since the early
1980s to carry out their agendas-by reducing urban violence
and drug abuse through youth empowerment, community revi-
talization and grass-roots action.
In 1982, the Foundation, with major seed funding from
the Ford Foundation and assistance from IBM, Exxon, the Met-
ropolitan Life Foundation, the Burden Foundation and more
than sixty other local and national funders, launched a neigh-
borhood self-help crime prevention program based on those
principles in 10 inner cities.
In this report, we summarize the results and lessons of our
demonstrations during the last decade, describe our resulting
next generation of private sector ventures and propose new,
politically feasible, national policies for the inner city that build
on our practical experience in day-to-day street-level
implementation.
Today, with crime and drug-related violence tearing the
social fabric of our cities as never before, it is critically impor-
tant that we build on the accumulating knowledge and experi-
ence already gathered on the "front lines" of America's inner
cities. Through trial and error over the last decade in places
like the South Bronx, East Brooklyn, Liberty City in Miami,
Dorchester in Boston, Washington, D.C. and Newark, we
learned as much from failures as from successes.
As a result, there now are some answers to seemingly
intractable questions. How effective are specific anti-crime and
anti-drug strategies, like neighborhood watch, in the inner city,
whatever their popularity in the media? What are the relative
roles of minority non-profit community organizations and the
police? Of private organizations and public sector agencies?
What are the uses-and limitations-of volunteers? Can a wise
policy invest simultaneously in both individual high risk youth
and the neighborhoods where they live? What is the cost? Is it
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cheaper than prison building? How do we pay? Is an inner city
youth empowerment and community reconstruction policy now
feasible politically, as rhetoric over a "peace dividend" again is
heard, as in the 1970s?
We offer the report in the spirit of illuminating these
issues.
We can anticipate one central conclusion here-and it is a
hopeful one. Community-based organizations can create effec-
tive strategies to reduce crime and drug abuse in inner cities.
But we caution that effective programs cannot be developed
"on the cheap." Our experience tells us that these inner-city
ills require comprehensive solutions, not piecemeal, hit-and-
miss efforts. The most successful programs reach well beyond
the immediate symptoms of crime or drug abuse to address the
deeper problems of the surrounding community, and particu-
larly the multiple needs of disadvantaged youth. Providing
comprehensive, multiple remedies for those overlapping
problems requires a serious commitment of resources-more
serious than our nation has been willing to contemplate up to
now. But we believe that the easing of world tensions on the
wake of the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe offers an unparalleled opportunity to give these
problems the resources they deserve-to finish, at long last, the
agenda set out by. the Kerner and Eisenhower Commissions.
Dr. David Hamburg, President of the Carnegie Corpora-
tion of New York has concluded:
We'll never know as much as we like, as evaluations are
difficult and can direct resources away from the strategies
themselves, but we know enough to act and we can't
afford not to act.
As the 1990s begin, we now know enough to act on the
common principles that so often spell success for inner city
youth and communities.
1. MORE SEPARATE, LESS EQUAL
Early in 1968, the Kerner Commission, established during
the "long hot summer" of 1967, issued its devastating report
on the causes of the urban riots of the 1960s. In a momentous
passage, the Commission declared that America was moving
toward "two societies, separate and unequal." And it called for
"compassionate, massive, and sustained" national action to
address the roots of urban violence.
But by the Spring of 1968 America's cities were in flames
again. Two leaders who had been among those most deeply
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concerned with the fate of America's "two societies"-Martin
Luther King and Robert Kennedy-lay dead. For some, there
was a growing fear that continuing violence was fraying the
bonds that held American society together.
It was in that tense, urgent atmosphere that President Lyn-
don Johnson established the National Commission on the
Causes and Prevention of Violence, under the leadership of
Milton Eisenhower. Like the Kerner Commission, the Violence
Commission recognized that the problems of violent crime and
civil disorders were deeply rooted in the conditions of urban
life in the United States. In its final report, released in Decem-
ber 1969, the Commission concluded that violence was "like a
fever in the body politic; it is but a symptom of some more
basic pathology which must be cured before the fever will
disappear."
The Violence Commission declared that "the way in which
we can make the greatest progress toward reducing violence in
America is by taking the actions necessary to improve the con-
ditions of family and community life for all who live in our cit-
ies, and especially for the poor who are concentrated in the
ghetto slums." The Commission acknowledged that violence
had to be controlled through law enforcement and the courts-
in the short run. But it also insisted that in the long run,
"Safety in our cities requires nothing less than progress in
reconstructing urban life." The Commission concluded that
"the poverty and social isolation of minority groups in central
cities is the single most serious problem of the American city
today"; and it called for neighborhood-level efforts to reduce
violence by diminishing that isolation and poverty.
Individual and Community Development
Others shared this vision of neighborhood capacity build-
ing and community self-determination. In his 1967 book, To
Seek a Newer World, Robert Kennedy suggested that rebuilding
the inner city and transforming the lives and futures of its peo-
ple would take something more than the "individual achieve-
ment" through which a handful of people up to then had
escaped the urban ghetto. It would take something much
deeper: The people of the inner city had to be helped to "build
communities of security and achievement and dignity"-to
"gain self-sufficiency, control over their own destiny."
The ills of the inner city had to be attacked through a com-
prehensive "process of community development"-which in
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turn must "begin on an economic base; a foundation of individ-
ual and community self-support."
Proponents of this view of community development
believed that the creation of new, indigenous community enter-
prises within the inner cities could be the basis for a revitaliza-
tion of the community as a whole-in its social aspects no less
than its purely economic ones. Many saw the emerging com-
munity development corporations of the time (like the one
Robert Kennedy was instrumental in creating in Brooklyn's
Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood) as models for that commu-
nity self-regeneration. These decentralized, locally based insti-
tutions -could take over some of the governing .and community-
building functions usually performed by more distant govern-
mental bodies-from social services, through education, to
drug and crime prevention.
But a pessimistic view was in the air in the 1970s and
1980s. In place the stirring vision of the Kerner Commission;
which wanted to turn cities into "citadels of the human spirit,"
there was a growing perception that not much could be done
about the roots of crime, inner city isolation and deprivation.
We did not engage in that reconstruction of urban life the
Violence Commission had called for; on the contrary, we
slashed many existing urban programs, including many of the
most innovative and promising. We cut not only some ineffec-
tive programs that seemed to promise only continued depen-
dency and stagnation for the urban poor-but also many of
those that sought to contribute to that self-sufficiency and self-
determination of which the Presidential commissions had
spoken.
On the national level, our response to the continuing-
indeed increasing-problem of crime and violence in the cities
was largely reactive. We poured substantial amounts of scarce
resources into "hardware"-including armored equipment
Whose value was questionable at best. We began steadily to put
more and more people behind bars-in the nation's prisons
and in localjails. Expenditures for criminal justice in the 1980s
increased 4 times as rapidly as for education, and twice as rap-
idly as for health and hospitals. Over the decade the number of.
adults behind bars doubled. Nearly 1 in 4 Black men aged 20
to 29 would be behind bars, on probation or on parole on any
given day. The U.S. had the highest rates of imprisonment in
the industrialized world-except, significantly, for the Soviet
Union and South Africa.
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The impact on crime of all the prison building was prob-
lematic. [... ] While the number of adults in prison steadily
rose, the serious crime rate first declined and then rose. With
each new prison cell costing $75,000 on the average, it became
difficult to justify to the American taxpayer how prison building
was an effective, or cost-effective, way to stop crime.
Over the 1970s and 1980s, to the extent that we devoted
significant resources to crime prevention at all on the national
level, they went mostly to support "target hardening"--defen-
sive measures designed to reduce the opportunities for crime
without trying simultaneously to address its causes. To be
sure, some of those measures were useful in protecting individ-
uals from victimization in crime-ridden communities. But the
vision that called for linking them to a broader strategy of com-
munity regeneration was too often abandoned.
Obviously more was needed; and the Eisenhower Founda-
tion was created on the idea that the "reconstructive" tradition
represented by the Kemer and Eisenhower Commissions was
even more relevant in the 1980s than in the 1960s. Surely the
nation needed a strong and efficient criminal justice system;
certainly efforts to reduce the opportunities for crime had a
place in an overall strategy against crime in the cities. But we
had begun to stray too far away from the understanding that
crime reflected deeper pathologies of urban life in America. A
truly effective strategy against violence and crime in the cities
would need to address those pathologies as well; particularly
the blocked opportunities and multiple disadvantages of low-
income youth, the disruption and stress of family life in the city,
the erosion of community institutions and a sense of purpose.
2. EARLY INFLUENCES: ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS FOR THE
TAXPAYER'S DOLLAR
There were some encouraging examples available of pro-
grams that had tried to address these interrelated problems.
For despite the generally reactive character of much social pol-
icy toward crime in the 1970s, a number of innovative pro-
grams, both public and private, had emerged which showed
real promise of reducing crime, delinquency, and drug abuse.
These programs had varying approaches. Some empha-
sized providing intensive services to address the multiple
problems of disadvantaged children and youth. Others empha-
sized community revitalization through resident organizing or
the development of new opportunities for the young in school-
ing and work. All had in common the general aim of prevent-
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ing crime rather than simply reacting to it after the fact. Early
influences on the Eisenhower Foundation included, but were
not limited to, Head Start, Job Corps, Centro Sister Isolina
Ferre, Fairview Homes, the Argus Community and the House
of Umoja:
Head Start and Day Care
The Head Start program provided preschool education
and enrichment for poor minority children. Preschool has
been evaluated as one of the most cost-effective inner city
crime and drug prevention strategies ever developed. In 1985,
the Committee for Economic Development, composed of
American corporate executives, concluded, "It would be hard
to imagine that society could find a higher yield for a dollar of
investment than that found in preschool programs for its at-risk
children. Every $1 spent on early prevention and intervention
can save $4.75 in the cost of remedial education, welfare, and
crime further down the road."
Figure 3 shows dramatically how disadvantaged kids in the
Perry Preschool program in Michigan, compared to similar
children not in preschool, had significantly fewer arrests,
school drop outs, cases of mental retardation, and experiences
on welfare-as well as significantly higher literacy, employment
and attendance rates in vocational school or college by the age
of 19. All of those welcome outcomes seemed interrelated.
That is, the secret to preschool seemed to be not only early
intervention, but also "multiple solutions to multiple
problems." Head Start operated on the premise that disadvan-
taged children had many needs at the same time-including
cognitive stimulation, better nutrition, improved health care
and more social support.
As for related day care and family enrichment, the Yale
Child Welfare Research Program has assessed coordinated
pediatric child care, social work and psychological services
given to low income mothers and their first child over 30
months from birth. Ten years following the end of the services,
program boys were statistically less likely to be involved in
predevelopment behavior (like truancy) than comparison
group boys.
Job Corps
"Multiple solution" principles somewhat similar to Head
Start also became apparent in a number of successful public
and private programs for older disadvantaged youth. In the
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public sector, Job Corps became one of the most successful
national crime and drug prevention programs.
Job Corps was an intensive program that took seriously the
need to provide a supportive, structured environment for the
young people it sought to assist. Job Corps featured classroom
courses, which could lead to G.E.D.'s, counseling and hands-on
job training for very high risk kids. Corps programs were
located in rural and urban settings. Some of the urban settings
were campus-like. Others essentially were "on the street." In
the original design, a residential setting provided sanctuary
away from one's home. Today, non-residential variations are
being tried, and it will be important to compare their cost-
effectiveness to the live-in design. Yet even for the non-resi-
dential programs, the notion of an extended-family environ-
ment has been maintained.
According to Labor Department statistics, during the first
year after the experience, Job Cops members were a third less
likely to be arrested than nonparticipants. Every $1.00 spent
on the Job Corps results in $1.45 in benefits to society, includ-
ing reduced crime and substance abuse-which account for
$0.42 in benefits alone-reduced welfare dependency, and
increased job productivity, income, and taxes. Evaluations
found that 75% of Job Corps enrollees move on to a job or
full-time study; graduates retain jobs longer and earn about
15% more than if they had not participated in the program.
According to one evaluator, "Naysayers who deny that labor
market problems are real and serious, that social interventions
can make a difference, or that the effectiveness of public
problems can be improved will find little to support their
preconceptions" in the experience of programs like Job Corps.
Centro Sister Isolina Ferre
Other promising programs were based in disadvantaged
communities and sought comprehensive community-based
strategies against crime and violence.
One such program, Centro Sister Isolina Ferre, in the
LaPlaya neighborhood of Ponce, Puerto Rico, was started in
1968 by a Catholic nun, Sister Isolina Ferre, who had spent the
past several years working on New York City's toughest streets.
Playa de Ponce was a community "where 16,000 people lived
neglected by government and private agencies"-with delin-
quency rates more than twice that of the rest of the city of
Ponce, high unemployment, poor health conditions, no basic
health care services, and "few, if any, resources." Centro
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began on the premise that, "If family and community could be
strengthened, and meaningful employment made available," it
might be possible to "make substantial progress in the struggle
against neighborhood crime and violence."
Like the vision of Robert Kennedy and of the Kerner and
Eisenhower Commissions, Centro's strategy was based on the
fundamental idea that attacking crime and violence required
addressing the development of the community as a whole.
"We wanted to bring the community to an awareness of its hid-
den strengths," writes Sister Isolina, "to develop among the
people of the community the competence to protect themselves
and their children." At the heart of Centro's approach, in
other words, was the assumption that there were important
strengths even in this very poor community-and that what was
needed was to find ways to nurture and mobilize them; that the
community, though deprived and troubled, was potentially
"competent" to deal with its own problems.
With this vision, Sister Isolina began to put into place sev-
eral programs designed to develop that community compe-
tence. One example stands out especially-the system of youth
advocates or "intercesores." These were young, streetwise
community people who became all-around advocates and men-
tors for young people brought before the juvenile court. The
advocates would "get to know the youth and his or her peers
and family, and would look into the schoolwork, family situa-
tion, and day-to-day behavior of the youth"; they would involve
the youth in a range of developmental programs the Center
began to create, including job training, recreation, and tutor-
ing. Their role went well beyond simple individual counseling;
the advocate was to "become familiar with the whole living
experience of the youth," to work with "the family, the peers,
the school, the staff, the police, and the court"-in short, "to
help the community become aware of the resources it had that
should help the youth develop into a healthy adult." After
some initial mistrust, the police began to work closely with the
intercesores, often calling them first before taking a youth to
court.
Centro also developed community-based health services,
innovative educational alternatives for youth at risk of drop-
ping out of school, and a program of family supports through
"advocate families" who took the lead in helping their neigh-
bors with family problems. They created an extensive job-
training program, especially strong in crafts and photography,
on the premise that "building a community without jobs is like
trying to build a brick wall without cement."
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The journalist Charles Silberinan, in his 1978 book Crimi-
nal Violence, CiminalJwtice, called Centro "the best example of
community regeneration I found anywhere in the United
States." LaPlaya is considered the toughest neighborhood in
Ponce. Over the period of initial operations of Centro, from
1968 to 1977, the rate of reported juvenile offenses was fairly
constant in Ponce, while it showed a two thirds decline in
LaPlaya. Whether the difference in community wide juvenile
offenses was attributable to Centro, rather than any to other
significant interventions or to demographic and police report-
ing changes, can not be known for certain, for no scientific
evaluation has yet been done. But the possibilities were
intriguing. We wanted to further explore Sister Isolina's belief
that the most effective strategy against crime and delinquency
is "to give the people in poor communities a sense of their own
dignity and importance, assist them as they take advantage of
their own resources to create a meaningful life for themselves
and their children, and give them access to satisfying employ-
ment that enables them to support their families and communi-
ties with a sense of pride and dignity."
Fairview Homes
The Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program was
begun in Charlotte, North Carolina Public Housing in 1979.
The Charlotte Public Housing Authority received almost
$450,000 from four federal departments as part of the national
Urban Initiative Anti-Crime Program.
The monies were used mostly to hire staff to run programs
within Fairview Homes over two initial demonstration years.
Persons employed included professionals, adult public housing
residents who were "natural leaders," and high risk youth who
lived in the project. With the assistance of the Fairview tenant
organization, a staff of 16 adult residents and former residents
was hired. Jobs also were supplied for 48 high risk youth, aged
16 to 19.
The program provided residents job training and work
opportunity in many management, employment, health and
anti-drug services. Residents also were trained in ombudsman
and advocate skills-so that they might leverage resources to
continue the program after the initial funding ended. Employ-
ment was chosen to nurture personal growth, skill develop-
ment and control over one's environment and life.
An evaluation between 1979-1981 showed that calls for
service to the police increased by 51 % within the housing pro-
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ject, while service calls in the rest of the Census tract did not
increase. Crime rates in Fairview Homes as measured by police
reports declined during the program; crime in the remainder of
the Census tract and within the City of Charlotte rose. The
most dramatic decreases in Fairview Homes, as measured by
police, were in serious assault, robbery and burglary rates.
Fairview crime rates based on interviews with residents also
decreased. For the high risk youth employed, between their
employment in the early 1980s and the late 1980s, only 3 of the
48 had been arrested for serious crime (drug dealing and
assault), based on housing authority and police records.
Parallel to Centro, the Fairview program was founded on
the assumption that public housing residents were competent
to deal with their own problems. The evaluation observed that,
"In those areas in which the commitment to involving residents
as working partners in the program development and imple-
mentation was achieved, the greatest amount of success was
experienced. Where residents were involved as partners with
professional staff and management [of the public housing
authority], the program reached and exceeded the goals.
When the residents played only menial or limited roles only a
partial achievement of goals could be found."
The evaluation concluded, "Rather than talking to and
planning for the residents of low income communities, pro-
grams seeking to serve these communities must begin to talk
and plan with the residence for the services that will be
offered."
After the 1979 to 1981 period, Fairview Homes fought
severe fiscal constraints. For example, federal cutbacks during
the 1980s "snipped the drug and alcohol program just as it
started to gain some headway...." Yet, through funding from
private foundations, local government and other sources, the
program has continued in various forms and has been
extended to other housing projects beyond Fairview, within the
Charlotte Housing Authority. The existing initiative, called the
Safe Neighborhood Awareness Program (SNAP), presently is
funded at an average level of over $100,000 per year. Between
1985 and 1987, neighborhoods in the SNAP program exper-
ienced a decline in police-based crime rates of from 2% to
18%; police-based crime rates in the same size developments
without SNAP programs increased from 32% to 64% during
this same period.
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The Argus Community
The Argus Community in the South Bronx was founded in
1968, the same year as Centro, by Elizabeth Sturz, a poet and
former probation officer. Argus is a community-based center
for high-risk youth, mainly Black and Puerto Rican. It provided
"an alternative life program for adolescents and adults who
have been on the treadmill of unemployment, underemploy-
ment, street hustling, welfare, substance abuse, crime and
prison, and who saw no way out for themselves."
Through residential and nonresidential programs, Argus
sought to offer some fundimentals too often lacking in the
families and communities from which these youth came. It
aimed to create an "extended family" of responsible adults and
peers that could offer "warmth, nurturance, communication,
and structure," and that would model and teach productive val-
ues. Within that "extended family" setting, the program
offered prevocational, vocational and academic training, and
worked to link those trained with employers in the city.
Over time, Argus added day care, family planning, health
care and early education, which not only provided parenting
assistance for the children of teen mothers in the program, but
also sought to "teach the young mothers-and fathers-how to
be good parents." Argus' founders believed that "angry, alien-
ated teenagers can be pulled in, can be brought to the point
where they no only do not steal and assault but have something
of value to give to the society."
Argus briefings pointed out that the non-residential pro-
gram, mostly for teenagers who were at risk but not yet in seri-
ous trouble, was designed as alternative life training to prevent
the need for youth to end up in the residential program, for
those some what older with more serious problems- today,
especially drugs. So a full range of intervention evolved, from
early prevention to treatment.
Some people are referred to Argus from throughout the
city. Most come from the neighborhood. Argus youth are at
higher risk than 'the clients of most other community-based
youth agencies in New York City. Despite this extremely trou-
bled clientele, the program has had encouraging successes.
The Eisenhower Foundation evaluated a cycle of the Argus
day time, non-residential Living for Learning Center. Youth
were assessed over 20 weeks of training and then over a follow-
up period. Measures were taken before and after, 9 months
apart, with 100 high risk Argus youth and 100 comparable
youth who did not receive training. Argus youth had higher
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salaries, paid more taxes, and received more job benefits than
the comparison youth. To' complement these findings, studies
by the Vera Institute and the New York Criminal Justice Coor-
dinating Council have shown that 67% of the Argus Commu-
nity's enrollees attained nonsubsidized job placement in 1980.
This is a much higher job-placement rate than for similar high-
risk youth who are not involved with the program. These stud-
ies also demonstrated lower crime recidivism rates for Argus
graduates than for graduates from almost any other program in
New York City that works with such high-risk offenders.
The House of Um4a
Philadelphia's House of Umoja also was begun in the late
1960s, in response to high levels of gang violence among the
city's minority youth. Under the leadership of Falaka Fattah, a
journalist, and her husband, David Fattah, Umoja built on the
idea that gang violence was in good part rooted in low self-
esteem and a need for belonging among urban minority youth.
Their response was to provide a "homelike setting" for a group
of Black gang members that, like Argus, offered the support of
an "extended family"-based, in Umoja's case, on an apprecia-
tion of the cooperative values of African culture. The House of
Umoja offered a "sanctuary, a sheltered environment," that
included counseling, involving the youth in household manage-
ment, monitoring their school performance, helping them con-
nect with jobs and training, looking after their needs in health,
nutrition and recreation, and fostering a "sense of together-
ness and group unity by imparting the values inherent in Afri-
can culture." The program linked these efforts to "build self-
respect, self-control, and a willingness to channel one's energy
into a future based on education, employment, and family"
with the development of several community-based enterprises
in which those goals could be put into practice.
Over the 1960s, an average of 39 Black youth died on Phil-
adelphia's streets, and hundreds more were maimed for life as
a direct result of gang violence. Then the Fattahs negotiated a
gang truce. By the mid 1970s, there was a dramatic drop in
gang violence to 6 killings a year in 1976 and 1 in 1977.
Although no scientific study of trends in gang violence was
done, according to one New York Times account, "Experts in
criminal justice believe that the House of Umoja had a consid-
erable role" in reducing gang deaths.
No control group studies over time have yet been made of
Umoja youth. A less formal assessment has been made on a
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representative sample of 15 high risk youth who lived at Umoja
between 1971 and 1978. They had been diverted from the jus-
tice system to Umoja. Only one had served time in prison for
any serious offense since joining Umoja. The 15 were primarily
employed as laborers, machinists, community workers or retail
salesman. A few had acquired some college or post high school
training. They felt that their survival in a city as tough as Phila-
delphia had been made easier by their experience with Umoja.
As with Centro, we believed that the basic notions underlying
Umoja warranted careful evaluation.
Underlying Principles and Cost-Effectiveness Compared to Prison
Though different, these promising programs often shared
common underlying principles. All sought to prevent crime
and delinquency by addressing their causes-by empowering
residents of high-crime communities, improving services or
expanding opportunities for high risk youth, or some combina-
tion. The more youth-oriented programs often worked with
young people in a supportive, nurturing and disciplined set-
ting-for some, an "extended family" sanctuary off the street-
which they regarded as a precondition for healthy individual
development which was notably lacking in the lives of many of
the youth they served. They often viewed improved self-
esteem as a key instrument of change among disadvantaged
youth-a step toward reducing drug abuse and crime, staying
in school, becoming more employable, or recognizing that
manhood or womanhood need not be defined by having a baby
at age 16.
Because these were genuinely preventive programs, more-
over, they also promised to be more enduring and more cost-
effective than the superficial, reactive responses to crime and
drugs that characterized too much of our public policy. They
were certainly less costly. Today, for example, the annual cost
per person is over $30,000 for New York state prisons and
$22,000 for federal maximum-security prisons-but about
$16,000 for Argus and Umoja residents, $13,00 forJob Corps,
$2,000 for Argus nonresidents, and less than $1,000 for Centro
nonresidents.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, some maintained that the
prognosis was next to hopeless for high risk inner city youth -
at least those past preschool age--and that the only alternative
was incarceration. But these programs promised that compre-
hensive solutions could work for teenagers and young adults.
We believed that it was urgent to find out more about how
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effective programs to prevent crime, violence and drug abuse
worked in the inner city-and which worked better than others.
3. THE NEIGHBORHOOD PROGRAM
When the Eisenhower Foundation began its work in the
early 1980s, careful evaluations of preschool programs were in
progress, and the Job Corps was demonstrating consistent suc-
cess. But there were few attempts to see if the principles
underlying successful community-based youth empowerment
programs could be replicated and more carefully evaluated.
We did not seek "cookie cutter" replications of the promising
programs our early thinking. But we did hope that the underly-
ing principles might be implemented in a flexible, locally tai-
lored, reasonably low cost way. If this proved successful, we
thought, then a broader strategy of youth reinvestment could
be tested with inner city community organizations as the grass
roots program operators.
At the same time, the Foundation was aware that neighbor-
hood or block watches and citizen patrols (like the Guardian
Angels) were being popularized in the early 1980s as citizen-
based, non-criminal justice 'ways of reducing crime. Such pro-
grams often were called "community crime prevention" or
"opportunity reduction." That is, they were designed to allow
fewer opportunities for potential offenders to commit crime-
because, for example, neighborhood residents would be organ-
ized to look out for suspicious behavior and report it to police.
Such protective action, it was reasoned, was worthwhile, even
though opportunity reduction didn't really address the under-
lying reasons why offenders were motivated to crime in the first
place, as did youth empowerment programs like Centro,
Fairview, Argus, Umoja and Job Corps. The opportunity
reduction programs typified the national policy stress at the
time on the importance of volunteers, the need for citizen self-
reliance and the potential that "lean and mean" initiatives
could not only compensate for the reduction in federal govern-
ment domestic spending but could actually work better than
past wasteful government programs. However, there were
then few sophisticated evaluations available, especially of block
watches, patrols, and other opportunity reduction efforts in
severely deteriorated inner cities. There was only one carefully
evaluated model of success-a block watch program which
both reduced burglary and fear in a white working and middle
class neighborhood in Seattle.
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Accordingly, we decided to create a demonstration pro-
gram to test the possibilities of both opportunity reduction and
community-based youth empowerment in the inner city. We
began the demonstration with an open mind-wanting to
assess objectively what worked best, and what did not, so that
future inner city programs could build on success-whatever
direction it took us. We sought to apply the ideals of the Ker-
ner and Eisenhower Commissions but tried to be realistic
about both the difficulty of achieving success in the inner city
and the difficulty of measuring success through scientific
evaluation.
The Planning Proces
The Foundation selected 10 inner city non profit commu-
nity organizations in poor urban neighborhoods for the dem-
onstration program-in Baltimore, Boston, the Bronx,
Brooklyn, Cleveland, Miami, Minneapolis, Newark, Philadel-
phia and Washington, D.C.
To test the potential of a "lean and mean" approach, we
kept seed funding to the community groups low-a total of
about $50,000 to $70,000 per organization over a 30 month
program,-for 6 months of planning and 24 months of imple-
mentation. Past programs suggested that this was the minimum
period over which results could be expected. Each inner city
organization was to develop, within broad guidelines, its own
design for tackling crime and violence in its local community.
We called this a "bubble-up," as opposed to a "trickle down,"
process. We sought to empower local organizations to take the
lead in defining anti-crime strategies best suited to their own
capacities and the specific problems and conditions of the com-
munity. We did not ask for traditional proposals from these
groups; instead, they were asked to submit a brief capacity
statement outlining their past "track record" and their ability
to take on an innovative crime-prevention project. Most of the
organizations ultimately selected had considerable experience
in economic development, low-income housing, or youth
services.
Once the 10 community groups had been selected, a com-
munity assessment was undertaken, by outside evaluators. The
assessment provided basic planning information for the pro-
gram and a "baseline" for the evaluation of the program as a
whole. The assessment became a basis for planning the local
program, for it offered a broad picture of the problems seen by
local residents as most pressing. Was drug dealing a major
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problem? Were older people being mugged on the way home
from shopping? Were local businesses threatening to leave
unless the commercial area was made more secure? Through a
series of "mini town meetings," to which all neighborhood res-
idents were invited, the community organizations "bubbled
up" a program tailored to the community's specific needs and
concerns.
The Foundation did not dictate the substance of these pro-
grams, but required only that each organization work within a
broad framework. Most importantly, each program was to
empower youth and so address the causes of crime (for exam-
ple, through employment training and "extended family"
support from mentors and peers). Each was to reduce oppor-
tunities for crime (for example, through civilian block watches,
civilian patrols or police foot patrols). There also was a con-
cern with protecting and involving senior citizens, who were
particularly vulnerable.
Community organizations were free to emphasize youth
empowerment over opportunity reduction, or vice versa. Each
group was required, as well, to develop "financial self-suffi-
ciency," in the sense of creating an ongoing mechanism to
carry on the program for at least 12 months after the initial 30
months of support had ended (for example, through capitaliz-
ing local businesses or learning to be more effective at
fundraising).
Instead of imposing solutions from above, then, we tried
to expand the capacity of inner city nonprofits to come to grips
with local crime problems. In that sense, the Neighborhood
Program also was a test of the capacity of a national private
sector "intermediary" organization (the Foundation) to pro-
vide meaningful support and assistance to diverse local organi-
zations engaged in crime prevention.
All 10 programs were launched in inner-city neighbor-
hoods characterized by relatively low income, most of which
were severely disadvantaged. All but one (Minneapolis) had a
very large minority population. All suffered serious crime
problems and several were increasingly wracked by drug abuse
over the course of the program. They were, in short, tough,
"multi-problem" communities-the kind of communities in
which viable crime prevention programs have traditionally
been difficult to sustain.
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The Locally Created Programs
During the course of the 30 months of the Neighborhood
Program, the community groups "bubbled up" a wide variety
of specific projects. These are only some of them:
Baltimore's Neighborhood Housing Services organization
(NHS), which had been primarily involved in housing
rehabilitation and loan programs, started a youth athletic
league that involved about 250 local youth in structured
recreational activities. With a pressing drug problem in
the community, NHS went on to hold community anti-
drug workshops and crime prevention meetings, in coop-
eration with local police, and to recruit 200 residents as
block watchers.
In Boston, the Dorchester Youth Collaborative (DYC)
used the Neighborhood grant to develop several youth
Prevention Clubs, which enrolled from 40 to 60 "high
risk" young people from the community at any given
point. They operated out of DYC headquarters, which
became a kind of extended family sanctuary. The most
successful groups developed and produced anti-crack
breakdancing performances at many local schools and
events resulting in anti-crack videos which have been
widely distributed. DYC also developed a successful
community and family mediation program.
In the Bronx, the Mid-Bronx Desperadoes Community
Housing Corporation (MBD), with a successful track rec-
ord in community development through housing rehabil-
itation, used the Neighborhood Program grant as a way
of supporting local housing and commercial develop-
ment. MBD launched a successful civilian patrol that,
with police support, operated three evenings a week, as
well as tenant patrols in both MBD's own buildings and
in local public housing. MBD also held crime prevention
seminars for tenants and homeowners, briefly operated
an employment referral service for the neighborhood,
and established several youth activities, including Scout
troops, school drug prevention programs sponsored by
local police, and athletic programs.
In Brooklyn, the Local Development Corporation of East
New York (LDC-ENY), near Bedford-Stuyvesant, also
sought to link crime prevention activities with its existing
emphasis on economic development. LDC-ENY had
been formed to increase industrial job opportunities for
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local residents: it used its Neighborhood Program grant
primarily to develop block-watch associations--establish-
ing 78 of them over the grant period. Later, LDC-ENY
launched a biweekly youth council and an after-school
program for youth which met four days a week.
In Cleveland, the St. Clair-Superior Coalition developed a
court watch program which trained residents to attend
trials and hearings in which neighborhood cases were
heard. It also monitored local police services, organized
several street clubs, and developed a weekly youth
council.
In Minneapolis, the Whittier Alliance used the Neighbor-
hood grant in part to continue its already existing effort
to organize local block clubs, usually maintaining about
thirty clubs at any one time. The program also hired off-
duty police officers in a "summer beat patrol" program
to patrol the neighborhood's commercial strip on sum-
mer evenings. The Alliance worked with the police to
crack down on local prostitution by arresting customers
and publishing their names in the community newspa-
per-an effort that significandy decreased prostitution
arrests in the neighborhood. It targeted commercial
"hot spots"--including two bars where fighting and drug
dealing were rife-by putting pressure on the owners and
the police to improve conditions. A youth director was
hired after 12 months of implementation. Over 200
youth were placed in part-time jobs with local businesses
and residents.
In Philadelphia, the Walnut Hill Community Development
Corporation created a highly regarded victim-witness
assistance program which trained 55 volunteers, in its
first year, to help victims and witnesses negotiate the
criminal court process. It organized 12 block clubs, revi-
talized a "Town Watch" civilian patrol, and, after the res-
ignation of the first program director, later began a youth
council and extensive recreational activities for local
teenagers.
In Washington, D.C., the Neighborhood Program grant
initially was sponsored by Jubilee Housing, a church-
related group mainly engaged in housing rehabilitation
in the Adams-Organ neighborhood. A spin-off organiza-
tion, Around the Comer to the World, developed most
of the anti-crime strategies, which focused strongly on
economic opportunities and cultural awareness for local
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youth. ACW fielded programs in youth leadership train-
ing, cultural programs, and community clean-ups, and,
most ambitiously, launched a housing rehabilitation busi-
ness operated by high risk youth and ex-offenders.
Employees met each week as "team leaders" in an
extended family setting and served as mentors for neigh-
borhood youngsters.
The Evaluation Outcomes
The neighborhood prisons was evaluated by researchers
from Northwestern University, Fordham University, Rutgers
University and the -University of Maryland. The evaluations
asked several questions. Were the programs implemented as
planned? Were any intermediate objectives met? Were they
able to financially sustain operations at least 12 months after
the initial 30 months of funding? Was fear of crime reduced?
Ultimately, were crime, drug abuse or related community
problems reduced among participating youth or on the com-
munity as a whole? Eight out of 10 programs were imple-
mented as planned. [. .. J For the two groups that didn't
implement as planned, in Miami and Newark, the major reason
appeared to be that the overall organization was large and did
not give the anti-crime initiative continuing support at top
levels of management. One result of the relative disinterest by
top management was a turnover among directors of anti-crime
programs.
Not surprisingly, all 8 of the groups which successfully
implemented their workplans achieved at least one if not more
of their intermediate goals-like improved self-esteem among
participating youth, improved social cohesion among residents
in the neighborhood, increased participation among residents
in community activities, or improved perceived quality of life in
the neighborhood.
Before the Neighborhood Program, no national inner city
anti-crime community-based demonstration had incorporated
the "financial self-sufficiency" requirement of continuing on
after initial support. In the Neighborhood Program, all 8 of the
community organizations which successfully implemented their
workplans were able, with assistance from Eisenhower, to con-
tinue on. They raised nearly $300,000 in additional funding
during the thirty months of initial program operations and just
short of $1M thereafter. The largest single success in this
respect was a $250,000 federal grant received by the Founda-
tion for the Washington, DC program to capitalize its home
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repair and weatherization business (about which more in Chap-
ter 4).
In Brooklyn and the Bronx, income from economic devel-
opment helped cover the costs of crime prevention efforts.
Cleveland's St. Clair-Superior organization joined in a working
coalition with 10 other local groups and secured funds from
state and local government as well as private foundations. In
Baltimore, a Self-Help Fund- was established by corporations.
In Boston, almost $200,000 was acquired from government,
foundations, and corporations through traditional fundraising.
Eight of the original 10 programs continued on for more than 3
years after the end of the 30-month Neighborhood Program
grant. For the nonprofits to demonstrate financial self-suffi-
ciency also bought them time. Few anti-crime pr6grams show
measurable results in less than 30 months. Extra resources and
hence extra time might allow the "bugs" to be worked out
later, even if little sucicess is apparent after 30 months. (For
example, Project Redirection, the Ford Foundation teen
mother program discussed later, showed little success after 24
months but clear success after 60 months.)
The most important question of any anti-crime program is
whether it actually reduced crime or related anti-social behav-
ior. Next best, wasfear of crime reduced among neighborhood
residents?
Although, as we shall see in a moment, there were mea-
surement problems, small sample sizes, and limited compari-
son groups, anti-social behavior appeared to most clearly
diminish in Washington, D.C. and Boston-where there was
the greatest sustained focus on empowering youth and the
most consistent attempt to replicate the principles underlying
programs like Job Corps, Argus, Fairview, Centro and Umoja.
This was especially encouraging given the short duration of the
programs and the complex problems of the young people. In
these two initiatives, a priority on youth empowerment was
present from the very beginning. It was not added on towards
the end of the program, as in some of the other communities.
Working with the Eisenhower Foundation, the Washington,
D.C. and Boston groups also leveraged far more resources than
the other groups to continue their anti-crime programs after
the 30 initial months of operations. It may be that the very
nature of sustained youth empowerment-actually addressing
the causes of crime-allowed these community groups and the
Foundation to successfully raise monies. In turn, the greater
level of funding may have helped to achieve success.
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Next best, fear of crime was most clearly down in the
Bronx and Brooklyn, and arrests for prostitution were down in
Minneapolis. These three initiatives implemented a more
intense and sustained focus on opportunity reduction and com-
munity organizing than any of the other sites. Less fear and
fewer arrests do not necessarily mean less crime. But these
positive indicators can help stabilize a neighborhood-and thus
help retain businesses, bring in new investment and generate
economic development. Before the Neighborhood Program,
there were few examples of declines in fear through opportu-
nity reduction in such devastated places as the South Bronx
and East Brooklyn, so the community groups here have broken
new ground. Like most of the neighborhoods in the demon-
stration, the South Bronx, East Brooklyn and Whittier commu-
nities experienced complex changes during the course of the
Neighborhood Program-sometimes adverse ones, including
an increase of drug-related problems in several of them-that
made it difficult to isolate the impact of the programs on over-
all local crime rates.
The other cities in the demonstration experienced less suc-
cess in reducing crime or fear when program neighborhoods
were assessed statistically vis a vis comparison neighborhoods,
although some programs showed slight progress. In compari-
son to Washington, D.C. and Boston, the programs in the
other 8 cities focused more on opportunity reduction-or some
mix of opportunity reduction, victim-witness initiatives and
youth programming. In these 8 cities, the youth programming
was less intense and less multifaceted than the youth empower-
ment of Washington, D.C. and Boston (e.g., athletic leagues
rather than sustained jobs and supportive extended family
settings).
The findings from the Neighborhood Program tend to
converge with those of other recent studies in suggesting that
opportunity reduction programs like neighborhood watch, by
themselves, rarely reduce crime in the inner city. Sometimes,
but only sometimes, do such initiatives reducefear in the inner
city. This is consistent with the conclusion of Northwestern in
its evaluation of the Neighborhood Program that "traditional
strategies [like opportunity reduction] do not work as well in
high crime communities as in more middle class communities."
We will more thoroughly discuss the limitations of conven-
tional opportunity reduction later in this volume. But we also
concluded that proactive citizen patrols and police foot patrols,
in particular, can help support a broader strategy of youth
empowerment and economic development in disadvantaged
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communities. For example, we conclude that tenants should
displace drug dealers from operating in public housing. Yet,
without reduced high school drop out rates, effective job train-
ing, real job opportunity and therefore a vehicle to generate
self-esteem, youth who live in the projects will remain vulnera-
ble to drug abuse and drug market employment. They will sim-
ply walk across the street from the projects to run drugs. But if
block watches and patrols are used to help tenants feel more
safe so that mothers can walk from their apartments to nutri-
tion programs and preschool centers, and if the increased pub-
lic safety encourages corporations and local government to
begin on-site job training leading to placement in permanent
employment, then conventional community crime prevention
makes sense as one part of a larger, more thoughtful and com-
prehensive, plan for an inner city neighborhood.
At the same time, we are more encouraged by the potential
demonstrated by those programs that sought to achieve crime
prevention by developing comprehensive strategies to meet the
multiple needs of disadvantaged youth in their communities-
by providing multiple services in an alternative, "street savvy"
way or by linking youth to new opportunities for meaningful
work in the community. As we will see in more detail later in
this report, our own frustratingly limited-but encouraging-
evidence from the Neighborhood Program on the potential of
these "youth investment" strategies is increasingly backed by
the results of evaluations of several other recent programs, in
addition to those of earlier efforts like Job Corps, Argus and
Fairview Homes. These point to broad underlying principles
which, we believe, should guide new youth investment initia-
tives in the future. Some of those principles can best be illumi-
nated by taking a closer look at the strategies of- youth
investment developed in the Neighborhood Program.
4. YoUTH INVESTMENT IN AcTION: A CLOSER LOOK
To gain some deeper insight into the potentials-and
some of the problems-of inner city community based youth
empowerment programs, and to provide a more tangible sense
of what they attempted and what they accomplished, let's look
more closely at the experience of the two Neighborhood Pro-
gram initiatives which were most intensively devoted to youth
investment-Washington's Around the Corner to the World
(ACW) and Boston's Dorchester Youth Collaborative (DYC).
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ACW: Individual and Community Change Through Youth Enterprise
The Neighborhood Program initiative with the closest
affinity to community-based programs like Centro began
through organization of residents against drug trafficking in the
Adams-Morgan neighborhood of Washington, D.C. in the early
1980s. Called Around the Corner to the World because of the
rich international ethnic mix of the neighborhood, the program
then started several enterprises that employed high risk youths
and ex-offenders. The most promising was a weatherization
and home repair business. As operations developed, the Eisen-
hower Foundation, working closely with ACW, secured a
$250,000 capitalization grant for the business from the federal
Office of Community Services in the Department of Health and
Human Services.
The Adams-Morgan neighborhood is a mixed area of the
city undergoing rapid change, with a largely minority, low-
income population increasingly joined uneasily by more afflu-
ent newcomers. Eisenhower's community assessment found
drugs and drug dealing to be the most serious crime problem
perceived by residents and business people in the area. ACW
emerged, as a recent program statement puts it, "in response
to symptoms and causes of crime and the deterioration of a
sense of community." One section in particular-Reed-
Cooke-had "witnessed dramatic changes resulting from gen-
trification, the breakdown of family structure, the absence of
local leadership, and the hopelessness of poverty that has
grown in the area."
Accordingly, ACW saw its mission as the "empowerment
of the low and moderate income residents," to "revitalize the
spirit of the entire community through a series of programs
designed to promote community unity and youth-focused lead-
ership development." These goals would be accomplished
through programs to develop cross-cultural awareness, civic
involvement to ensure greater control over the decisions affect-
ing the local community, and the economic development that
would provide serious jobs and training for neighborhood
youth in ongoing enterprises designed to meet community
needs. ACW stressed:
Skills training and employment must exist; affordable
business, housing and economic investment options must
be made available; and leadership must be trained to
mobilize and work with citizens for neighborhood self-
reliance. A sense of ownership and self-sufficiency are
intricately tied to self-esteem and community pride.
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Early on, ACW managed to elect a slate of officers to their
District of Columbia Neighborhood Planning Council-which
not only involved youth in local decision making, but helped to
channel some public funds into community youth programs.
By the end of 1985, ACW's civic involvement had expanded to
the point where it had 16 members in elected positions, and
another 5 in appointed positions, in community agencies and
organizations affecting the Adams-Morgan neighborhood.
The heart of the youth program was the development of
the youth businesses-an effort that turned out to be encourag-
ingly successful. The first of them, aptly called DC Doo, pro-
duced compost from horse manure gathered from a local stable
and sold it-20 tons worth in the summer of 1984. The larger
and more complex enterprise was the weatherization busi-
ness-which, during the summer of 1985, hired 11 neighbor-
hood youth full time and weatherized an estimated 4 or 5
houses a week.
In addition to being employed through ACW, workers met
as an extended family peer support group to deal with work
and personal problems in the offices of ACW, which served as a
kind of sanctuary, or place to go off the street. They also
became role models to younger people in the community--
many of whom were being approached by drug dealers.
Measures of Success. Rutgers University evaluated the expe-
rience of 11 high risk young people who were employees of the
business. Information was gathered from police records, inter-
views with participants, ACW staff, community leaders and
business leaders in the neighborhood. When they were initially
employed in the weatherization and housing rehabilitation
business, the workers were between the ages of 18 and 26.
[. . . During the 12 month period before ACW employ-
ment, the young people accumulated 10 arrests. During an 18
month period of ACW employment, there were no arrests.
During the 12 month follow-up after ACW employment, there
were 3. Similarly, [... ] police contacts with these 11 young peo-
ple declined dramatically during the 18 month period of ACW
and continued at about the same low level during the 12 month
period after employment. (Police contacts do not always lead
to arrests.)
During the 12 month period before ACW employment,
only I of the 12 young people was employed or in school.[...]
During the 18 months with ACW, all remained employed.
After this period, most remained employed (by ACW or else-
where) or were in school. Independent living was defined as
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establishing a household independent of the 'individual's par-
ents. [ . .] The number of young people who established
households of their own increased from I to 9 after ACW
participation.
There was no formal control group. But estimates by
Washington, D.C. court personnel are that about 30% of
youths on regular probation are re-arrested-much higher than
for ACW participants (although the latter were somewhat
older). During the period of time, 1983-1988, when the
before-after comparisons were made for the ACW workers, the
violent crime offense rate for the District of Columbia first fell
and then sharply rose, ending slightly higher. The same
occurred for property crime rates for the District as a whole.
The violent and property rate trend also repeated itself over
these years in the 3 Census tracts covering the ACW neighbor-
hood. The increase beginning in the mid-eighties appears
drug related. For example, a Rand Corporation study found
that arrests for drug distribution in the District of Columbia as
a whole increased by 7747o from 1981 to 1986. In sum,
although we were not able to form a scientific comparison
group, the crime involvement of the young adults working for
ACW dropped sharply while a very different pattern was devel-
oping in the neighborhood and District.
Interviews with ACW workers and their supervisors in
1986 found the supervisors agreeing that most workers
improved in several skills. Employees felt that ACW had pro-
vided a supportive environment that encouraged personal
growth and independence; this was felt more strongly by work-
ers who had been in the program a year or more than by those
who had worked for ACW for a shorter time. Many said that
ACW provided new friends with whom they could spend time,
off the job as well as on it, rather than spending most of their
leisure time on the street.
Rutgers found encouraging suggestions that involvement
with the program had several positive impacts on employees'
lives and on the way they perceived their futures. All said the
standard of living for themselves and their families was "much
better" or "better" when they were involved with the program
than before. Seven of 8 interviewed said that what they were
doing for money before joining ACW was "hustling and work-
ing" and 1 said "working and gambling"; after joining, all 8
said "working." Only 3 described themselves as satisfied with
their job skills before ACW; all 8 were satisfied while employed
by ACW.
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All of these workers believed that their jobs with ACW had
helped them get ahead in life while they were with the pro-
gram. Being in the program, moreover, made most of them
more confident that they would go further in school. Before
their participation in ACW, none knew of job opportunities
within the Adams Morgan neighborhood. Before ACW, too,
the majority did not feel confident about their capacity to be
self-sufficient; during their stint with ACW, all became more
confident. Prior to ACW, 6 of these workers said they had sold
drugs at least "a few times"; the same number said they had
never sold drugs during their employment with the program.
These results are illustrated in the comments of a 29 year
old single parent interviewed by the Rutgers researchers. She
had been a former work team leader and also a weatherization
employee with ACW, and had been involved since ACW's
beginning. She now has two children, a 13 year old daughter
and a 10 year old son, who participate in many activities in
ACW's new Skill Development and Learning Center for kids
(see below). She told the Rutgers researchers, "Whenever the
door is open, everyone comes in... and you couldn't find bet-
ter friends than Kevin, Jabali and Darnell" [ACW staff]. This
parent saw ACW as a support network providing extended fam-
ily relationships-an alternative to keep kids off the streets,
help them develop positive attitudes, and dissuade them from
drugs. She described the supports from the program as help-
ing her become more self reliant, and was pleased at having
moved with her children from her parents' home into her own
apartment.
Initially, ACW expected that the weatherization business
would lose money. It didn't. There was a strong local demand
for weatherization work, and the business quickly doubled,
turning a substantial profit while providing over 400 families
with free weatherization services by early 1985.
Rutgers reported that the business generated over
$1,000,000 in contracts locally and provided weatherization,
low-cost home remodeling and energy conservation support to
over 1,000 low income renters, home-owners and nonprofit
corporations. It trained and employed over 60 youth and
young adults from inception in 1985 to 1988.
The success with individual youth in the context of success
with the business led, in turn, to positive change in the Adams-
Morgan community as a whole. A University of Maryland eval-
uation found that 93% of the ACW weatherization customers
surveyed were satisfied with the work done and with the skills
and courteousness of the workers.
1991] YOUTH INVESTMENT AND COMMUNITY RECONSTRUCTION 533
One businessman interviewed by Rutgers concluded that
ACW was "an asset to the Adams-Morgan area"-in part
because its staff had demonstrated skills in finding non-con-
frontational solutions to community crises. A youth added,
"ACW helps Blacks in the community come together to build
individual and collective self-esteem instead of fighting and
doing drugs." Perhaps also related, the Northwestern evalua-
tion concluded that there may have been a slight decrease in
fear among neighborhood residents as a result of ACW's youth
work and its civic involvement. That involvement was carefully
nurtured over time by gaining membership by ACW staff and
trustees on local decision making bodies, like the Adams-Mor-
gan Community Development Corporation, the Police Advi-
sory Committee and the Neighborhood Planning Council. The
ACW Executive Director said that "our whole civic involve-
ment has become much more sophisticated-to enfranchise
those who had been disenfranchised in our community."
Expanded community involvement also was expressed
through the ACW Skill Development and Learning Center for
neighborhood kids, begun after the business. The Center
works with an average of 100 children and young people dur-
ing any one year to provide tutoring and skills development in
photography, computer and graphics, silk screen printing, pho-
tography, karate, modem dance and newsletter production.
Other social and cultural events, which include trips to local
museums, picnics, swimming, skating and other special events,
help to foster growth and strengthen communication skills.
In 1988, ACW entered into a co-development agreement
with the Hilltop Tenant Association, and the Adams Morgan/
Mt. Pleasant Community Development Corporation to con-
tinue efforts to organize tenants and attract resources for a $2.5
million dollar project to purchase and convert a 24 unit rental
property into a tenant owned low yield cooperative. ACW
agreed to perform a substantial portion of the rehabilitation.
Individual and Community Change. ACW, more than any
other non-profit community group in the Neighborhood Pro-
gram, was able to demonstrate success, including fewer arrests
with a cohort of specific at-risk youth as well as success, in the
community as a whole, including consumer satisfaction and
improved housing stock. The cause and effect relationships
between individual change and community change seemed to
work both ways. Individual change helped create community
change-as when employees not only became less involved in
anti-social behavior themselves but also repaired the physical
environment and mentored kids away from drug dealers. Corn-
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munity change helped create individual change-as when posi-
tive perceptions of ACW by residents and businessmen made it
easier to begin the Skill Development and Learning Center,
which targeted specific children. In this focus on creating both
individual and community change, ACW most resembles
Puerto Rico's Centro Sister Isolina Ferre, among the programs
from which we originally drew underlying principles. To date,
very few public or private sector programs have been able to
demonstrate the simultaneous individual and community suc-
cess of Centro and ACW. Yet both are needed. [...]
ACW continues to confront many problems, with the big-
gest difficulties being the stop-start funding of contracts from
local government and the reluctance of many funders to con-
tinue support past the demonstration stage. But, as the Uni-
versity of Maryland evaluation concluded, ACW offers
important clues on "how economic and human capital develop-
ment... can both be pursued, without either having to be sacri-
ficed for the other."
DYC: Working Hands-on With Troubled Youth
The Dorchester Youth Collaborative (DYC) was estab-
lished in the late 1970s, in a low-income, rapidly changing Bos-
ton neighborhood-racially and ethnically mixed, with large
Hispanic, Black and White populations. DYC aimed to provide
nontraditional services, activities, and advocacy for local youth
deemed to be at high risk of delinquency, teen pregnancy,
school failure and substance abuse-youth who were not being
adequately served by more conventional social service
agencies.
Given its existing commitment to youth services, an impor-
tant part of DYC's ambitious effort under the Neighborhood
Program grant involved the organization of at-risk young peo-
ple into Youth Crime Prevention Clubs. The Clubs were
designed to steer neighborhood youth away from the lures of
street life and into structured activities to help them develop
self-esteem, stay in school or find other educational alterna-
tives. DYC youth use the space of the center as a physical sanc-
tuary from the streets-an extended family that provides
"positive role models for the youth in contrast to what was
most visible to them on a daily basis."
The demand for the Clubs was much stronger than antici-
pated. Within two weeks of the program start-up, over 50
neighborhood youth had become involved in the Prevention
Clubs. Within a few months 4 Clubs had been established-2
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for boys, I for girls, and I mixed. Although DYC had planned
an elaborate recruitment process to pull young people into the
Clubs, it turned out not to be necessary; they flocked into the
Clubs on their own, usually drawn through word of mouth.
The Prevention Clubs offered a range of structured activi-
ties and projects for and by youth whose lives outside the pro-
gram were often chaotic and insecure, some of whom had little
going for them beyond street hustling and drugs. The 2 all-
boys Clubs took part in a basketball league, and "for the major-
ity of the participants it had been their first experience in
organized sports." The girls' Club formed a performing dance
group. The mixed club, perhaps the most popular, formed a
breakdance group, the Electric Generation-also racially inte-
grated-which focused its message on "freedom from drugs,
freedom from crime, and racial harmony."
The Electric Generation performed widely-at hundreds
of events throughout Boston (schools, hospitals, churches,
senior centers, on radio and television) and at a benefit in
Washington, D.C., sponsored by the Eisenhower Foundation.
The anti-drug rap routines have been recorded on a video,
"Stand Back From Crack," which has been distributed nation-
ally and which helped lead to a gang and drug abuse preven-
tion grant from the federal Administration on Children, Youth
and Families.
Several things are noteworthy about the character of these
Clubs. "From the beginning," as Northwestern University's
evaluation of the DYC program points out, "these groups were
racially integrated and bilingual," "about equally divided
between Whites, Blacks and Hispanics." The kids really do
relate to one another, as any observer who spends a day hang-
ing around the DYC headquarters can attest. There is a con-
stant flow of young people in and out, with hugs, handshakes,
amusement and good will.
This was a significant achievement in a community which-
like all too many others in urban America-has been wracked
by frequent racial conflict among its youth. As the evaluation
notes,
The Dorchester community had a very heterogeneous
racial composition and racial tensions were a major prob-
lem. Developing an integrated youth program was an
important goal, rarely tried by other agencies, and an
important accomplishment.
Moreover, a substantial proportion of the youth were
extremely "high risk"-"basically street kids," as the evalua-
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tion puts it; kids who not only faced severe family problems,
drug abuse and school failure but who had also been hard to
involve in structured activities of any kind in the past. The
level of deprivation many of them faced was extreme.
An example: the youth were supposed to check in daily
with the DYC director; when they did they were offered a
snack. The evaluation notes,
Originally, food was used partly to attract youth to the
program, but it was quickly clear to staff that the availa-
bility of food was essential to the youth. For many, the
cereal or other snack which they received at DYC was
their first meal of the day, especially near the end of the
month when food supplies at home became depleted.
It is not by chance, we think, that proper nutrition also is key to
successful preschool and early intervention program for
younger kids.
At any rate, the demand for the Clubs was highly encour-
aging. Indeed the Prevention Clubs could have enrolled more
youth than they did-if the program had been able to hire
enough staff. Early on, DYC met its initial objective of launch-
ing 5 clubs, and "in fact more youth were interested in partici-
pating in the program but there were not enough staff
members to handle an increase in Club members." In particu-
lar, it proved difficult to recruit and retain adult leaders for the
Clubs. Given the minimal level of early funding, DYC
depended on volunteers for this essential job; and though it
provided a small stipend, "even with stipends it was difficult to
find qualified volunteers." The job was complex and demand-
ing; it involved "counseling, group work supervision of per-
formances, transportation, and monitoring of participants"-
all, again, with a difficult clientele. Unsurprisingly, there was
frequent turnover and burnout among the Club leaders and
other DYC staff. Finding new ones was hampered not only by
the general lack of money but by the "shortage of professionals
in the field."
Belonging to the Clubs meant abiding by clearly defined
rules-no drugs, no crime or police contacts, no dropping out
of school, no serious problems with parents. Initially, DYC
hoped to closely monitor each youth, preferably on a daily
basis, in order to provide a continuous source of guidance and
support. But that proved impossible to do, again because of
insufficient funds to support such a staff-intensive job. Though
DYC did manage to help some youth find temporary shelter in
extreme family crises, "the limited staff and the need to main-
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tain activity levels for as many youth as possible seemed to
override the goal of the more formal monitoring system."
Northwestern observed that the youth Clubs were well
implemented-despite the lack of resources; and that they had
succeeded in attracting their target group of high-risk street
youth developing interracial activities, providing the youth with
opportunities to develop and exhibit positive skills, and in
"mainstreaming" them into activities in which many had never
before participated. The program "filled an important gap in
local youth programs, between those which were designed for
youth who were 'basically going to make it anyway'.. .and those
which were designed for youth already caught up in the crimi-
nal justice system." Unlike other agencies, DYC managed to
deal with the "street culture" of these youth, while (as one
respondent put it) "mainstreaming them into normal adoles-
cents," where they had before been "just on the fringes."
In spite of insufficient funds for an ambitious program fac-
ing great need, DYC still was more successful than most Neigh-
borhood programs in raising self-sufficiency monies to
continue on after initial Eisenhower support. Over the years,
DYC gained the respect of local Boston funders. To illustrate,
in 1990 a fund raising luncheon for DYC was held at the
Harvard Club, attended by many local foundations and
corporations.
Measures of Success. Researchers from Rutgers evaluated the
high-risk youth who went through DYC. They were able to col-
lect considerable information on the youth who participated in
the program, both at intake and periodically thereafter. They
collected this information on 22 youth, of whom 9 also were
interviewed at length. Their findings, though frustratingly lim-
ited, are encouraging. [... I
The youth studied were all between ages 12 and 19. 95%
were from low-income families, 77% from single-parent fami-
lies. Four of the 22 were homeless. About two-thirds were
male; 13 were Hispanic, 6 Black and 3 White. According to the
Rutgers evaluation, at intake 16 of the youth were involved in
what DYC defined as "community problems"-that is, violent
behavior, truancy, vandalism, graffiti, theft, and other behavior
that could lead to the possibility of arrest. After entering DYC,
only 6 were. At intake, 13 of the 22 had been involved with
drugs or alcohol; 10 of those 13 remained drug free during
their involvement with DYC. There were no pregnancies
among the young women studied, in a neighborhood where
teen pregnancy rates are estimated to be quite high. Three of 6
youth who had dropped out of school prior to joining the clubs
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were "reintegrated" into either traditional or alternative
schooling.
Although a formal control group of youth proved impossi-
ble to find, comparisons to Boston as a whole and to
Dorchester provide some helpful perspective. During the
period in which the DYC youth cohort was tracked (1983-
1987), Boston's annual school dropout rate averaged 16%
(18% among Blacks and Hispanics), according to the Boston
Public Schools' Office of Research and Development. Among
the DYC enrollees, 28% had dropped out before or shortly
after joining the program. Program staff convinced more than
half of the dropouts to return to school. Overall the dropout
rate among the participants fell to 14%, slightly lower than the
City's average rate-a promising finding given the especially
high risk population DYC enrolled.
Dorchester District Court statistics showed that 27% of the
DYC enrollees had been arrested at least once, and they con-
tinued to have problems with the law even after joining the
program, so that the number arrested after joining decreased
only to 23%. While this decline is somewhat disappointing, it
is important to realize that during this same period, the
number of juvenile arrests in the Dorchester community had
increased by 63%, from 386 in 1983 to 628 in 1987, according
to the Boston Police Department.
A 1988 survey of Boston school children, conducted by the
Rocky Mountain Behavioral Studies Institute, showed that, by
the time children have reached the 9th grade, at least one third
will have tried drugs (virtually half among those who have
reached the 12th grade). We do not know what the proportion
is among students who have dropped out of school-who are
more representative of the DYC cohort-but it is reasonable to
assume that it is significantly higher. The Rutgers evaluation
reported that 59% of the DYC cohort had abused drugs or
alcohol (that is, they were more than occasional users) upon
entry into the program. Through 1988, 77% of the partici-
pants had managed to stay away from any form of substance
abuse. This is particularly significant because the interviews by
Rutgers showed that three-quarters of these at-risk participants
had strong peer involvement in and fascination with drugs.
Many of the youth interviewed by Rutgers believed that
the program had made an important, and positive, difference in
their lives. One "credits DYC with saving his life"; another, a
founding member of a DYC-sponsored rap group which is
heavily involved in community anti drug activities, told the
researchers that before he joined DYC "my opportunities con-
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sisted of shooting drugs, gang-banging, selling dope, stealing
and killing." The researchers profiled one DYC youth they call
"William":
When William' first came to DYC four years ago to
join the break dance troupe, he was fifteen. At that time
he had a drug problem with marijuana and crack. He
also sold crack and was heavily involved in gang activi-
ties... He became violent very easily and at one point
threw a cinder block through the back window of a taxi-
cab, trying to hit the passenger.
The DYC staff continued to counsel and work with
William during this period. At no point did the staff tell
William that he could not attend the center or continue
to participate in DYC activities... After a year of inter-
mittent involvement, William dropped out of the center
for 2 years, and during this period was arrested four
times: twice for possession of drugs (crack) with intent to
distribute, once for assault, and once for resisting arrest
and physically assaulting a police officer. William admit-
ted that he was "high" each time he was arrested.
After his last arrest, William called DYC for assist-
ance. He decided to rejoin DYC and make the attempt to
redirect his life. He is proud of the fact that he broke his
crack habit "cold turkey," without outside assistance.
During the last two years he has been drug free, main-
tained steady employment and experienced no arrest or
incidences of violence. William is a founding member of
the DYC-sponsored anti-drug rap group, "One Nation,"
and he attends the center daily. His future plans are to
complete high school and go on to college.
Rutgers emphasizes that not every Prevention Club partici-
pant offers that kind of "success story"; not all "matured out"
of serious trouble. But Rutgers concluded that the program
"has unquestionably impacted in a positive and dramatic man-
ner on the lives of the young people we interviewed":
While we do not have an adequate comparison
group, it is important to recognize that these participants
entered the program in their pre-and early teens. Six
already had been arrested prior to their participation.
They were approaching a time when "anti-social" behav-
ior would be more likely to occur, not less likely... It
appears that the program provided a structured yet sup-
portive environment, during a turbulent time of life in a
difficult neighborhood. Many of those interviewed talked
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about DYC being a family, sometimes more of a family
than the people they lived with.
DYC also ran family mediation counseling for people in
the neighborhood. Although the mediation was not as central
to the work funded by Eisenhower as the Prevention Clubs, it
did serve as one program component. Over the mid-1980s the
mediation program expanded the number of clients served
while it consistently reached agreements among clients in
about 759 or more of all the cases mediated.
By 1990, DYC was negotiating purchase of a much larger
building for its headquarters, including a recording studio for
new anti-drug videos, a practice stage for the performing
groups to develop their acts, and a computer learning center.
A new partnership also was developing with the Boston Police,
who committed to community-based policing and possible
police mini stations in the neighborhood.
5. PRACTICAL STREET LEVEL LESSONS
From the beginning, the Neighborhood Program was
designed to explore what worked best to reduce crime and
drug abuse in inner cities. In turn, we planned to use this
accumulating knowledge to help design the next generation of
demonstrations that would build on the successes-and learn
from the failures--of the earlier generation. The experience of
the original influences on our programming-like Job Corps,
Argus and Fairview-along that of our replications-like
Around the Corner to the World, the Dorchester Youth Collab-
orative, the Mid-Bronx Desperadoes and the Local Develop-
ment Corporation of East New York-has given us a great deal
to work with as we move toward that next generation of pro-
grams-and as we think about what national-level policies will
be most appropriate for the inner cities in the coming years.
The overriding lesson from the Neighborhood Program is
that, like Head Start for children, multiple solutions can be suc-
cessfully applied to reduce the multiple problems of high risk
youth.
Comprehensive community-based programs providing
both needed services and real opportunities for the young can
be among the most effective-and cost-effective--strategies to
reduce crime, violence and drug abuse in the inner city.
But we have also learned that some kinds of programs and
strategies are more cost-effective than others in their relevance
to national policy. Among the lessons we have learned through
hands-on, day-to-day, street level implementation are these:
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1. Inner city non-profit organizations can be effi-
cient as the lead institutions to implement youth invest-
ment and community reconstruction.
2. Technical assistance increases the odds for
success.
3. It is folly to expect success without adequate
resources and facilities-"lean and mean" doesn't work
very well.
4. Volunteerism is being oversold in the inner city.
5. Public sector agencies, including the police, have
a crucial role in supporting community-based programs.
6. "Block watch," "neighborhood watch" and other
conventional community crime prevention tactics are
sharply limited in the inner city.
7. Higher standards of evaluation are needed to bet-
ter guide program strategies and national policy, espe-
cially given the drug crisis and recent increases in crime
rates.
Inner City Non-Profits Can Be Effiient as the Lead Institutions to
Implement Youth Investment and Community
Reconstruction
In spite of grossly inadequate resources, non-profit inner
city organizations usually proved to be effective, sensitive and
imaginative, we found, as the institutions that implement youth
empowerment and other strategies on a day-to-day basis in the
inner city. They often surpass for-profit organizations, busi-
ness oriented coalitions (like Private Industry Councils) and
government bureaucracies-as vehicles for change that are in
closer touch with the people.
But a commitment must be made to expand the capacity of
existing non-profits which undertake social development and
youth empowerment. And the number of such organizations
must be substantially increased if they are to have more
national impact. It is clear from the Eisenhower experience
that we cannot expect to tackle the wider, deepening problems
of crime and drug abuse in America's cities on a shoestring---or
in the short run.
Some of the community groups in the Neighborhood Pro-
gram were social service and youth organizations-like the
DYC. Others were physical economic development and hous-
ing rehabilitation organizations-like the Mid-Bronx Despera-
does Community Housing Corporation. We were able to
demonstrate that successful workplan implementation, youth
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empowerment, and crime or fear reduction can be accom-
plished by both types of organizations. This could have been
more easily predicted with social service organizations like
DYC-in that youth empowerment and drug and crime preven-
tion are "softer" goals consistent with their experience. But
the integration of these goals into "harder" housing rehabilita-
tion organizations demonstrated that social and economic
development are not at all incompatible within the same organ-
ization. (Such integration was not 100 per cent successful-as,
for example, with one economic development organization,
where staff was not entirely comfortable with youth "hanging
around" the offices.)
Success among both types of groups-social and economic
development-therefore adds to the number of community
organizations which can be tapped in future youth empower-
ment programs. The economic development organizations are
especially capable of partially financing ongoing youth empow-
erment, remedial education, employment training, drug pre-
vention and crime prevention from stable income streams, like
housing syndication (as was the case with the Mid-Bronx
Desperadoes).
Among the 10 inner city organizations in the Neighbor-
hood Program, success in implementing workplans sometimes
appeared to be more frequent among smaller-sized institutions
than among larger, multipurpose groups. For example,
because the Walnut Hill Community Development Organiza-
tion in Philadelphia was a young and modest sized organiza-
tion, the program became an important part of its objective and
there was great motivation among staff and trustees to success.
At times, multi-service organizations with large budgets, as in
Miami and Newark, seemed to let crime prevention become
lost within many other priorities, which received more atten-
tion from top managers and trustees. The lesson for funders is
that small is not necessarily cost-ineffective and that youth
investment programming can simultaneously be a means to
expand institutional capacity.
Technical Assistance Increases the Odds for Success
The Northwestern evaluators concluded that a key reason
for the success of the inner city organizations in implementing
the Foundation's Neighborhood Program across the nation was
the Foundation's capacity to provide technical assistance, which
usually is not available in an adequate form at the local level.
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For example, the Foundation raised $559,000 in start up
money for the 10 inner city programs and later helped raise
$1,272,000 more to continue the 8 successfully implemented
programs after 30 months of planning and operations. The
Foundation funded and sponsored the needs assessment-and
then facilitated the grass roots, "bubble up" planning process,
including town meetings, whereby citizens tailored strategies to
documented needs at each location. A technical assistance
Guidebook summarized other existing programs from which
ideas could be drawn.
Eisenhower helped guide implementation through site vis-
its and paid for the consulting expenses of persons needed on-
site to assist local program directors. The most popular form
of technical support consisted of national cluster workshops,
held periodically so all program directors could exchange
experiences and "war stories." Over 30 months, the Founda-
tion sent 74 technical assistance mailings to all. 10 sites, pro-
vided 79 instances of site specific technical assistance and
responded to 115 requests for assistance. The staff had not
expected the breadth of information requested nor the contin-
ued need for assistance. Implementation monitoring by the
Foundation sought to insure that local milestones were
reached. [... ]
Northwestern found that the need for technical assistance
provided by a national intermediary did not seem to diminish
as a local program developed. "In many of the Neighborhood
Program communities, the local organization continued to
evolve crime prevention strategies and to request assistance in
their new efforts."
Eisenhower itself did not have sufficient resources for all
the technical assistance which appeared necessary. For exam-
ple, a need often remained for management training of com-
munity organization executive directors and anti-crime staffers,
as well as for more specialized training for specific staffers-as
in how to better link up on-the-job skill acquisition with com-
puterized remedial education and job placement.
Neighborhood Program directors embraced the "bubble
up" planning process-because it provided flexibility to truly
target local problems and allowed people to develop a personal
stake in the program working. They appreciated not having to
respond to a "top down" "request for proposal"-the usual
format, for example, by which the federal government speci-
fies, in detail, what a locality must say to stand a chance of
receiving money.
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However, in retrospect, and given limited resources, the
Foundation allowed community organizations to try too much.
There was so much "bubble up" that some programs were
watered down. For example, in some cases there were rela-
tively unfocused mixes of opportunity reduction, superficial
youth programs and victim-witness initiatives. Based on the
evaluation findings, we will continue to encourage local creativ-
ity in the future, but also require a stronger focus on the under-
lying principles that appear most effective, based on our
experience and other evaluations.
It Is Folly to Expect Success Without Adequate
Resources and Facilities
The day-to-day realities of implementing the Neighbor-
hood Program showed the shortcomings of the rhetoric of the
1980s that "leaner and meaner" inner city initiatives could be
more effective. The initial Neighborhood Program budgets of
$50,000 to $70,000, total, for 30 months, meant that program
directors were paid between $15,000 and $25,000 per year and
usually served as the only full time salaried crime and drug pre-
vention staff. Yet a pervasive theme in the evaluation was that
these resources were insufficient to accomplish the multiple
tasks of the organizations.
This isn't surprising, given the depth of the problems
these community groups sought to address. Over and over
again, programs were frustrated, hampered, and sometimes
stillborn because of insufficient funds for more paid staff, the
absence of qualified, trained people to hire even had the funds
been available, lack of space for program activities, and lack of
money to pay for the most basic, essential supplies.
Even the two groups with which the Eisenhower Founda-
tion was most successful in leveraging continuation financing,
ACW and DYC, faced financial difficulties and constraints,
especially as they tried to expand their activities. One reason is
the cutback of government funds over the 1980s at all levels for
inner city drug prevention and social development, combined
with the inability of private corporations to take up the slack.
Another is that public and private funders often lose interest in
financing successful operations after initial demonstrations
show success.
In East New York, despite help from several Vista volun-
teers, the project was "overwhelmed by the work," as a staff
member put it: "There's too many things to do at one time;
block organizing, clean-ups, meetings, fundraisers, the after-
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school program and cleaning the office." Several programs
had trouble hiring, and even more trouble retaining, project
directors-in part, as the evaluation notes, because of the "low
salaries offered." In Philadelphia, the Walnut Hill program
had only one staff member for the first 10 months of program
operations; the first project director "received a betterjob offer
and resigned" after a few months' work, as did the coordinator
of an anti-crime and fear program for senior citizens. The pro-
gram's executive director commented that, "With nonprofits,
it's terrible. The pay is so low, especially for professional peo-
ple. They'll do it when they don't have other opportunities,
but when something better comes up you can't blame them for
taking it."
These limitations had a fundamental impact on the charac-
ter of many programs. According to the Northwestern evalua-
tion, in Philadelphia the constant turnover of staff made it more
difficult to maintain the momentum of the program and to
develop a coherent framework within which program activities
could be developed. In some instances, the program seemed
to develop more in response to external conditions than to the
internal plan of the crime prevention program for Walnut Hill.
In the Mid-Bronx program, a well planned employment
information and referral service folded after a few months of
operation, because there was insufficient staff available to run it
and the economic-development specialist who served as its
director left after a few months, with no one hired to take her
place. An after-school program designed by Around the Cor-
ner to the World, similarly, never got off the ground because
no one had "sufficient time for the many tasks involved in
implementing a new program." ACW's youth leadership pro-
gram had the advantage, albeit a small one, of one full-time
member who was paid a stipend when project funds permitted,
and of being able to draw on specific skills in local economic
development possessed by some of the community residents on
ACW's advisory committee.
The low level of funding also meant that most programs
had to cope with a lack of basic materials-vans, cars, recrea-
tion and office space. The Mid-Bronx Desperadoes' successful
civilian patrol was forced to plan its coverage of the neighbor-
hood depending on whether it was able to borrow someone's
car. The lack of a vehicle on a steady basis meant that the
patrol was mainly on foot, which naturally limited its range.
"One member had voluntarily used his car for several weeks,"
the site evaluation notes; "after a while, however, he became
reluctant to continue this as no other member used his/her car
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for patrolling." Another member donated a car to the patrol,
but it needed repairs and insurance, and "the project director
was still in the process of completing these arrangements at the
end of the grant period."
Most youth programs required more space for "drop-in
traffic" that could be used on a daily basis. This was consistent
with the need for physical sanctuary that programs like Centro,
Argus and Umoja view as essential to shelter youth from the
chaos of inner city streets and drug dealing. Accordingly,
almost all program directors had to find additional space,
beside that available to the parent organization, for youth pro-
gramming. Availability of space varied, depending at times on
the willingness and the availability of local institutions to pro-
vide access without charging fees.
Volunteerism Is Being Oversold for the Inner City
It was hoped that the programs could make up for the pau-
city of formal resources and paid staff by drawing heavily on
volunteer efforts from community residents. And the pro-
grams did indeed make creative and extensive use of volun-
teers. What is clear, however, is that creative efforts
notwithstanding, a reliance on volunteerism is no substitute for ade-
quately resourced programs and adequately rewarded and trained staff.
Toda'y there is a widespread call for a return to the spirit of
volunteerism in addressing America's urban problems. While
we're sympathetic to the sentiment behind that approach, our
experience-and it is by now extensive-tells us that while vol-
unteers may be very helpful in the context of a well-designed
and resourced program, volunteerism is crucially limited as a
response to inner city problems-particularly given the nature
of the communities that are hardest-hit by crime, youthful
alienation and drug abuse.
A first problem found in many sites was a sheer inability to
recruit a stable pool of inner city volunteers for program activi-
ties. Sometimes, this seemed to be mainly because most of
those who might have been qualified for the tasks needed paid
employment rather than volunteer work. The East New York
program, for example, planned a volunteer subway station
watch, to be trained and supported by the New York City
Police, in response to residents' fears about crime at two local
stations. But "despite considerable efforts, they had little suc-
cess in getting volunteers. The project director attributed the
lack of response to residents' need for paid work, as opposed to
volunteer work, and the possible danger involved." In the
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Mid-Bronx, according to the evaluation, "recruitment of volun-
teers appeared to be an almost constant activity for the pro-
gram"-and one which therefore drew off an inordinate
amount of the limited time and energy of the paid staff.
Despite these constant efforts, volunteer participation in
most program activities fluctuated unevenly. A particular prob-
lem was that turnover among neighborhood residents made it
difficult to maintain "both tenant associations and tenant
patrols." Patrols would start up and work actively for a short
time, then peter out unless they were re-activated by specific
incidents in the neighborhood.
It was not surprising, then, that with some exceptions it
appeared to be easier to recruit and retain volunteers in less
disadvantaged neighborhoods. One example is the Whittier
program in Minneapolis, formed in a community 86% white
and with higher levels of education than most other program
sites. The Minneapolis program maintained a relatively high
level of volunteer participation, especially on its active advisory
board, but as Northwestern evaluation notes, volunteers there
were "predominantly white, relatively young and well-edu-
cated." Even so, the Whittier Alliance had some difficulty
recruiting volunteers because of the high level of transiency in
the Whittier area. At the Cleveland, St. Clair-Superior Coali-
tion, similarly,-most of the volunteers for the program's court
watch effort were "white, senior women."
Drawing in effective volunteers is difficult even in more
advantaged communities. For example, a 1989 national Wash-
ington Post-ABC poll found 85% of the respondents agreeing
that "very few would be willing to join a community group
against the drug problem."
Getting volunteers was all the more difficult in the poorest
neighborhoods. The fact that they are resource-poor to begin
with is part of the reason why they are faced with the problems
of crime, drugs and deterioration of community life in the first
place. In Philadelphia, some staff noted the special difficulty of
recruiting volunteers because of the high proportion of female-
headed households in the neighborhood. This meant that
many women in the community would already have their hands
more than full coping with family and work; it also reflected an
often-noted decline of available working-age men in many dis-
advantaged inner city neighborhoods. Many Neighborhood
Program sites found it particularly difficult to recruit male vol-
unteers, and indeed in many projects the majority of volunteers
were women. But it was still not easy to recruit women on a
stable basis, either, in poor communities where substantial pro-
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portions of local women were hard-pressed and already
overburdened.
These recruiting difficulties meant that many organizations
that had hoped to run some of their programs by relying heav-
ily on volunteers were sorely disappointed. In East New York,
though neighborhood youth responded eagerly to an after-
school program, it turned out to be very difficult to get their
parents involved. Our community group had hoped that parent
volunteers would take some of the load off the program staff
and Vista workers, and more generally that "parents would
become involved in the crime prevention program through
their children." But only one parent volunteered to help with
the after school program, and few contributed to fundraisers
sponsored by the Vista workers to buy supplies for the pro-
gram. Other carefully evaluated programs in high-crime neigh-
borhoods, like the national Violent Juvenile Offender Program,
have experienced similar problems in mobilizing volunteers.
It wasn't only other commitments or lack of energy that
kept potential volunteers away from many Eisenhower neigh-
borhood program activities. In several sites, the program
launched projects-like civilian patrols or block organizing
against drug-dealing and youth crime-that were inherently
dangerous, and were made more so, as we'll see below, because
offenders and drug dealers, far from being outsiders to the com-
munity being organized, often were local residents them-
selves-living on the same block, perhaps with eyes and ears at
block meetings. In general, much of the job of achieving public
safety in these high-risk communities-a job often unreflec-
tively thought to be especially appropriate for volunteers-is
tough and dangerous work, which can put participants in real
peril. That fact underscores our next lesson-the need for bet-
ter linkage of community programs with police and other for-
mal public services.
Public Sector Agencies, Including the Police, Have a Crucial Role in
Supporting Community-Based Programs
The other side of the limits to volunteerism is the great-
and often underappreciated-importance and potential of the
public sector in supporting inner city youth investment, eco-
nomic development and crime prevention. The taxpaying citi-
zen should remember that perhaps the two most cost-effective
national crime prevention programs ever created-Head Start
and Job Corps-are in the public sector.
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Following in the community and youth empowerment tra-
dition, Eisenhower's initial approach tended to emphasize the
need to develop locally-based institutions that would be in
some ways alternatives to public institutions in the cities; partly
because of the high cost of public services, in an age of fiscal
constraint, but partly also because of the widespread sense, at
all points of the political spectrum, that many urban public
agencies, from schools through police to city government, were
inadequately serving the people of the inner city. We continue,
of course, to stress the enormous potential of grassroots, "self.
help" efforts. But our experience also affirms the vital role of
public services, as Head Start and Job Corps underscore.
Most of the Neighborhood Program sites made important
and sometimes extensive use of the resources and expertise
offered by public and semipublic agencies, from the federal
government down to neighborhood planning councils. With-
out that help, the programs could not have accomplished what
they did. This suggests that in the future, we should strive to
make the linkages between community-based organizations
and public institutions even stronger and more consistent. As
will be noted later, some foreign countries, like France, are far
ahead of the U.S. in forming community, public and private
coalitions at the local level to combat drugs and crime.
Several neighborhood sites used VISTA workers to fill
staff functions, including Cleveland, Minneapolis and especially
Brooklyn, where several Vistas were usually at work at any one
time. In Brooklyn, indeed, the Vistas were crucial; according to
Northwestern, without them the program "would not have
been able to complete the extensive work on block organiz-
ing," and it is unlikely that it could have developed its after-
school center, open four days per week, without the Vista work-
ers-especially "given the lack of adult volunteers." The Vista
workers, however, according to the various site reports, were
sometimes inadequately prepared or trained to take on some of
the multiple and complicated tasks the programs called for.
What this suggests is that there may be great potential for a
stable source of nationally funded workers to aid nonprofit
organizations in the cities-but any new National Service pro-
gram will need to boost their level of training and support.
Several local programs prospered by developing solid
working relations with a wide range of public agencies. In
Washington, D.C., all of ACW's entrepreneurial projects for
neighborhood youth were done in conjunction with govern-
mental agencies and/or other local organizations-including
the U.S. Park Service, the District of Columbia Energy Office
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and the Major's Summer Youth Program. The most successful
of the projects, the weatherization business, was only fully
launched via the $250,000 capitalization grant from the federal
Office of Community Services-which not only enabled the
business itself to prosper but enabled it to support other pro-
gram activities.
The availability of public capital of this kind is especially
crucial for inner-city community organizations, because private
capital, in these "risky" neighborhoods, is often almost impos-
sible to obtain. When it is committed, the capital primarily
flows at market or above market rates, for projects that can be
easily liquidated-such as real estate and other types of physi-
cal development.
Police. Working relations with local police departments in
many communities significantly bolstered the efforts of the
nonprofit organizations. In the Bronx, the police worked regu-
larly with the Mid-Bronx Desperadoes, providing training and
support for patrol volunteers, sponsoring an Explorer Scout
troop for local youth, and establishing police-sponsored sub-
stance abuse programs in local schools. In Minneapolis, the
Whittier Alliance, with donations from a number of local busi-
nesses, hired off-duty police officers as a Summer Beat Patrol to
police the area's main business sections several evenings a
week. The Police Department did most of the administrative
work for' this program, which resulted in increased prostitution
arrests and an apparent decrease in fear of crime in the area.
Police in Whittier also served on the program's advisory com-
mittee and task forces and provided information on local crime
conditions; in turn, the program helped the police develop bet-
ter referral systems for dealing with non-police matters.
But it seems clear that the nature and severity of the crime
problem in many inner city communities calls for an even more
carefully developed relationship between community organiza-
tions and police. Neighborhood Program experience suggests
that this is especially crucial because of the increasing role of
drugs dealing in the life of the inner city. In East New York, for
example, it was sometimes difficult to do the work of block
organizing effectively because of the threat of harassment or
retaliation by drug dealers. According to the program's direc-
tor, the drug dealers have become aware of the East New York
Crime and Fear Prevention Program and use their best efforts
to intimidate Vistas and people in blocks who appear to be
cooperating with the Vistas' block organizing efforts. Most of
the Vistas refuse to go on certain blocks in fear of their per-
sonal safety.
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In Washington, D.C., Jubilee Housing, the original spon-
sor of the program that later was taken over by Around the
Corner to the World, initially took a hard-line approach to
drug dealing. Dealers were evicted from Jubilee buildings. But
there was some concern and even resentment among residents
who felt that they were "being asked to take on the responsibil-
ities of police officers in the issue of drug dealing," and that the
police "were not providing the same services to the Adams-
Morgan community as they did to other communities. Empha-
sizing the importance of stronger backup from the police of
community-based anti-crime work, one resident pointed out
that, after all, "we don't wear badges, the police do." Many
thought it was too dangerous to ask residents to engage in anti-
drug surveillance in a community with such a serious and per-
vasive drug-sales problem. At issue, in short, is where the
responsibility for public safety falls, and how much of that
responsibility can realistically or legitimately be expected of
groups of ordinary citizens-who are not only not trained to
cope with dangerous situations but also, of course, pay taxes to
support public agencies which are.
There is little evidence that community-based policing in
the form of foot patrols reduces crime per se. Evaluations in
cities like Flint, Michigan, Kansas City, Missouri, Newark, New
Jersey, Houston, Texas, and New York all point to this conclu-
sion. There are some findings that there is a reduction in resi-
dentfear of crime as a result of police foot patrols. This occurs
mostly in middle class urban neighborhoods, not inner city loca-
tions. Hence, we are not suggesting that an increased police
presence can by itself effectively attack the crime and drug
problems on these communities. But it can help the commu-
nity deal with them. Wherever it is tried, community policing
remains popular with citizens. A police show of force can at
least keep dealers on the move and help protect the operations
of inner city non-profit based youth empowerment and eco-
nomic development efforts. This is especially true to the extent
that police departments have stopped simply reacting to crime
after it has occurred, and have begun to analyze the underlying
problems which cause the crime, so that proactive prevention
strategies can be put in place. For example, in Newport News,
Virginia, a police-community partnership reduced the burglary
rate in high crime public housing by 35% over 2 years. This
was done not through more arrests, but, for example, through
improving maintenance of the housing projects, among other
preventive rather than reactive strategies.
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Such innovation is called "problem oriented policing" in
the U.S., building on the thinking of Professor Herman Gold-
stein. But it also has affinities to Japanese police prevention
traditions-where, for example, police mentor youth and resi-
dents "consult" with police over domestic violence. (We will
consider the potential role of these innovations further, below).
Schools. The Neighborhood Program suggested, as well,
the need to explore more fruitful partnerships between com-
munity organizations and schools. One of the many rationales
for community-based organizations is that they often can pro-
vide the kind of remedial education, with mentoring and peer
support, which many failing inner city school systems are not
capable of providing. Yet, at the very least, school facilities can
be used after hours for community program activities. Schools,
after all, already have the kind of space-for classroom and ath-
letic activities, in particular-that is desperately hard for com-
munity organizations to find elsewhere. Because the facilities
already are in place and unused for large portions of the day
and week, they can be an extremely cost-effective resource.
But school districts were not always supportive in the
Neighborhood Program-a pattern too often noted by other
community-based initiatives, like the Violent Juvenile Offender
Program (discussed in Chapter 3). In East New York, for
example, plans for an after-school tutoring program were
halted by the requirement that the program pay "custodial
fees" for the use of local schools, which would have amounted
to about $5,000 a year, far more than the program could afford.
(An after-school program was begun later in the schools, with
up to 120 youth attending daily.)
DYC's experience with local schools in Boston was more
positive and more complex. According to the Rutgers
researchers, the program "developed and maintained an excel-
lent relationship with local schools." DYC offered several serv-
ices to local school systems, including in-house counseling and
crisis intervention for students and their families, gang violence
intervention, drug counseling and drug prevention education.
As this suggests, schools can be a crucial and important
resource for community-based programs-and vice versa.
Much as with the police, the task is to begin to develop more
effective links to community-based organizations. Conse-
quently, the Foundation is exploring some promising new rela-
tionships in its second generation of programming (Chapter 6).
In addition, the Foundation is examining ways to co-target on
the same youth both school-based multiple services, like those
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offered by the national Cities in Schools program, and commu-
nity organization-based services. [..1
"Block Watch, " "Neighborhood Watch" and Other Conventional
Community Crime Prevention Tactics Are Sharply Limited
in the Inner City
Closely related to the limits of volunteerism as a strategy
for approaching urban crime, drug abuse and violence is a
more general limitation of those strategies which focused pri-
marily on tactical community organizing in block watches or
other more traditional kinds of community crime prevention, at
the expense of developing strategies that addressed these com-
munities' needs for such more strategic and "structural" efforts
as youth empowerment, extended family "sanctuary," educa-
tion, job creation and job placement.
There is a substantial difference between the often vague
idea of "involving" the community in defending itself against
crime and the idea of community self-determination in the
larger and deeper sense of the overall development of the
social and economic potential of a community-development
within which some defensive strategies, of course, can and
should have a place. Our experience, indeed, suggests that it is
very difficult to accomplish the goals of community organizing
against crime even on their own terms without tackling some of
the deeper problems of the community.
These limits stem directly from the social and economic
characteristics of disadvantaged inner city locales. First, the
Neighborhood Program experience suggests that-as in the
case of volunteer participation-it is difficult to keep strong
defensive crime prevention organizations in a deprived com-
munity afloat in face of economic disadvantage, residential
instability, or lack of consistent interest among the residents.
In Cleveland, the evaluation notes that the persistent problem
of residential turnover "meant that streets continually needed
to recruit new residents." The "apathy of residents" was
described as "one of the major frustrations" the East New York
program. In many of these neighborhoods, economic insecu-
rity and residential instability limited the consistent pool of res-
idents who could be reliably expected to participate. This was
compounded in some neighborhoods by a deep-seated aliena-
tion among many residents and a sense that community efforts
wouldn't make much difference. In East New York, "Many resi-
dents were reluctant to talk with the Vistas, assuming they were
social workers, police officers, or other government workers,"
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and in addition "some residents seemed to feel that they were
unlikely to accomplish much or to be tired of the effort that
changes required. One active member of a block association
explained, "People come and promise you things and then
nothing happens, so you get disappointed. There are lots of
things that need to be done, but you also need someone with
the power to get it done." "For various reasons, then," the
evaluation concludes, "the Vistas found it difficult to recruit
members for the block associations."
The tactical model that often underlies block organizing
efforts in particular often seems to rest on a set of presump-
tions about residents' energy and stability that is more appro-
priate to a stable middle-class or working-class neighborhood
than to poorer communities with higher transiency, lower
resources and fewer social networks. But it is precisely those
communities that most suffer from urban violence. Our experi-
ence in this regard is supported by a growing body of other
recent research.
For example, in a recent review, Professor Dennis Rosen-
baum of the University of Illinois warns that, in spite of wide-
spread publicity by advocates, most scientific evaluations of
block and neighborhood watch show "either no effect or
increases in crime rates in the experimental areas after the
intervention." As for fear, with the exception of one neighbor-
hood in London, "fear of personal crime and property crime
either were unaffected by neighborhood organizing or showed
significant increases relative to controls." Similarly, a recent
national study of neighborhood watch programs, funded by the
National Institute of Justice, concludes, "The neighborhoods
in which programs exist are predominantly middle-income,
racially homogeneous areas" whose populations consist mainly
of "long-term residents living in single-family, owner-occupied
homes."
Differences in community structure may also underpin sig-
nificant differences in residents' views of what the goals of com-
munity crime prevention should be-indeed what crime
prevention means. To some extent, as other research has also
found, block-organizing tactics in particular are likely to be
more attractive to people with higher incomes and more time
for participation in community activities; poorer residents may
be more concerned with adequate police protection on the one
hand and with efforts to deal directly with the longstanding
social and economic ills of the community, on the other. This
split clearly affects the character of residents' participation in
crime prevention activities. In the Whittier programs, for
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example, one of the most successful in recruitment, few mem-
bers of the organization came from lower-income households;
few were parents and few were from minority groups.
Nor is this problem only one of apathy or lack of energy.
Often its roots lie still deeper in the social structure of vio-
lence-torn urban neighborhoods. For example, in some Neigh-
borhood Program communities it was difficult to get residents
organized to fight crime, and especially drug dealing, because
many offenders or drug dealers were also community resi-
dents-sometimes living on the same street, or the same block.
For one thing, this created some danger to residents, who felt
that dealers would be able to keep tabs on who was involved in
the block associations-and perhaps retaliate against them. In
the St. Clair-Superior Coalition neighborhood in Cleveland,
for instance, a resident noted that "people were afraid to speak
out. People seem to know who commits the crimes, but they're
reluctant to speak up." In East New York, where drugs were a
pervasive problem, the program became increasingly involved
in dealing with drug sale locations. This was particularly prob-
lematic, as numerous residents were either dealers or users and
residents were afraid to give information directly to the police
about drug dealers.
Beyond the sheer worry about potential harm or retalia-
tion, the Neighborhood Program evaluations reveal an even
deeper issue. In East New York, for example, drug dealing was
"also a difficult problem to discuss in some block associations,
because some members or friends who were suspected dealers
or users." Traditionally, some community crime prevention
approaches have tended to define the people who cause the
problems-"street" youth, drug abusers, dealers-as "outsid-
ers" to the community. But that perception is clearly inappro-
priate for many urban communities-and especially, of course,
those that are hardest-hit by drugs and violence. For it is, after
all, from these communities that many offenders, hard-drug
users and drug dealers come. Not only do they live in close
proximity with other residents; more crucially, they are some-
one's son, brother, uncle, or friend. Moreover, many move in
and out of illegal activities in the course of their lives. There is,
therefore, rarely a clean hard line between "the community"
on one side and the offenders who trouble it on the other.
Partly for that reason, many people in disadvantaged communi-
ties, while insisting in their right to adequate police protection,
also want to see serious efforts that address the deeper causes
of crime-and are often skeptical about the value of the "pull
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the wagons together" approach to crime prevention that char-
acterizes some community anti-crime programs.
This tension was particularly apparent in Washington,
D.C. Efforts to organize low-income housing tenants to do
"something" about drugs were not markedly effective and gen-
erated some resentments and resistance in the community-in
part because residents thought that the job should be done by
the police, in part because of the sense that drugs reflected
deeper community problems, especially affecting the young,
that should be directly addressed. The director of Around the
Corner to the World was consequently concerned that the pro-
gram's anti-drug efforts "should unite the community, not
divide it"; block watch programs in particular might cause divi-
sion because "family members and friends were frequently
involved in the drug problem." Accordingly, he proposed a
range of strategies that included political lobbying to make the
area a higher priority for law enforcement, providing employ-
ment opportunities, and launching an anti-drug educational
campaign. The weatherization business employment program
was the most effective part of this richer and more comprehen-
sive anti-drug strategy.
The Northwestern evaluation found that, outside of crises,
it was difficult to sustain interest in conventional opportunity
reduction, becase its goal is a non-event-the absence of crime. This
is much less a problem in youth reinvestment programs, like
ACW and DYC, because less recidivism and crime are only a
part of an overall package of tangible success, which includes
staying in school, feeling better about yourself, getting a
diploma, getting a job, improving the community (for example,
through housing rehabilitation), helping other youths, and
moving into independent living.
Accordingly, in many Neighborhood Program locales,
there was a notable imbalance between the frequent lack of
enthusiasm for such things as block watch meetings or "busi-
ness watch" efforts on the one hand-and the frequent
enthusiasm for more tangible strategies, especially youth
empowerment activities, on the other-even though many
youth activities in many places, save for ACW and DYC, were
well meaning but superficial. In many sites where they were
attempted, efforts to provide some form of recreational,
employment or educational activity for local youths had more
"takers" than they could handle. Those activities seemed to
meet a real and pressing need that was keenly felt in their com-
munities. With some exceptions, that need was less keenly felt
for "community organizing" approaches to crime prevention.
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Nor do more conventional community crime prevention
tactics pay sufficient attention to domestic violence. Domestic
violence and child abuse are woven like a red thread through
many low-income urban communities; they are a critical part of
the community's crime problem, and one that is especially
troubling because of its potential to generate further violence
in the future, as children in violent and abusive families grow
up. A successful workshop on violence against women at the
St. Clair-Superior Coalition was well-attended; but on the
whole, many programs shared the tendency, all too common in
America, to think of the crime problem almost exclusively in
terms of "street" crime perpetrated by "outsiders." Violence
in the family is only poorly addressed, at best, by conventional
block-watching strategies; like drug use and drug dealing, an
effective community response will have to address its deep
roots in the social fabric of inner city communities.
Block watches, in particular, often seem appealing to
urban policy-makers, and to funders, because they are believed
to promise significant results at very minimal cost-especially
given their reliance on resident volunteers. But our experience
shows that to be a false promise and a false economy: some of our
Neighborhood Program initiatives relied heavily on block
watches and still cost $50,000 to $70,000 over 30 months of
planning and implementation, with minimal impact.
In terms of enthusiasm generated in devastated inner city
areas, one partial exception was the patrol launched by the
Mid-Bronx Desperadoes. The evaluation does not show that it
reduced crime community-wide. But it both sustained a rela-
tively high level of resident participation and, according to
Northwestern's evaluation, may well have diminished fear in
the neighborhood. This finding is consistent with the conclu-
sion of Professor Dennis Rosenbaum that there is no certain
evidence from other evaluations that volunteer patrols have
more of a long term effect on crime, even though some citizens
feel less fearful.
We believe that, at least for the Mid-Bronx Desperadoes,
the proactive nature of the citizen patrol had a place in secur-
ing the neighborhood for economic development. "It's not a
no man's land any more," one patrol member said; "it's a no-
nonsense place." And for another member, "The patrols are
out there and if kids are hanging around or acting up, the
patrols make them break it up. I've never seen that in a neigh-
borhood before. It really makes a difference." [. . .1
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6. THE NEXT GENERATION OF EISENHOWER PROGRAMS
When the Foundation's street level lessons are combined
with innovative programs over the last decade run and evalu-
ated by others, we can frame reasonably well a wise direction
for new youth investment programs and creative national pol-
icy for the 1990s.
Accumulating Evidence
In addition to the "street-level" lessons known from our
own program, we have been inspired by the accumulating evi-
dence of success in several programs run and evaluated by
others over the last decade. Some of the most impressive other
programs of the 1980s which dispelled the myth that "nothing
works" for the disadvantaged included: JobStart, Project
Reduction, the Violent Juvenile Offender Program, the School
Transitional Environment Program, the Door, City Lights, the
Phoenix Program, the "I Have A Dream" Program, and Cities
in Schools. Consider each briefly:
JobStart. JobStart targeted disadvantaged school dropouts
aged 17-21 who read below the eighth grade level. The pro-
gram provided basic education, occupational training, support
services such as child care and transportation, and genuine job
placement assistance for long term employment. These multi-
ple solutions were implemented through community-based
organizations, Job Corps centers, vocational schools and com-
munity colleges. Youth who participated in the program
showed significant improvement in attaining high school and
General Education Diplomas compared to control groups.
After the first 12 months of evaluation, arrests were lower for
program youth than control youth, but statistical significance
has not been reached. Ongoing evaluations are assessing for
longer run employment gains, crime reduction and related
outcomes.
Project Redirection. Project Redirection focused on teen
mothers 17 or younger who lacked a high school diploma or an
equivalency degree. Most were eligible for receiving Aid to
Families with Dependent Children. Implemented in several
locations, the program's approach was comprehensive, seeking
to enhance the teen's educational, job-related, parenting, and
life-management skills, while encouraging these young people
to delay further childbearing until they had become more self-
sufficient. The program's strategy was to link participants with
existing services in the community and to support these
"brokered" services by providing workshops, peer group ses-
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sions, and individual counseling in the program setting. It also
paired teens with adult community women, who volunteered to
provide ongoing support, guidance, and friendship both within
and outside of the formal program structure. Five years after
entering the program (and 4 years, on average, after leaving it),
Project Redirection participants, while still disadvantaged, had
more favorable outcomes than a comparison group of young
mothers in the areas of employment, earnings, welfare depen-
dency, and parenting skills; their children were at a develop-
mental advantage, compared to controls.
The Violent Juvenile Offender Program. The Violent Juvenile
Offender Program was implemented from 1981 to 1986
through neighborhood-based organizations in the Bronx, Chi-
cago, Dallas, Los Angeles, New Orleans, and San Diego. Each
local version of the program involved an ongoing needs assess-
ment through which neighborhood resident councils planned
and revised their efforts. Each local program was required to
include violent-crisis intervention, mediation, family support
networking, and youth skills development. After 36 months of
planning and implementation, serious juvenile crime decreased
in 3 of the 6 targeted neighborhoods, compared to their
respective cities. Most of the programs developed means of
financial support to carry on all or part of the effort after fed-
eral funding ended.
The School Transitional Environment Program. The School
Transitional Environment Program was established for high
risk youth, generally low income and minority, entering large
senior high schools. It was designed to reduce the difficulty of
transition by such students from smaller feeder schools, usually
junior highs, to the more complex senior high environment.
Core academic subjects and homeroom were taken mostly with
other high risk students. Core and academic classrooms were
kept close together, so in a way a familiar physical space was
created. Homeroom and academic teachers received extra
training to enhance their academic and emotional counseling
skills. There was extra one-on-one counseling of students.
Special team meetings of teachers in the program were held
regularly. In some cases, there was extra counseling staff. The
mentoring was complemented by student peer sessions to dis-
cuss common problems. The extra cost was low. Statistically,
program youth had significantly lower dropout rates, fewer
absences and higher grades than controls, in several locations.
The Door. For almost 20 years the Door has been supplying
multiple, integrated services at a center for high risk youth in
New York City. The Door has had several evaluations. All
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have been positive though none have yet had control groups.
Nonetheless, some of the changes among program youth have
been so dramatic that it is difficult to conclude that the pro-
gram was not responsible, in part. For example, in one 3 year
study cited in a National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA) mon-
ograph on model programs, 40% of Door participants either
stopped using drugs or significantly reduced their use. In
another study, there was a significant increase in self-esteem
among persons who participated in the program for at least
one year.
City Lights and the Phoenix Program. City Lights in Washing-
ton, D.C. and the Phoenix Program, in Akron, Ohio appear to
be successful at involving failing students with behavior
problems in academic and vocational training programs,
remediating their educational problems and reducing behavior
problems. City Lights, developed by the Children's Defense
Fund, is a community-based program for emotionally disturbed
and delinquent youth aged 12 to 22 that incorporates crisis
counseling; individual, group and family therapy; and a com-
prehensive, computer-aided instructional curriculum. Though
evaluation of the program has just begun, it has achieved a
90% attendance rate during its first two years, despite the his-
tory of chronic truancy that characterizes most of its students.
Similarly, the Phoenix Program has succeeded in returning
90% of its students to the public schools, and recidivism rates
of its participants have declined.
"The I Have A Dream" Program. Eugene Lang's private sec-
tor "I Have A Dream" program originated when Mr. Lang
returned to his elementary school in East Harlem and prom-
ised to pay the college tuition of every graduating sixth grade
class member who finished high school and qualified for higher
education. As of 1989, about two-thirds of the kids in this class
had received high school diplomas or General Education
Diplomas. More than half were enrolled at least part time in
public and private colleges; only 1 was in prison. School drop
out rates-and correlated crime-were far higher for compara-
ble young people in East Harlem. A former Deputy School
Superintendent said, of Mr. Lang's six grade class, "If 50% of
those kids are going to college, its a small miracle." The key
seems to be not only the assurance that college will be paid but
the special attention and mentoring that Mr. Lang provides.
Cities in Schools. Cities in Schools is a drop out prevention
program which operates out of schools or alternative locations
in over 30 communities across the U.S. The key to Cities in
Schools is the repositioning of existing public and private
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agency service providers into multi-service school locations.
There, they serve alongside teachers, as a coordinated team.
Typically, the team includes social workers, employment coun-
selors, recreation coaches, educators, health professionals and
volunteer mentors. Students at risk of dropping out are
referred by teachers, school administrators, probation officers,
parents and others. A mentor case manager is assigned to each
student. The case manager provides services and brokers the
services of others on the team. Long term control group evalu-
ations have not been undertaken. Cities in Schools reports
point too much lower drop out rates than the national average
of 30%.
Some Common Elements
JobStart, Project Redirection, The Violent Juvenile
Offender Program and the School Transitional Environment
Program all have been evaluated with sufficient scientific rigor,
in our view-as have Job Corps, the Argus Community and
Fairview Homes, among the early influences on the Foundation
which were discussed in Chapter 2. The Door, City Lights, the
Phoenix Program, "I Have A Dream" and Cities in Schools all
are extremely promising, but should be more rigorously evalu-
ated, we believe-as is the case with Centro Sister Isolina
Ferre, the House of Umoja, the Dorchester Youth Collabora-
tive and Around the Corner to the World, among the other
early influences discussed in Chapter 2.
There are many individual variations among these pro-
grams (which we view as a positive sign of locally tailored solu-
tions). Yet they often share common elements-like sanctuary,
mentoring, nurturing, social support, cultural heritage or other
group identity, peer pressure, discipline, pursuit of high school
degrees or G.E.D.'s, employment training and employment
placement. Like Head Start, these multiple solutions usually
result in multiple outcomes-higher self-esteem, staying in
school, parenting at a later age, improving life management
skills, becoming more independent and less welfare reliant,
being more employable, and getting less involved with drugs
and crime. Most definitely, not all of these good outcomes
happen in all of these programs-and sometimes evaluators are
frustrated by lack of consistency-but the broad pattern is for
considerable simultaneous change.
Most of these initiatives are based in community organiza-
tions, although some are located in schools or junior college.
Some are residential, some are not and some have both
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options. (More comparative cost-benefits are needed.) The
age range is from pre-teens to young adults, so the phrase
"juvenile delinquency prevention" doesn't fit very well. Most
of these programs try to change individual youth, but a few
(like Centro and Around the Corner to the World) more ambi-
tiously also try to create change in the community.
A number of these programs include some combination of
what official service bureaucracies call "primary prevention"
(changing the setting or strengthening resistance before any
negative behavior by high risk individuals), "secondary preven-
tion" (redirecting individuals who have started getting into rel-
atively minor trouble) and "tertiary prevention" ("treatment"
of individuals who have been officially adjudicated or otherwise
labeled by the criminal justice" welfare and health care
systems).
Eisenhower Demonstrations for the 1990's
With an eye to this accumulating evidence and the com-
mon elements which often appear associated with success, the
Eisenhower Foundation has embarked upon a second genera-
tion of programs to begin the new decade. These innovations
incorporate a more consistent focus on the kinds of inner city
youth investment strategies which we believe hold greatest
promise.
Cities affiliated with the Foundation's second generation
include Albuquerque, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Ange-
les, New York, Newark, Philadelphia, Portland (Oregon), San
Juan, Washington, D.C. and Wilmington (Delaware).
Specific empowerment strategies continue to "bubble up"
from grass roots planning, rather than "trickle down" from via
distant regulations. These new initiatives are not "crime and
drug abuse prevention"-which is too narrow a way of under-
standing what really happens. That is part of their goal. But
more broadly, the second generation Eisenhower-affiliated pro-
grams will, in different ways:
Employ or mentor high risk youth with sufficient
extended-family-like discipline and social support
(including remedial education) to reduce crime and drug
abuse while they increase school completion and future
employability;
Empower inner-city neighborhood non-profit
groups to operate the programs, organize local residents,
integrate crime prevention with economic development,
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bring in creative problem oriented community policing,
and link up with schools;
Develop financial self-sufficiency in order to ensure
that program activities can continue.
Increased Resources. As these guidelines make clear, the second
round of Neighborhood Programs continues many of the prin-
ciples of the first-but with some important additions and shifts
of emphasis.
We have increased the level of funding for each site-in
order to concentrate limited resources rather than spread them
too thinly to support adequate staff and programming. New
programs will be better equipped to hire additional staff. And
we are upgrading our capacity to generate continuing financing
of demonstrations after initial funding.
Employment Training and Placement. The second round of
sites also has a stronger and more consistent emphasis on
employment and social supports for high-risk youth. We've seen that
this was one of the most promising successes of programs like
Job Corps, Argus, Fairview Homes and ACW; we want now to
generalize it to all new demonstrations. This emphasis is, we
believe, also backed by evidence from many of the other pro-
grams cited here on the paths into-and out of crime, drug
abuse, and other problems among the inner city young. The
role of stable work opportunities stands out as crucial in that
path-but research, for example by the Vera Institute ofJustice
in New York, suggests, as well, that for youth in poor neighbor-
hoods, many of whom have been subjected to chaotic and
deprived family lives and inadequate schooling, more is needed
than just the provision of an opportunity to work. Conse-
quently, following the experience of programs like Argus,
ACW, and DYC, we will emphasize the provision of essential
supports offering guidance, discipline, and the modeling of
productive and cooperative values. As part of that support, the
programs will typically include training in basic educational
skills.
For junior high school age youth, too young for employ-
ment training, the goal of staying in school or succeeding in
alternative community school settings will be furthered by the
use of mentor role models-for example minority professionals
who have left the inner city but who wish to play a role in
empowering the disadvantaged. The mentoring will help form
a bridge for junior high school youth to proceed to senior high,
and to an age when employment training is appropriate.
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Our emphasis on building intensive social support, coun-
seling and discipline into these programs reflects growing evi-
dence that they can make a significant difference-provided
that they are of sufficient quality and consistently implemented.
But employment training for high school age inner city youth,
even buttressed by a wide range of social and personal sup-
ports and remedial education, will be frustrated unless it is
carefully linked with actual jobs in the public, private and non-
profit sectors. The Foundation's new demonstrations, there-
fore, are seeking to develop viable economic enterprises in the
community, and/or to build strong links with existing employ-
ers in the area. Ultimately, we want these programs to begin
moving toward the kind of community economic self-determi-
nation that has been the long-range goal of the Foundation
from the start.
Defensive measures and conventional community crime
prevention tactics can still have a place-but we now plan to
ensure that any efforts at citizen patrols and innovative polic-
ing, for example, be more clearly linked with a focused strategy
of community revitalization than was usually the case in the first
generation of Neighborhood Programs.
More Attention to Drugs. We also are paying more specific
and consistent attention to drug abuse and drug dealing. As
we've seen, these were a major concern at most of the Neigh-
borhood Program sites, and they became more urgent over the
course of the program as the "crack" epidemic struck many
program cities. Indeed, many Neighborhood Program staff
described drugs as the central problem in their communities
and the greatest obstacle to program efforts. But only a few
developed strategies directly aimed at reducing drug use,
though somewhat more tried to develop ways of coping with
drug dealers. We think that the epidemic of drugs in most
inner-city communities calls for more concerted attention in
this next round of demonstrations-particularly toward linking
innovative strategies of drug abuse prevention and treatment with broader
strategies of education, community economic development and effective,
supported job training and other structured activities for youth. With-
out such linkages, the destructive role of drugs in the lives of
young people and in the community as a whole may undermine
any efforts, even good ones, to develop the community eco-
nomically or to train and motivate the young.
As with anti-crime strategies generally, we do not wish to
impose a top-down vision on the new programs of exactly what
a community-based approach to preventing and treating drug
abuse should look like-especially because there are currently
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few clear guidelines for dealing with the "new " drug abuse
that heavily involves "crack" cocaine, PCP, methamphetamine
and other drugs for which long-established treatment strate-
gies do not exist. Our approach will be to let local communi-
ties "bubble up" new kinds of anti-drug strategies-while
simultaneously enhancing our capacity to provide technical
assistance and information on what is being tried elsewhere-
and what is working.
Police Support of Community Organizations. Given our finding
of the need for more supportive and innovative policing to help
deal with the drug problem, we now are developing new ways
to link police more closely with the youth development, anti-drug, and
employment generation efforts in our program communities. We do
not envision simply asking for more police in the community-
but rather, building on some of the most encouraging exam-
ples of creative policing in the United States and overseas, to
develop new ways in which police can support the work of com-
munity-based groups.
For example, in Japan, police teach martial arts to neigh-
borhood youths "to help make them better citizens." The
thinking behind such, in effect, early intervention is not unlike
new experiments in the United States by the Police Executive
Research Forum on problem oriented policing. Such policing
allows police, for example, to be nurturers in support of at risk
youth facing many personal problems.
Japanese police are organized into "kobans"-police mini-
stations at the neighborhood level. Police are assigned to the
same substation, and therefore neighborhood, each day. In
some places, the kobans are residential. A police officer lives
there with his wife and family. Whether residential or nonresi-
dential, the koban allows assigned officers to associate with
others in the community-as their neighbors. This helps create
trust by citizens of police and vice versa. Citizens even come to
the koban for "personal guidance"-for example, when a
woman seeks help from a husband who is physically abusing
her.
In their work as early interveners as well as good neigh-
bors, the Japanese police are far better prepared than Ameri-
can police. While American police cadets are typically trained
for 3 to 5 months before going on the streets, Japanese police
are trained for 1 to 2 years. That training is also in much
greater depth. Accordingly, we will advocate for training
reform, beginning at the FBI National Academy course for top
police executives.
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Surely we cannot simply take a model from another coun-
try, particularly one so different as Japan, and impose it in the
American inner city context. But new ideas can be generated
when American police are exposed to foreign methods, and
then culturally appropriate solutions for American inner cities
can be generated. That is why the Eisenhower Foundation
brought police chiefs, other top police officials and American
inner city community leaders to Japan to observe Japanese
policing methods as a prelude to our next generation of inner
city youth empowerment programming.
Examples of Second Generation Programs
Second generation Eisenhower affiliated programs are
choosing to implement youth empowerment in a variety of
ways. To give just a few examples, in San Juan, Wilmington
(Delaware) and Portland (Oregon), partial replications of some
of the principles underlying Centro and Umoja are underway.
Baltimore and Washington, D.C. are giving priority to police
supported economic development linked to youth empower-
ment. Chicago and Albuquerque are forging community
organization-school alliances with active business support.
Replications of the Principles of Centro and Umoja. The original
Centro program, located in Ponce, Puerto Rico, is extending to
other locations on the island, including the Caimito community
outside of San Juan.
The program, which is non-residential, is preparing high
risk teens and young adults from the neighborhood for gram-
mar school and high school equivalency examinations offered
by the Department of Public Instruction. In addition to aca-
demic instruction, the program seeks to develop supportive
social skills and values that will mitigate against delinquency,
drug abuse and unemployment. For example, a new tree refor-
estation initiative is teaching skills marketable on the island.
Plans are also being made for an adolescent mother center. A
grant from the federal Office of Substance Abuse Prevention
will help expand these new initiatives.
The overriding goal remains "the integral development of
the person within the community." Caimito, as Ponce, per-
ceives itself as "a large family without distinction of colors or
creed." As in the original Ponce program, "advocate" mentors
will serve as intermediaries between police and youth who are
on the verge of serious trouble with police. Youth who are
diverted from the juvenile justice system will work for Centro
in Caimito. Some eventually may become advocates; the evalu-
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ation will follow how "service recipients" can become "service
providers." A residence has been built on the grounds of the
Caimito Center. A police officer lives there with his family to
better insure, Centro hopes, close, day-to-day and neighborly
relationships among high risk youth, advocates and police.
The officer is a graduate of a new police human relations train-
ing program.
In Wilmington, the Juvenile Awareness Education Pro-
gram is partly building on the experience of Umoja, as well as
on other ideas. Youth diverted from the criminal justice system
as well as youth recruited from the neighborhood are involved.
A block of two-story row houses is being renovated. Some
buildings were opened in 1990, and local cable television cov-
erage then was used in a 2 hour fund raising telethon. When
fully operating, there will be both day and residential programs
that include psychological assessment and treatment, individ-
ual and group counseling, remedial education, GED instruc-
tion, life skill training, pre-employment skills training, job
training, entrepreneurship development, gang arbitration,
community outreach and cultural/recreational activities. Each
young man participates in an 8 month "rites of passage" Young
Lions Manhood Training Program, one-on-one with an adult
mentor. These tasks must be completed:
1. Stay in junior high school, establish a measurable
educational objective and achieve it.
2. Read the autobiography of a famous Black leader.
3. Complete a business project or work experience
that establishes the notion of being industrious.
4. Demonstrate the ability to save money and account
for a full month of financial activities.
5. Complete a family/community volunteer project.
6. Create a personal program of physical fitness and
complete an obstacle course.
7. Identify a "life philosophy" in writing and through
verbal presentation.
8. Complete training to become a counselor to and
role model for peers.
9. Participate in a spiritual awareness activity and par-
ticipate at least monthly in existing family spiritual
awareness programs, if any.
10. Participate in 75% of all educational activities
offered via the Young Lions programs.
Each Young Lion trainee takes an oath at a public cere-
mony in front of adults and peers. He promises a "full commit-
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ment to "discover myself and my responsibilities as a man in
this society," agrees to "respect myself and others," and
pledges to "remain drug free and avoid situations and groups
that may result in my conflict with those in authority."
The Portland program is being developed in response to
an "invasion" of the "Bloods" and other gangs which
originated in Los Angeles. A Hope for Youth Conference,
organized by neighborhood groups and the Mayor's Office of
Neighborhoods, brought together minority leaders, community
organizers, business leaders, the founders of Umoja, the Presi-
dent of the Eisenhower Foundation and the Portland Police-
led by Tom Potter, the Captain who was a member of the Foun-
dation's delegation to Japan. The Conference helped mobilize
citizen and financial support and was well covered in the local
media. It is a good coalition building, public awareness
expanding and fund raising model for future replications in
other cities.
The community education generated money for property
acquisition, building rehabilitation and program staff. Initial
commitments by the Mayor's Office led to substantial private
sector matches.
As in Wilmington, Portland will carry out day and residen-
tial extended family variations and a rites of passage youth
empowerment process. The Founders of the original Umoja,
in Philadelphia, will be the first Portland "house parents," and
will remain in Portland as long as it takes to locate and train
suitable local parents. Participants (aged 12-15) will become
involved both through criminal justice diversion and neighbor-
hood outreach. Mentors will be recruited from among Black
police, but also from among ex-inmates. Later down the road,
Captain Potter may coordinate problem oriented community
policing and Japan-inspired innovations in the same neighbor-
hood as the residential buildings.
As we have seen (Chapter 2), these influential models-
Centro and Umoja-have never been fully evaluated by
researchers. By working with the new variations from the
beginning, we hope to be able to provide a depth of evaluation
that will shed new light on their effectiveness. In addition, the
Foundation's coordinated case study evaluations will document
the inevitable rough and tumble through which the principles
of early and now well known models are tried in other loca-
tions. How long will it take, with what success? Will the origi-
nal concepts be adhered to or reconfigured? What is the effect
of vastly different social, cultural and political environments
(like Portland and Wilmington)? Is public acceptance and
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funding more forthcoming when the replication is near the
original model (as in Caimito and Wilmington) rather than
"imported" over many miles (Portland)? What is the relative
cost-effectiveness of residential and non-residential compo-
nents? How will it compare to residential versus non-residen-
tial Job Corps?
Youth Empowerment and Economic Developmet. The Baltimore
Jobs in Energy Project (BJEP) is an inner city community-
based housing rehabilitation, weatherization, youth employ-
ment and social service organization in South Baltimore. The
executive director and the Baltimore Commissioner of Police
were members of the Eisenhower Foundation's delegation to
Japan. As a result of the delegation, the Baltimore police have
agreed to operate a police koban substation in a large, aban-
doned old Victorian police station which Baltimore Jobs has
rehabilitated through support from Baltimore funders and the
Eisenhower Foundation.
Instead of being called a "ground breaking," the ceremony
opening the building, led by the Mayor, was called a "bar pull-
ing." The old police station still had cells in it. In one cell,
staff cut half way through the bars and painted over the saw
marks. In front of local TV news cameras, the Mayor pulled
the bars out, symbolically showing that there are alternatives to
imprisonment. Because one use of the space will be for com-
munity-based remedial education, the theme of the ceremony
was "turning bars into books." The police substation is one
part of the building. Another part hosts other community
organizations, which pay rent. This helps to ensure the eco-
nomic self-sufficiency of the program. Still other parts of the
building include the offices of Baltimore Jobs and its employ-
ment training initiatives for high risk youth. One of those
training initiatives will be run by the Police Department. The
police who maintain the Department vehicles will conduct an
auto maintenance employment training course for high risk
youth.
Police foot patrols and problem oriented policing which
operate out of the building are designed to reduce fear of
crime and thus help BJEP's efforts toward economic develop-
ment-largely in the form of the residential reconstruction,
which helps employ high risk youth. Police and program youth
will share the same entrance way-a modest use of environ-
mental design to increase communication and reduce mistrust.
The re-opening of the police station as a youth center has
become a source of pride among residents. It signals improved
community/police relations. And it illustrates an innovative
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way to overcome the not uncommon problem of neighborhood
resistance to community based operations moving in.
Throughout the Foundation's second generation, we will
assess new ways of securing neighborhood resident and city
zoning commission approval of nonresidential and residential
community programs. We hope that the notion of including a
police substation in or on the grounds of extended family sanc-
tuaries, as in Baltimore and San Juan, will become a national
model. There already are other precedents. For example, in
New York City, resident opposition to a facility in Chinatown
was overcome through negotiation of a community meeting
space and a storefront police precinct in the building. The
Foundation will convene a national workshop among commu-
nity organizations and city officials to share successes and so
expand community-based facilities in the future.
Through new grants from the federal Office of Substance
Abuse Prevention and other agencies, Baltimore Jobs is inte-
grating drug abuse prevention into its development-empower-
ment-police support framework. Options are being created for
each participating youth. Thus, for example, a 17-year-old girl
referred by the principal at Southern High School who is
experiencing chronic failure in school might choose from
among one or more of these options: Training in auto
mechanics and job retention skills from Police Department pro-
fessionals, working on basic literacy with intensive tutoring and
support from an older woman mentor, joining regular hiking
trips in a state park, brainstorming with the Youth Center's
Idea Team, helping on a Service Corps project to plant trees
on a barren lot, and spreading an anti-drug message through
community performances with a Youth Center-based dance
troupe. A 13-year-old boy referred by the juvenile justice sys-
tem who has been involved in violent or delinquent acts can
consider: Joining weekly youth-to-youth counseling groups,
meeting with local police officers at the Youth Center koban,
exploring engineering careers and the associated education
and skills needed, receiving regular assistance with his math
homework, being involved in policy-setting and decision mak-
ing as a member of the Youth Center Steering Committee, and
making home visits with a police officer mentor to educate
neighborhood residents about signs of youth substance abuse
and delinquency. [ ... ]
Community-School Innovations. Youth Development, Inc. is a
community organization in Albuquerque which operates a drop
out prevention program located in two high schools. Students
at risk of dropping out are referred by regular school teachers
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and counselors. Youth Development then provides one-on-
one classroom instruction, counseling and family problem solv-
ing. A work experience program exposes students to real
world jobs and motivates them to stay in school to qualify for
employment. Students earn their way out of the program by
improving their grades and attendance. Seed funding from the
federal Departments of Health and Human Services and Labor
have been leveraged against continuation funding from the
local Private Industry Council.
Preliminary findings from an ongoing Eisenhower Founda-
tion evaluation are encouraging. Only 1 of 38 youth referred
to the program because of high risk of dropping out actually
did drop out after 9 months. Twenty nine improved their
grades, and there was an average 11 increase in the number
of days attending school.
In Chicago, our affiliated community organization, Youth
Guidance, is operating programs out of Roberto Clemente
High, Austin Community Academy and Bowen High. Major
corporations supply equipment, personnel and technical assist-
ance to teach state of the art vocational training that is linked to
usable, marketable skills for the inner city teenagers. The
Hyatt Corporation is advising the Clemente program on food
service training. Bell and Howell is guiding the Austin pro-
gram in telecommunications opportunities. The Bowen pro-
gram is focusing on office technology. The practical job skill
training is used as an incentive to motivate kids to attend
classes and stay in school. We do not expect far reaching pro-
gram impacts for at least 36 months, based on past experience.
In the future, the Foundation will explore how the corpo-
rate and Private Industry Council linkages in Chicago, Albu-
querque and similar programs can be better integrated with
multiple support services located in the high schools.
7. A NATIONAL POLICY OF YOUTH INVESTMENT AND
COMMUNITY RECONSTRUCTION
We are encouraged by the promise of these new program
directions. But as we look back at the Eisenhower Founda-
tion's experience over the last decade and forward to the future
of American cities, we cannot be as encouraged by the trajec-
tory of national policy. We have been made painfully aware of
the limits of that policy as we worked with inner-city neighbor-
hood organizations in the 1980s to fight crime, violence and
drug abuse.
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The Neighborhood Program was begun during a period of
urban retrenchment--a period of systematic withdrawal of
resources, and attention and concern from the urban disadvan-
taged. The federal government slashed many existing urban
programs, including many of the most innovative and promis-
ing. It cut not only some ineffective programs that seemed to
promise only continued dependency and stagnation for the
urban poor-but also many of those that sought to contribute
to self-sufficiency and self-determination.
The retrenchment, as we've seen, constrained in myriad
ways the neighborhood organizations with which Eisenhower
worked. It diminished the already meager resources available
in communities to attack the deepseated problems of violence,
youth alienation, and drug abuse-and it simultaneously con-
tributed to the worsening of the problems themselves.
Deterioration
For the crisis of the inner cities we set out to address has
indeed deteriorated since the start of the 1980s-much less the
end of the 1960s, when the Kerner and Eisenhower Commis-
sions drew their already stark and troubling portraits of
America's drift into "two societies." Some of the changes are
glaringly apparent. The drug problem has escalated relent-
lessly, destroying individuals and families, besieging communi-
ties, and massively straining the resources of public and non-
profit institutions in the inner cities. Overwhelmed criminal
justice systems are strained beyond capacity.
Urban rates of criminal violence in many cities now are up
to-and sometimes even beyond-their former peaks in the
early 1980s. The number one cause of death nationally among
young Black males is murder (not accidents or diseases).
Beneath such horrific symptoms lie deeper changes, less explo-
sive and visible but no less devastating, in the underlying social
and economic conditions of the inner cities. A few examples
serve to sketch the magnitude of that devastation:
Half of black children under 6 were below the pov-
erty line in 1988.
The poverty rate among Hispanic children rose by
36% between 1979 and 1988.
The average poor person in the cities is much farther
below the official poverty line than twenty years ago.
The urban poor are far less likely to escape from pov-
erty than they were in the late 1960s.
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Forty percent of Black children are raised in father-
less homes.
Since the 1960s, the percentage of white high school
graduates enrolled in college has gone up, to almost
60%, while the percent of Blacks has gone down, to
about 35%.
Policy Failure
These tragic facts-and we could easily list many more-
tell us clearly that, in terms of national impact, the human
resource and urban policy we have followed for the past decade
has been a dismal failure. Too often, that policy has been
based on the belief that we could revitalize the cities and nar-
row the gap between the "two societies," not by the concerted
action called for by the Kerner and Eisenhower Commissions,
but by cutting back on public services and public commitment
and hoping that the fruits of an expanding private economy
would "trickle down" to the poor. It became fashionable to say
that the inner city's problems had been caused by over-gener-
osity-by too much compassion, too much commitment.
Volunteerism was said to be the solution for domestic
problems but heavy spending the solution for international
security problems. The state of the cities after more than a
decade of these policies in action has by now made abundantly
clear the limits of these views. We believe it is past time to
return the Commissions' vision of "massive, compassionate,
and sustained" action to the forefront of the public agenda.
We have tried the alternative. It has failed.
Because of this legacy of neglect, the U.S. has fallen
behind some European countries and Canada in the serious-
ness and creativity of its solutions to the problems of drugs,
disadvantaged youth and the inner city. For example, in major
cities, the French have organized networks of local elected offi-
cials, government administrators and private sector leaders.
They identify needs, plan action and carry it out. The action
plans focus on the people who commit most of the crimes-
particularly the young-and include remedial education, job
training and job placement as part of the solutions. Cities
where these networks function well have reduced crime.
Based on the European experience to date, a recent report
to the federal government of Canada recommends, "Canada
should be addressing the extent to which its social, educational
and economic programs are adequately focused on crime pre-
vention at the local and national level." Importantly, this
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report was commissioned by the Ministry of Justice in Canada,
which apparently is showing a willingness to construct solu-
tions far beyond the criminal justice system as part of national
policy.
Meanwhile, the United States is in great danger of falling
still further behind-with consequences that will affect not only
the inner cities but the nation as a whole. We believe that
enough is known to move forward boldly to reverse the decline
of the cities and reclaim the inner-city young. This will require
consistent and farsighted leadership at the federal level.
Only at the federal level can enough dollars be earmarked
to make a national impact on the inner city. This level of fund-
ing will, in turn, leverage substantial private, state and local
dollars if we create or reform institutiofial mechanisms that tar-
get funds from the federal to grassroots levels. Bureaucratic
heavy handedness will destroy the chemistry needed to tailor
local solutions to local needs.
With sufficient resources and flexible federal-local delivery
vehicles, a carefully conceived and comprehensive strategy can
reach a wide enough segment of the inner city disadvantaged to
create a kind of "critical mass"-that will launch deteriorating
communities into an upward spiral of increasing organization
and achievement and their disinvested youth into a cycle of
increasing self-esteem, education and employability.
More specifically, these priorities should be placed high on
the national and federal agenda:
The extension of early education to all eligible chil-
dren and the reform of inner-city schooling;
The creation of a Youth Investment Corporation to
replicate inner city successes with older high risk youth,
leverage public against private funds, and create a
Harvard Business-type management school for staff of
inner city youth empowerment and social development
non-profit organizations.
The reform of existing school-to-work transition
ventures to better integrate training, social support and
job placement.
The commitment to a broad strategy of economic
development that creates jobs for high risk youth
through public investment in infrastructure rehabilitation
and affordable housing as a human right, not as an eco-
nomic commodity.
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The enhancement of national drug control strat-
egy-to place more demand side priority on prevention
in the inner city and to expand treatment.
Early Intervention and Urban School Reform
Intensive preschool appears to be among the most cost
effective crime and drug abuse prevention program yet
devised, along many other benefits, as we have been told by the
corporate executives on the national Committee for Economic
Development. Yet, whereas more than 50% of the nation's
higher income families ($35,000 and above) enroll their 3-year-
olds in preschool, the enrollment rate is only 17% for lower
income families. It is noteworthy, if frustrating, that the Kerner
Commission called for "building on the successes of Head
Start" more than twenty years ago. Today, there is almost
unanimous agreement among knowledgeable observers that
Head Start operates well and that the program should be
expanded to the 4 out of 5 eligible disadvantaged children who
are left out at current funding levels. The cost would be about
$4.8B more per year (about the cost of 8 stealth B-2 bombers).
A Ford Foundation panel has recommended that at least one-
half of the new slots should be full day programs for children
with working parents, and we concur.
A hopeful model for how a federally financed Head Start
program for all might be further enriched in part through local
government and private sector funding matches is Project Bee-
thoven on the South Side of Chicago, created by businessman-
philanthropist Irving Harris. Working with families in Robert
Taylor Homes public housing who send their children to Bee-
thoven Elementary School, Mr. Harris has combined prenatal
care, home visits, help with nutrition and counseling to enable
teen mothers to complete school and obtain job training.
Their infants are prepared nutritionally, psychologically and
socially to enter school. All services are integrated, and avail-
able right on the premises of Taylor Homes.
Inner City School System Reform. But effective multiple solu-
tions cannot stop with prenatal and infant care. One promising
comprehensive elementary school plan is for states, localities
and the private sector to create variations of the Rhode Island
Children's Crusade. The state of Rhode Island is providing
state college scholarships for low income pupils, combined
with academic and remedial help from third grade through
high school. The only requirements are that parents allow
state monitoring of report cards and that students obey the law,
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shun drugs, avoid early pregnancy and don't drop out. Pupils
will be tutored and paired with mentors throughout primary
and secondary school. When old enough, top performers will
secure summer jobs, where they will serve as role models to
others.
The plan, which is contingent on the state matching funds
with the private sector, builds on New York State Liberty Schol-
arships for low income students-but enrolls them at any ear-
lier age and provides educational and social assistance. The
idea originates from Eugene Lang's private sector "I Have A
Dream" program, described in Chapter 6. Through the "I
Have a Dream" Foundation, the idea is spreading throughout
the country. We believe that locally tailored variations of the
Rhode Island, New York and Eugene Lang concepts, with adult
mentors, should be embraced by all 50 states, and should be
financed at the state, local and private sector levels. The fed-
eral government can disseminate information and might make
modest seed grants to set up state systems.
Our position is consistent with the recent report, Saving
Urban Schools, by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advance-
ment of Teaching. Carnegie calls for strong federal leadership,
backed by actual federal financial support from a proposed
National Urban Schools Program, modeled in spirit on the
Rural Extension Act that was enacted years ago to assist Ameri-
can farmers. Although federal funds would seed local reform,
Carnegie believes that state and local governments have the
prime responsibility for the fiscal health of public education.
One reasonable guideline is one new federal reform dollar for
each eight state and local dollars. This is a modest increase
over the 7% Washington presently pays for public education.
Carnegie advocates a national policy of greater equity in
urban school financing-which means more money for inner
city schools-and a commitment to educate all children, even
those from the most difficult backgrounds. Beyond early edu-
cation and enrichment, Carnegie calls for new local governance
procedures. If, after a reasonable period, a specific urban
school fails to meet objectives which have been clearly agreed
upon in advance, officials from the school system have the
power to intervene. Carnegie believes that the range of such
intervention should include professional consultation, new
leadership in the specific school, and, in the extreme, the clos-
ing of the school.
Similarly, the Carnegie Council on Adolescent Develop-
ment has urged that national policy must proceed beyond early
education and pay more attention to continuity with middle
19911 YOUTH INVESTMENT AND COMMUNITY RECONSTRUCTION 577
school youth aged 10 to 15. The Council points out that, while
youth in this age range are vulnerable to failure and high risk
behavior, they are still impressionable and can be influenced--
as we have seen, for example, with the progress of youth at the
Dorchester Youth Collaborative, many of whom are in this age
range. Consequently, the Carnegie Council calls for federal
leadership to encourage local change. Rigid class schedules
should be replaced with cooperative learning in which students
work together in small groups. Teams of about 125 students
and 5 or 6 teachers should remain together throughout middle
school, until students advance to high school. A core academic
program should promote critical reasoning and include com-
munity service. California and Florida have begun implement-
ing many of these changes, and the Edna McConnell Clark
Foundation is funding demonstration programs to revamp
middle 'schools. Policy planners need to follow the experience
of Clark closely and build on its lessons.
We endorse these school-based reforms; the call by the
nation's governors for "annual report cards" on students,
schools, localities, states and the federal government; and the
goal enacted by the nation's governors of making the U.S. first
in math and science scores world-wide by the year 2000.
According to a recent poll by the National School Boards
Association, urban schools are taking an increasingly active
role in providing services against drug abuse and related
problems, particularly when family support is inadequate. This
is a welcome trend. It should be reinforced through expansion
of the multiple solutions in school locations provided by pro-
grams like Cities in Schools and the Chicago Youth Guidance
and Albuquerque Youth Development programs which the
Eisenhower Foundation currently is evaluating.
But we also believe that inner city community organiza-
tions like Argus, Centro, DYC and ACW must be empowered
to play a stronger role, as partners with parents and schools-
especially given that there often are serious bureaucratic
impediments to reform in many local school systems and
because remedial education and social support often can be
more effective in these supportive community alternatives than
in schools.
The Youth Investment Corporation
The existing federal Head Start agency provides a vehicle
to implement multiple solutions to the needs of very young
children. But there is no agency at the national level to provide
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leadership and seed funding for day-to-day operating programs
(not experimental demonstrations) that solve interrelated
dilemmas for older high risk youth.
It is time for a new, dynamic, creative implementing
agency-a Youth Investment Corporation. As we propose it
here, the Corporation will replicate the principles underlying
success at a sufficient scale to begin to create a national impact.
The LISC Model. In the early 1970s, the Ford Foundation
created the private sector Local Initiatives Support Corpora-
tion (LISC). The purpose of LISC is to generate neighborhood
based economic development in the private sector-operating
through non-profit community development organizations.
LISC has celebrated its tenth anniversary and has been
described as "way ahead of the learning curve" by corporate
executives assessing progress on anti-poverty programs. Here
we have one effective non-profit model of a national intermedi-
ary organization in the private sector that can deliver funds and
technical assistance to community-based organizations. The
Youth Investment Corporation will take on a similar role in
supporting youth empowerment and social development in the
inner city.
The back pages of this report contain draft federal legisla-
tion-the Youth Investment Act of 1992. The Corporation will
leverage public against private sector loans and grants, finance
replications of successful youth empowerment programs,
expand the number of inner city community organizations
which can implement such programs, and improve their execu-
tive functioning through a new Youth Management Training
Institute.
There are some youth organizations which have been well
established over many years, have substantial budgets and
include affiliates in many cities. The YMCA, YWCA and Boys
and Girls Clubs are examples. We do not rule out financial
assistance to such groups by the proposed Youth Investment
Corporation. But the financial focus will be more on younger,
smaller, more neighborhood-based and specifically inner city
groups, like ACW and DYC, which show promise but need an
infusion of capital and management training so that they can
reach a critical mass of operations and financing to proceed on
their own, integrating social and neighborhood development in
a reasonably concentrated geographic area. The Youth Invest-
ment Corporation will work with emerging groups of this kind
and also help create and finance new organizations, especially
as they can spin off from established groups and especially
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when there is an established leadership base in the
neighborhood.
The need is great for an infusion of day-to-day operating
funds to local groups. To create a national impact, we need
many more organizations like Argus and DYC. They need to
be financially healthy. Even the best existing programs often
continue to struggle financially. This is not due necessarily to
insufficiencies within the organizations. Instead, too many
public and private funders prefer to finance initial demonstra-
tions, but not continuing operations.
Grants will be necessary for many new and emerging orga-
nizations. But when there is sufficient capacity in an organiza-
tion, the Corporation will make loans, as well. Here, a
revolving loan fund might be appropriate. Following the
example of LISC's Local Initiatives Managed Assets Corpora-
tion, the Youth Investment Corporation can consider a mecha-
nism to purchase sound loans. This can increase the velocity of
lending by the Corporation.
The Rouse Model and For-Profit Linkages. The Rouse Corpo-
ration, chaired by nationally known developer James Rouse,
channels some of its profits to the non-profit Enterprise Foun-
dation, which rehabilitates housing in low income communi-
ties. Similarly, the Youth Investment Corporation will make
grants or loans to inner city non-profits which create or
strengthen for-profit entities. Over time, the for-profits will
generate income streams which can at least partially finance the
operations of the parent non-profit social development and
youth empowerment activity.
The non-profit/for-profit linkages will be crucial to gener-
ate more financially self-sustaining mechanisms at the grass-
roots level. In this way, the Youth Investment Corporation will
not just "throw money at the problem." We have sufficient
experience not to claim that creating or strengthening viable
for-profits in the inner city will be easy. Nor will it be any eas-
ier to link them to non-profits. But the Rouse experience, com-
bined with the non-profit structure yet business-like operating
style of organizations like the Mid-Bronx Desperadoes in New
York and the Marshall Heights Community Development
Organization in Washington, D.C., already provide a solid
point of departure.
Based on the principles that we have found to underlie
success, the Youth Investment Corporation will fund creation
or enhancement of comprehensive programs that are evaluated
to yield less crime, less drug abuse, less welfare dependency,
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fewer adolescent pregnancies, higher self-esteem, more school
completion, more successful school to work transitions, more
employability, and more economic and psychological self-suffi-
ciency among targeted high risk youth.
We will not expect all organizations to achieve all of these
objectives. But each should have multiple outcomes, based on
locally tailored need. Another objective will be success in the
for-profit activity (which will be a source of employment for the
youth). To have a national impact, we recommend that the
Youth Investment Corporation initially be funded at $500M
per year. The Corporation will leverage at least $1,in private
sector, state and local government hard cash matches for each
federal $1 granted to local community-based organizations for
youth empowerment.
Above and beyond federal seed funding and local cash
matches, the Corporation will co-target funds and programs
from other public sector agencies to the same neighborhoods.
Federal examples include Job Corps centers, training via the
Job Training Partnership Act, discretionary Department of
Education grants to schools in the neighborhood, economic
development grants from the Community Services Administra-
tion and the Economic Development Administration, human
services grants from the Office of Human Service Development
of the federal Department of Health and Human Services, pub-
lic housing crime prevention grants from the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development, resources from the Small
Business Administration, and ACTION grants.
Management Training. As part of the overall Youth Invest-
ment Corporation, a Youth Management Training Institute will
provide a sort of Harvard Business School or Wharton School
for executives and staff of inner city social development and
youth empowerment organizations. Such business schools will
be asked to provide pro bono assistance in establishing the cur-
riculum and training staff. (Business school staff also will need
to learn more about inner city organization values and operat-
ing realities.) As we found in the initial Neighborhood Pro-
gram, the need for more efficient management is great. More
resources are needed, but, even with them, well meaning and
often charismatic program operators are not necessarily good
managers. We hope that improved administration, managerial,
staff and financial management skills can, therefore, stretch
scarce dollars, whatever the funding level, and mitigate against
"burnout."
There already is a national Management Training Institute
for non-profits. It is focused on economic development agen-
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cies. There is a year long training curriculum. Each cohort of
trainees spends some time together learning as a group. The
rest of the year is spent applying lessons learned back in the
community, with on-the-spot technical assistance visits by Man-
agement Training Institute and staff. The Youth Investment
Corporation will use this strategy as a point of departure for
designing training suitable to staff of non-profit organizations
oriented more specifically to youth services and social
development.
A Public-Private Hybrid. As we envision it, the Youth Invest-
ment Corporation will be private sector and non-profit, but
authorized and appropriated through the public sector. Only
public sector resources, in our experience, are sufficient to
make a national impact. The most logical public appropriating
agency probably is the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices (HHS). HHS already has funded more programs (albeit
mostly demonstrations) on youth empowerment than any other
federal agency. During the 1980s, for example, HHS and the
federal Department of Labor sponsored far-sighted demonstra-
tions for high risk youth in over 30 locations-including start-
up funds for Eisenhower's affiliated second generation Albu-
querque, Chicago and Wilmington programs. During the same
decade, the HHS Office of Substance Abuse Prevention gained
experience in some promising youth investment-type demon-
strations and the Surgeon General of the United States, whose
office is located in HHS, created a new policy that perceives
violence more as a public health problem than a criminal jus-
tice issue.
This is not to rule out the possibility of a Youth Investment
Corporation appropriated through the U.S. Department of
Labor (which has begun a promising urban youth opportunities
program) or the U.S. Department of Justice (which could cre-
atively build on the Canadian Ministry ofJustice's receptivity to
social development, above). Or appropriations could be chan-
neled to the Corporation as an independent agency, following
the original federal funding mechanism of the National Co-op
Bank.
A private sector institution will, based on our experience,
implement more efficiently and rapidly than a public sector
institution. It can better leverage corporate and other private
sector funding than a purely public agency, and can promote
youth investment via videos and written reports with a more
business like image. There also may be increased tax-related
opportunity accruing to corporate-like "packaging" of the
institution. For example, it might be possible to enact a federal
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tax credit to corporations which provide loans and grants to the
Youth Investment Corporation.
A private sector entity will allow assembly of a talented,
dedicated private sector staff, with private sector salaries and a
commitment to remain with the institution for a sufficient
time-at least 5 to 10 years--to make a national impact. By
contrast, Assistant Secretaries and Deputy Assistant Secretaries
in the federal bureaucracy stay on the job for an average of
about 20 months. This makes it more difficult to develop a
long term program of carefully implemented and cost-effective
reform.
In sum, we propose a public-private hybrid which incorpo-
rates appropriate features of both sectors. Public funding can
insure sufficient national impact and oversight to insure prior-
ity on the truly disadvantaged. Private sector flexibility and
managerial cost-effectiveness can better deliver the change.
Local Targeting. Local community organizations will only
receive grants if the local public and private sectors, working
cooperatively, ensure that all qualified are placed in employ-
ment that has potential for leading to permanent labor market
jobs, not just temporary make work. The Corporation will
encourage jobs in the immediate inner city neighborhood of
the community organization and a mix of employment in both
service provision and economic development. This will help
promote development of the immediate inner city economy
and help to start the rehabilitation of housing and the inner city
infrastructure, so jobs and resources don't "leak out."
The Corporation will encourage local grant recipients to
negotiate problem oriented policing with the mayor. This will
help stabilize the neighborhood to for economic development
and stabilize the lives of youth monitored by police. [... ]
We also note the new Neighborhood Based Initiatives plan
proposed for the state of New York. The idea is for all relevant
prevention and treatment services for poor women and their
babies to be available at one place. Guidance is to come from a
Neighborhood Cabinet that includes government and neigh-
borhood representatives. If the Initiatives develop as prom-
ised, there is a potential to further integrate them with youth
empowerment services facilitated by the Youth Investment
Corporation.
Inner city non-profits will be required to involve and build
leadership among youth in their immediate neighborhoods. These
will not be programs designed to divert youth from all over the
city. By making the new innovations neighborhood specific,
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the Youth Investment Corporation will seek to create an inter-
active process between positive change among specific individ-
ual youth and positive change for the community as a whole.
The Corporation will educate the public and legislators on
how programs have succeeded. It will encourage state and
local legislators to adopt their own plans for implementing
model programs, whether the implementing vehicles be state
or local Youth Investment Corporations or other innovations.
Reforming Existing School-to- Work Training and Placement
The Youth Investment Corporation will provide a new,
focused implementing vehicle that expands the capacity of
community-based non-profits to train and place high risk
youth. The principles for that training and placement already
have been articulated through the private sector JobStart dem-
onstration program funded by the Ford Foundation and other
institutions.
Job Start. Over the late 1980s, JobStart targeted disadvan-
taged school dropouts aged 17-21 who read below the eighth
grade level. As noted in Chapter 6, the program provided
basic education, occupational training, support services such as
child care and transportation, and genuine job placement
assistance for long term employment. This comprehensive
strategy was run through community-based organizations, Job
Corps centers, vocational schools and community colleges.
Youth who participated in the program showed significant
improvement in attaining high school and General Education
Diplomas compared to control groups.
Early evaluation evidence suggests that JobStart is more
effective in the inner city than local programs implemented
under the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), the primary
current federal operating mechanism for training high risk
youth. JobStart does not "cream" the most qualified youth, as
do some JTPA programs, but succeeds with those in greatest
need. JobStart links basic education to occupational training,
while most JTPA-funded agencies do not. JobStart understands
that, to be successful, employment training must be comple-
mented by other supportive social services-like mentoring
and counseling. This connection is not sufficiently built into all
operations encompassed by JTPA. JobStart uses community
based non-profit organizations as vehicles for education and
training much more than the present JTPA system. JTPA dis-
burses federal money to local Private Industry Councils, which
are non-profit, but usually led by corporate-oriented officials
584 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 5
and not indigenous nonprofit minority leaders. This organiza-
tional structure does little to empower inner city residents by
giving them real ownership in management. In JobStart, "suc-
cess" is measured in terms of longer run employability, job
retention and earnings. In JTPA, "success" is measured in
terms of immediate job placement, even if the placement
proves to be short-lived. JobStart provides more assistance
than JTPA in obtaining jobs after training.
These findings are reinforced by Harvard Kennedy School
Professor John D. Donahue, who concludes in his recent book,
The Privatization Decision, "There is no compelling evidence that
the Job Training Partnership Act system, on balance, makes
much difference for the employment, earnings and productive
capacity of American workers."
Other Guides To Success. In addition to JobStart, several
related, innovative job training and placement programs for
high risk youth in the 1980s have been positively evaluated and
should be integrated into reform of the federal job training sys-
tems, in our view. For example, the Comprehensive Compe-
tencies Program, an individualized, computer-based learning
system that teaches basic educational skills, has been incorpo-
rated at someJobStart sites. The Summer Training and Educa-
tion Program (STEP) uses federal funding and is operated
jointly by school officials and employment and training person-
nel. STEP offers youngsters who are behind in school half days
of work and half days of intensive remedial education, together
with "life-planning" sessions. Jobs for America's Graduates is
a school-to-work transition program for at-risk high school stu-
dents that is sponsored by leaders from business, state govern-
ments, labor, and education. The Eisenhower-affiliated Youth
Development program in Albuquerque and Youth Guidance
program in Chicago are related examples of such in-school,
business-assisted vocational training that is combined with
learning basic verbal and math skills and placement after grad-
uation in the industries represented.
Project Redirection, the Ford Foundation-supported
mentoring initiative which has been evaluated as significantly
reducing the high school drop-out rate for single teen mothers,
also suggests that a coordinated training and job placement
program for single teen fathers will further stabilize the lives of
the couples. Recent research at the University of Chicago
shows that single teen high risk parents are more likely to
marry if the father is employed and the mother has finished
high school. Marriage encourages stable two-parent family life,
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which reduces the risk of crime and other negative behavior by
the children.
Nor should we forget that one of our original influences,
the residential Job Corps, has been demonstrated as a far more
effective alternative to JTPA for training, placement and crime
reduction of high risk youth. Currently, 14 states and 12 cities
operate year-round Youth Corps that incorporate various ele-
ments of the Job Corps experience. Other states and commu-
nities operate summer programs. An evaluation of the
California Conservation Corps found that the work of Corps
members generates a positive economic return. (The current
craze of "boot camps" as diversion programs for delinquent
youth incorporates some elements of Job Corps discipline but
little in the way of effective remedial education, training and
placement.)
In sum, to coordinate with our proposed Youth Invest-
ment Corporation, the JTPA system should be reformed so
that local sites operate more like JobStart, Comprehensive
Competencies and variations on Job Corps which better link
education, services, training and placement into permanent
labor market employment. Recently, JTPA was partially
reformed along these lines. But more legislative restructuring
is in order-including more delivery of training and placement
through inner city non-profits, rather than through the
existing, nonempowering Private Industry Councils.
Demographic Trends. Without significant reform of existing
federal training and placement of high risk youth, we will miss a
rare opportunity to place such youth in the private labor mar-
ket, based on projected demographic trends over the 1990s.
The U.S. Census Bureau reports an 8% decline in 18-year-olds
from 1989 to 1990 alone. The number of 18-year-olds will not
again reach 1989 levels until 2003. Consequently, companies
over the 1990s will be forced to reach out as never before to
inner city minorities, many of whom will be unskilled. Compa-
nies will have an incentive to train the disadvantaged and to
support reform of existingJTPA job placement. This is already
happening in programs like Youth Guidance in Chicago. Cities
and regions which have the most success in training entry level
applicants will have the advantage-over both American and
foreign competition. Basic skills in English and math will be
essential. But the level of training will have to rise even more-
because international competition demands more and more
skills. Even simple clerical work now often requires computer
knowledge.
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Will we reform JTPA and related education wisely-to
address the fact that functional illiteracy is 20% in the U.S. and
less than 1%6 in Japan? Or will the emerging private sector job
slots be filled by persons other than the currently disadvan-
taged? Now is the time for top government labor officials to
decide. It will take federal, state and local public sector leader-
ship to work with corporate executives to create a more recep-
tive climate in the private sector for the placement of high risk
youth.
The Minimum Wage. The minimum wage-which represents
society's effort to establish a floor below which market forces
should not be allowed to drive down the living standards of
workers-has declined sharply in real value after inflation. For
those who work full time at the minimum wage, it has become
increasingly difficult to support a family even at the poverty
line. We are convinced, based on both simple logic and our
own street experience, that we cannot overcome inner-city pov-
erty, or the social impoverishment and isolation that goes with
it, by providing below-poverty-level jobs. That is an obvious
contradiction in terms. Research has shown over and over
again in recent years that too great a proportion of new jobs
created in the American economy have been low-paying and
unstable. That will continue to be true of the largely service
oriented jobs that are expected to dominate new job creation in
the next decade. Those jobs cannot hold families together,
build a vibrant community economy, or offer an attractive
future for the disadvantaged young. A new human resources
and urban policy must begin to raise the floor of earnings to a
level sufficient to provide the basis for dignity, self-esteem and
self-determination. We believe that the current legislative
compromise, which restores part of the real value of the mini-
mum wage, is a step in the right direction. But it does not go
far enough, because the proposed levels by 1992 will remain
substantially below what they were a decade earlier, in real
terms. As a first step, the minimum wage should be fully
restored to its 1981 purchasing power.
Expanded Funding and Oversight. We endorse the recom-
mendations of the Ford Foundation's recent report, The Com-
mon Good, which concludes that, as in public education, local
communities should design and coordinate programs based on
existing models, like JobStart and Comprehensive Competen-
cies, and tailored to their needs. At the same time, the federal
government needs to carefully consider the recommendations
of the William T. Grant Foundation to increase the number of
high risk JTPA youth served and to begin at least 30 to 50 new
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Job Corps centers. The Grant Foundation proposes expanding
from 5% to 10% the number of eligible JTPA high risk youth
served (at a cost of about $1 B). But the feasibility of expanding
to at least 25% (at a cost of about $3B) also should be
explored. The real percentage of youth served at this level of
funding can be much higher, in our view, if the public sector
generates new jobs for at-risk youth in housing and interstate
highway repair (below), and if the proposed Youth Investment
Corporation helps to coordinate job creation.
If there are significant cuts in the size of American armed
forces (see Chapter 8), then the need is even greater for more
civilian job training and placement among high risk youth. To
manage the training-placement linkage more cost-effectively
and to insure that street level implementation resembles Job-
Start, a federal office responsible for overall policy and
programmatic direction of the government's youth employ-
ment efforts needs to be re-established, along the lines of the
short-lived Office of Youth Programs in the Department of
Labor over the late 1970s. State and local governments need
similar coordination.
A "Community Enterprise" Development Strategy for the Inner City
We can call for a significant corporate response to the
labor market demographics of the 1990s. But as the Vera Insti-
tute in New York has concluded, because of insufficient private
sector placement of minority disadvantaged youth, public sec-
tor job placement has been essential. Combined with this
experience is the pressing need for urban housing, infrastruc-
ture revitalization and associated services.
Consequently, we believe that a new human resource and
urban agenda must include a concerted plan to develop the
"whole community" through providing long-term, stable pub-
lic sector employment opportunities that address genuine local
needs. Without a major new commitment to this vision of pub-
lic-private local development, we will neither rebuild local
labor markets-thereby providing real and challenging work
roles for the young-nor deliver the services and reconstruc-
tive efforts so urgently needed in the inner cities.
Public Needs. There is clearly no shortage of public needs
to be met through local community enterprise. The mile-long
collapse of Interstate 880 during the San Francisco earthquake
of 1989 was only one of the more tragic illustrations of decrepit
urban infrastructure across the nation that urgently needs
reconstruction-and that could supply tens of thousands of
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new economic development jobs to properly trained youth
presently at high risk of drug abuse and crime.
As one astute observer wrote,
Our cities are in dire need of rebuilding, especially at the
core. In most major cities, the great supplies of housing
built to accommodate the influx of migrants, from rural
areas and abroad, in the early part of this century are
long overdue for rehabilitation or replacement. Our
public facilities are in similar need of repair. In the com-
ing years, these needs will multiply almost beyond mea-
sure. If we begin now to repair the decay of the past and
meet the needs of the future, we can create hundreds of
thousands of new jobs directly, and indirectly, millions
more.
The description sounds like any one of many written about
urban America in the 1980s; but the writer was Robert Ken-
nedy and the year was 1967. What has mainly changed is that
these public needs have deepened in the ensuing two decades.
The Kerner Report, too, citing "vast unmet needs" in edu-
cation, health, transportation, recreation, public safety and
other services, called for direct public job creation-"one mil-
lion new jobs in the public sector"-as a key response to the
deterioration of urban labor markets and the erosion of oppor-
tunities for the young. The Violence Commission, similarly,
called for public or non-profit job creation to provide a range
of community services, from job counseling to family support,
from drug abuse treatment to infrastructure repair.
A Bubble Up Non Profit Enterprise Strategy. We have been
encouraged by renewed national concern about the urgency of
inner city economic development. But we are skeptical of some
of the current calls for refurbishing strategies of urban devel-
opment which-like enterprise zones--depend on luring pri-
vate for-profit corporations into poor communities by
promising to relax wage and other regulations and lower taxes.
That "trickle down" approach has been tried; it has had little
success, especially compared to our "bubble up" approach of
directly empowering non-profit minority community organiza-
tions. It has led to scandal, like the money misspent by the
Wedtech Corporation in the Bronx. The private market has
repeatedly pronounced its judgment on the current condition
of the inner cities. Without substantial change, these commu-
nities will remain too volatile, their work forces too poorly
skilled and unstable, to attract private enterprise consistently,
on the level required to turn around the economic base of the
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community and to provide fulfilling jobs at living wages for
local residents. And as recent studies both in the United States
and in Great Britain indicate, the hidden costs of enterprise
zone strategies in lost tax revenues actually render them pro-
hibitively expensive, in terms of costs per jobs created. Nor
will such a strategy directly address the pressing service needs
of these communities.
On the other hand, we believe that a process of economic
development led by entrepreneurs in the private non-profit sec-
tor can revitalize the inner city in ways that can, in the long run,
iake private for-profit investment feasible and attractive-and
simultaneously create a strong local market for the products of
private enterprise. Most critically, in addition to highway
reconstruction by the Department of Transportation, we need
a renewed federal commitment to the construction and rehabil-
itation of low income housing, with non-profit organizations as
the primary contractors.
Our draft legislation for a national Youth Investment Cor-
poration also suggests the considerable potential for linking
non-profit organizations to for-profit affiliates or subsidiaries,
following the lead of the Enterprise Foundation and the Rouse
Corporation. Such linkages, in our view, should be basic to a
community enterprise strategy.
Housing as a Human Right, Not a Commodity. As conditions
deteriorated in the inner cities in the 1980s, consultants and
developers for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) profited. Under the present system of
low income housing construction and rehabilitation, almost
everyone involved in the housing sector-real estate develop-
ers, builders, mortgage lenders, investors, and landlords-
seeks a profit on the commodity. Practices in the private hous-
ing sector increasingly add costs to housing, from land devel-
opment, through every stage of construction or rehabilitation,
to final sale. In response, the Institute for Policy Analysis in
Washington, D.C. recommends a national housing program
that treats housing not as a commodity but as a human right.
The plan transfers the development, construction, rehabilita-
tion and management of housing from the profit to the non-
profit sectors.
The Foundation's own street level experience (albng with
that of many local community development corporations)
shows clearly that housing construction and rehabilitation can
be a major component of community economic regeneration
and also a key sector for the creation of jobs and supportive
services for high risk youth. Several non-profit organizations
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with which- the Eisenhower Foundation has worked have estab-
lished an impressive track record in undertaking home repair
and rehabilitation, developing housing, or in fostering retail,
manufacturing and light industrial development, coupled with
associated social services. Examples are the Mid-Bronx' Des-
peradoes Community Housing Corporation in the Bronx; the
Local Development Corporation of East New York, in Brook-
lyn; Baltimore Jobs in Energy; and Jubilee Housing, the Mar-
shall Heights Community Development Organization and
Around the Corner to the World in Washington, D.C. Of
course, it is the business of the Local Initiatives Support Cor-
poration (UISC) and James Rouse's Enterprise Foundation to
catalyze such non-profit development. They partner with
scores of qualified groups, which should become the founda-
tion of the new direction for HUD proposed here.
Details of a non-profit sector housing development and
rehabilitation plan have been introduced in Congress. They
provide a point of departure for new legislation in the 1990s
that departs from our present policy which, in effect, "bribes"
for-profit developers to build low income homes. The timing is
ripe for considering new alternatives, given that HUD is com-
mitted to cleaning up the current scandal among developers
and consultants, and to creating more tenant management in
public housing.
It will take a decade to expand beyond existing non-profits
and develop enough new non-profit organizations to address
housing needs for the poor. And there will be great pressure
from the for-profit constituency of HUD to keep money flowing
to it. So we do not here recommend an immediate, dramatic
increase in housing rehabilitation and building by non-profits
in one year or two. Rather, we recommend a program over the
1990s through which HUD expands the non-profit sector's
capacity and involvement in the $1 OB which the federal govern-
ment now spends annually on low income housing. As success
is demonstrated, the non-profit constituency will be further
built up.
Ultimately, though, we must face the realities that housing
is expensive and that much more low income housing is
needed-as is demonstrated by the homelessness which our
allies abroad cannot understand and our competitors use to cri-
tique our system. For example, public housing may improve
through tenant management, but such management must be
accompanied by dollar investments. In 1991 some 700,000 cur-
rent rental-subsidy contracts expire; failure to renew them will
cause severe hardship.
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Over the 1980s, HUD's overall yearly budget authority fell
from $38B to $15B. We suggest that budget authority be rein-
stated incrementally to the $38B level at the same time that the
number of non-profit community organizations is enlarged, the
capacity of existing models is expanded, and management
training of non-profit executives is enhanced. Initial incre-
ments of expanded budget authority for non-profits can be
undertaken in recognition that the HUD scandal already has
cost tax payers an estimated $6.9B in Federal Housing Admin-
istration losses alone, according to the Secretary of HUD.
Because the Local Initiatives Support Corporation and the
Enterprise Foundation already have proven themselves as
effective, private, high leveraging vehicles for building and
rehabilitating housing with non-profit community organiza-
tions, we recommend that HUD build on these models in
administering the new non-profit program.
As will be the case with our proposed Youth Investment
Corporation, HUD can require that each local non-profit hous-
ing development and rehabilitation organization create a for-
profit subsidiary that feeds revenues into the parent organiza-
tion. The result can be a balance between tapping
entrepreneurial potential and insuring that inner city develop-
ment is not used simply to benefit the affluent.
The goal is to harness the development process to create
job opportunities for high risk youth which, when combined
with reformed job training, remedial education and counseling,
can generate a powerful housing-driven program that recon-
structs the inner city, shelters the poor, empowers non-profit
organizations, and reduces crime and drug abuse. Up to now,
HUD has done little to recognize, in this way, the vast potential
of housing development for empowering high risk youth.
Tenant Empowerment and National Impact. One of our initial
influences, the Fairview Homes public housing crime preven-
tion program in Charlotte, North Carolina (Chapter 2) was in
fact based on job creation and tenant empowerment. It has
already been declared a model program by HUD-through
special recognition and awards made in 1985 and 1987.
There currently is much talk about empowering public
housing tenants, but unless tenant management and ownership
are expanded from a few exemplary programs to most public
housing projects around the nation, unless tenants are ade-
quately trained to manage, unless job training and opportunity
for project youth are realized, and unless funds are provided
for coordinated social and economic development, our experi-
ence predicts little national impact.
592 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY (Vol. 5
Along the same lines, volunteerism, block watches and ten-
ant patrols are being advocated for public housing without ade-
quate recognition of their limitations. HUD policy should be
revised to better recognize that such traditional policy, espe-
cially block watches, can only work as a small part of a multiple
solutions youth investment strategy, like Project Beethoven in
Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago. Similarly, HUD, as a bricks-
and-mortar agency, has always been vulnerable to rhetoric
about increased and expensive hardware, locks, lighting and
physical redesign to make space more "defensible"---even
though such "security" does nothing to change the motivations
of high risk housing project youth. The relative high costs of
physical changes at times have led to misuse of funds. As part
of current, welcome reforms, HUD leadership now has a genu-
ine opportunity to proceed beyond that limited, traditional
bricks and mortar mind set.
Dng Abuse Prevention, Drug Treatment and National Health Policy
The national Drug Control Strategy is a commendable
beginning. It is an initial response to an American dilemma that
must be resolved over a great many years in a thoughtful,
bipartisan way. Leaders on both sides of the aisle in Congress
agree with the Executive Branch that the policy will need to be
revised and refined over time.
As part of the continuing dialogue, the Foundation recog-
nizes that a comprehensive plan must acknowledge all levels of
need. Surely strong supply side drug enforcement is crucial-
nationally and internationally. As part of the supply side
response, we have advocated more creative, problem oriented
policing in inner cities to support the work of youth empower-
ment organizations, to protect them against the violence asso-
ciated with drug dealing, to keep dealers off-balance and on the
move, and to help stabilize the neighborhood for economic
development.
The Foundation's experience also suggests that the initial
National Drug Control Strategy is unnecessarily daunted by the
crisis of the inner city, where both drug use and dealing are
most intense. We believe that present policy needs to be bal-
anced more with the lesson that, especially in the inner city,
demand creates supply.
Drug Prevention. We already have spelled out a demand
side prevention policy to reduce drug use among high risk
youth in the inner city. The common elements which appear to
underlie successful programs must be applied in a variety of
19911 YOUTH INVESTMENT AND COMMUNITY RECONSTRUCTION 593
locally tailored ways, and combined with problem oriented
policing. Though we favor expansion of non-profit organiza-
tions as the implementing vehicles, there are myriad ways of
applying sanctuary, mentoring, peer influence, social support,
discipline and related principles which involve parents, the
schools and churches in concert with government agencies.
As long as inner city conditions and opportunity fail to
improve significantly, we can, based on past experience, expect
the demand for drugs to continue, regardless of which psycho-
active substance currently is fashionable among users in a par-
ticular location. (Drugs were a severe problem in the inner city
long before the currently declared drug crisis.)
It is not difficult to illustrate the threat of new drugs.
Although not widely popular on the U.S. East Coast,
methamphetamine-"crank"-has been used for over a decade
on the West Coast, mostly by persons on the bottom of the
economic ladder and often among kids who have school
problems and abusive parents. Crank is highly addictive, with a
much longer lasting high than crack cocaine. According to
Congressional testimony by Dr. Elliott Currie of the Institute
for Study of Social Change, University of California, Berkeley,
crank is a "drug that you can make in your bathtub using a few
inexpensive industrial chemicals, and it doesn't take a genius to
do it: In the Western States, it is routinely made by people
who're low-skilled, poorly educated, sometimes nearly
illiterate."
The implications are profound. As U.S. Senator Sam
Nunn has stated on ABC's Nightline, even if supply side
interdiction were 100% successful in stopping drugs from
entering the U.S., "in three months" there would be alterna-
tive, U.S.-made drugs on the street market to respond to con-
tinuing demand by users.
From the perspective of this report, some of the reasons
for inner city drug use are similar to the reasons for drug deal-
ing. As Dr. Terry Williams, of the City College of New York,
discusses in a recent book, there are few legal labor market
options. Unlike Wall Street and Madison Avenue, in East Har-
lem, with an unemployment rate of over 16%, the drug econ-
omy can be perceived as "an equal opportunity employer." In
spite of the brutality of the business, drug dealing may raise
self-esteem more than, in the words of one East Harlem
observer, "being exploited by the white man" or working as a
supermarket bagger. Even if you are scared and want out of
the drug business, peer and gang pressure can keep you in.
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The community-based programs described in this report
are successful precisely because they respond to these street
realities. The mentors and big brothers in these programs are
listened to when they expose the lies of big money to be made
in crack dealing. Remedial education, job training and place-
ment in a supportive setting combine to provide viable legal
options that make street sense. Peer influence to follow gang
rules is rechanneled into peer influence, for example, to pursue
Simba Manhood Training, as is being done by the Juvenile
Awareness Education Program in Wilmington, Delaware. Of
course, to call for more demand side options is not to excuse
drug dealing. We reiterate the need for tough law
enforcement.
Drug Treatrent. There is relatively little good information
from sound evaluations available to guide national policy on
inner city drug treatment. We are, therefore, encouraged by
the increased commitment to treatment as part of the new
National Drug Control Strategy.
Available evaluations suggest that "therapeutic communi-
ties" should be part of a comprehensive national treatment pol-
icy. The term therapeutic community is generic, describing a
variety of residential programs serving a wide spectrum of drug
and alcohol abusers. In comparison to other methods of drug
treatment, therapeutic communities coordinate multiple solu-
tions in a single setting - vocational counseling; work therapy;
education; recreation; group, family and individual therapy;
and medical, legal and social services. The primary "therapist"
is the community itself-consisting of mentors, staff and peers
who role model successful personal change. The treatment
process involves initial orientation, primary treatment during
which participants progress from junior status to role models,
and gradual reentry into society. The residential program at
Argus (Chapter 2) is a therapeutic community.
Examples of successfully evaluated therapeutic communi-
ties include Abraxis, begun in Philadelphia; Daytop Village,
begun in New York; Gateway House, begun in Chicago; Phoe-
nix House, begun in New York; Second Genesis, begun in
Washington, D.C. and Stay 'N Out, begun in New York. All
were created as heroin treatment programs and were positively
evaluated as such. All now have switched much more to cocaine
treatment, but cocaine-specific evaluations have not been com-
pleted. Typically, about two-thirds of the treatment popula-
tions of such successes are 21 years or older, though an
increasing number of therapeutic community programs (like
Abraxis) focus on adolescents. Many of the elements which the
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Eisenhower Foundation has identified as common among suc-
cessful inner city prevention programs also appear to underlie
therapeutic communities established for treatment.
Still, the surface has barely been scratched when it comes
to treatment innovations in the United States. There are a total
of 5,000 existing treatment centers of all kinds. Most are short
term and outpatient. There is as yet little scientific proof of
their cost-effectiveness. There is poor coordination in terms of
channeling the estimated 4 million addicts into them. A major-
ity of treatment slots still are for heroin users. Yet they now are
far outnumbered by cocaine addicts and multiple abusers-
who require different treatment strategies. And there is insuffi-
cient attention to the special needs of the disadvantaged and
women.
We do know this. Something close to a consensus has
emerged that significantly more funding is required to close the
gap between treatment need and availability among the disad-
vantaged. Without it, hard drugs will continue to ravage fami-
lies and communities in the inner city; drug-related violence
will continue at levels that place many neighborhoods in a state
of siege. Unless we begin to turn that situation around, it will
undermine all of our other efforts to develop the inner city eco-
nomically and socially. Expanded drug abuse treatment, inten-
sive outreach and aftercare need to be linked closely with youth
enterprise development, family supports, intensive remedial
education and other services. For example, a high official at the
National Institute On Drug Abuse has observed that, "For
many addicts, it's not rehabilitation; it's habilitation. They
don't know how to read or look for work, let alone beat their
addictions." As with the Foundation's second generation of
prevention programs, much more needs to be learned about
the relative effectiveness of residential versus day treatment.
And community-based facilities need to build in more neigh-
borhood police substations to encourage acceptance by neigh-
borhood residents, who otherwise would fear for their safety.
Treatment and Health Care. Underlying the inadequacy of
present drug treatment funding and facilities is the absence of
sufficient health care for millions of the "working poor." Cou-
pled with reductions and limitations in Medicaid programs in
many states, this has meant that many of the most basic drug
abuse, mental health, nutrition and preventative health needs
of inner city residents have been increasingly neglected. Today,
Medicaid reaches fewer than half of those below the official
poverty line. One result is that too many of the disadvantaged,
because of poor health or mental health, could not participate
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fully in community redevelopment even if its economic under-
pinnings were in place. And the lack of adequate care has put
hundreds of thousands of poor children on the street with
unresolved health and mental health needs--deeply com-
pounding the alienation, volatility and drug involvement of all
too many youth in the inner city. Our own experience in com-
munity programs like DYC affirms the crucial importance of
these preventive services. That is why, in Puerto Rico, at one
of the original influences on the Eisenhower Foundation, Cen-
tro Sister Isolina Ferre incorporated a community health care
system in support of its delinquency prevention ventures.
National polls show a broad and growing consensus on the
need for a more comprehensive and more equitable system of
health care-and a willingness on the part of Americans to pay
for it It is past time to transform that consensus into action.
8. FINANCING POLITICALLY FEASIBLE INVESTMENTS IN YourH
AND THE ECONOMY
Our experience has been that the most cost-effective, least
bureaucratic way to create urban change is to design programs
locally. When people have a stake in designing and planning a
program, they will work harder to successfully implement it.
As proven vehicles for implementing change, inner city
non-profit organizations typically are closer to the people than
more distant, more bureaucratic agencies. The non-profits are
channels for genuine popular participation. Our evidence is
that community organizations can deliver services more effi-
ciently and at lower cost than other institutions.
Whatever the sources of new monies, we therefore favor
direct funding to community non-profits whenever feasible,
and the future development of far more of such institutions.
Next closer to the people and therefore next most prefera-
ble as the institutions creating change are city based public and
private programs. Here the lesson for increased cost-effective-
ness is not to base programs "downtown," but in neighbor-
hood-based offices of city government and private agencies,
like the Neighborhood Based Initiatives plan proposed in the
State of New York (Chapter 6).
Local and State Investment
Local strategies can and should be financed, in part, by
local means. If, for example, state and local authorities were to
reallocate just 5% of the $44B annually spent on the criminal
justice system at their levels of government to community-
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based non-profits, the amount would be over 4 times that of
the proposed national Youth Investment Corporation, funded
$500M a year initially.
In another example, highly relevant to the policy proposed
here, the Governor of Oregon recently proposed "the most
significant-the most effective-anti-drug, anti-crime, pro-edu-
cation strategy (in America)." It is expansion of pre-school to
every child in Oregon who needs it, financed by earmarking
30% of the state's lottery dollars. Indeed, over the 1980s more
than 30 states increased taxes to maintain and increase social
programs, including a broad range of youth and education ini-
tiatives. And, from experience, we know that community based
groups are creative in identifying new sources of revenue. For
example, ALTERBUDGET, a coalition of nearly one hundred
community based social service agencies in New York City,
developed a proposal for an increased hotel room tax in order
to bridge the gap between revenues and needed social services.
Today, many local organizations, working with mayors, find
that time spent analyzing local budgets and identifying loop-
holes and waste is valuable in finding additional funds.
Federal Investment
At the same time, when adjusted for inflation, federal
investment in youth and related programs has declined by a
quarter or more over the 1980s. In 1981, New York City
received 16%. of its total revenue from the federal government;
by 1990, only 9.6%.
This is the opposite policy of the Kerner and Eisenhower
Commissions, which saw the federal government as the only
institution with enough resources and, potentially, the moral
authority to reverse the crisis of two societies, more separate
and less equal. They called for significant new allocations that
would supplement, not supplant, prior Congressional appro-
priations, and asked for sustained funding at these levels over a
long period of time.
A credible strategy for local development, then, must pro-
vide national-level resources on a scale sufficient to address the
deepening needs of local people and communities, in order to
make that empowerment real rather than simply rhetorical.
American taxpayers should not acquiesce to insufficient federal
responsibility. In the face of the growing economic impover-
ishment and social devastation of many urban communities, we
cannot substitute calls for more volunteers for a real commit-
ment to broad-scale, job-creating community economic devel-
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opment. We cannot substitute vague pleas to "get the
neighborhood organized" for a real commitment to channel
federal resources to investment in the youth who are the life-
blood of the community. We have seen-in our own programs
and in the best of others-that enormous creativity can be
unleashed by putting local community groups in the lead. But
we are frankly fooling ourselves if we imagine that they can do
the job on the cheap.
Federal dollars for urban problems can be made more
effective if they are directly targeted to the levels at which strat-
egies are best formulated. This means direct federal grants to
city government and to even more decentralized neighborhood
organizations. For example, federal, anti-drug block grant
money is routed through states, and this has produced some
inequities. In 1989, more than 50% of drug arrests in Wiscon-
sin were in Milwaukee, which received only 11% of federal
money allocated to the state. For the same year, Los Angeles
had 20% of the drug arrests but received only 6% of the state
allocations from the federal government.
A $10 Billion Per Year, 10 Year Federal Budget
The amount of new federal spending focused on disadvan-
taged high risk children and youth that is needed per year over
a minimum 10 year period to create a national impact depends
on success in reforming and better co-targeting existing federal
education, employment and economic development programs.
If significant progress on such reform is forthcoming in the
practical ways that we propose here, then a reasonable begin-
ning for a national program is slightly more than $1 OB per year
in federal spending for each of 10 years. These should be new
funds, above and beyond federal fiscal year 1991 spending.
They should be carefully targeted to the disadvantaged-for
preschool for all eligible ($4.8B), the Youth Investment Corpo-
ration ($500M), and job training and placement reformed to
implement JobStart-type initiatives locally and expanded to
more eligible youth ($3B). All of these initiatives can be consid-
ered as demand-side drug abuse prevention. In addition, we
propose at least $2B more per year on coordinated drug abuse
treatment that is integrated with the multiple solutions for mul-
tiple problems concept. This estimate does not include
returning housing development and rehabilitation to the levels
of the 1970s, repairing our Interstate highways, providing ade-
quate medical care to the disadvantaged (all federal responsi-
bilities) and urban educational reform in inner cities (which has
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more local and state responsibility). It assumes an equal
amount of new expenditures from state government, local gov-
ernment and the private sector combined. It assumes that cor-
porate America will significantly expand permanent labor
market opportunities for high risk youth in the 1990s, even
though more job opportunities must be provided by the public
sector in urban infrastructure reinvestment and low income
housing rehabilitation and construction.
These are our ultimate goals. To increase their political
feasibility, we recommend that the $1 OB per year increase be
implemented incrementally. We recommend $2B more per
year, so that, after 5 years, total spending on these federal pro-
grams will be up by $1 OB per year. Such a schedule will allow
for managed growth and orderly administrative expansion of
capacity. A similar incremented process makes political sense
for the related federal reforms in housing, infrastructure and
medical care, and for matching state, local and private sector
financing.
Understanding the Federal Budget Deficit
Where will we find the federal funds?
To answer this question, we must recognize simultaneous
fiscal demands. In particular, given the Gramm-Rudman-Hol-
lings law, the federal budget deficit must be reduced at the
same time that youth investment and community reconstruc-
tion are pursued.
We must be honest about the size of the deficit. [...] [mhe
Congressional Budget Office projected a fiscal 1990 deficit of
over $200B that rose to over $240B in fiscal 1991. This
increase is in contrast to the projected decrease in the deficit
from about $140B in fiscal 1990 to about $130B in fiscal 1994,
if we count surplus revenues from the Social Security Trust
Fund. But it is highly misleading to count the Social Security
surplus--and to use that surplus to pay for government operat-
ing programs, including military hardware. The Social Security
monies were not intended to hide the true deficit, but to guar-
antee pension benefits for today's taxpaying workers when they
retire.
Reducing Defense Expenditures
If, then, we acknowledge the magnitude of fiscal change
necessary on a number of fronts at the same time, the most
likely source of new revenue is from defense reductions.
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In 1969, the Presidential Violence Commission proposed
financing inner city reform through the "peace dividend"
expected at the end of the Vietnam War. The surplus monies
never materialized. Today, with the Soviet threat and Eastern
European tensions reduced, there is similar talk. Learning
from the past, we must make every effort to transform the
emerging peace with Moscow into a genuine peace dividend for
American society, while we continue to maintain a secure
defense that is adequate for present realities.
The current argument for American military cuts is based
in part on confirmation by the Central Intelligence Agency that
the Soviet Union has delivered on promised initial defense cuts
and that greater Soviet military cuts are in fact, quite possible.
Also key has been an improvement in the capability of U.S. and
allied intelligence, making it possible to increase the number of
days of warning that the West has before a projected all-out
Soviet attack. "Warning time drives strategy and strategy
drives the budget," concluded the Chairman of the Senate
Armed Forces Committee, Sam Nunn.
MIT professor emeritus, William W. Kaufman, a defense
analyst for several U.S. defense secretaries, has concluded in a
Brookings Institution study that the U.S. can reduce its defense
budget from $305B per year to $160B per year over the next
10 years without undermining its global commitments or its
position in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.
Professor Kaufman concludes that a total of about $500B can
be saved over 10 years. The first step in the Kaufman plan
"would be to halt the rush to produce a next generation of
weapons that is now in the acquisition pipeline-at a cumula-
tive cost of more than $117 billion."
Professor Kaufman's recommendations for the Army for
the first five years of his plan are to cut one active-duty division
in the United States and to reduce force levels in Europe
through a new conventional-forces reduction agreement with
the Soviets. He also would postpone high-technology battle-
field weapons development.
For the Air Force, he proposes to scale back the B-2 stealth
force to 13 bombers and conduct rigorous testing; cancel the
C- 17 cargo plane and buy more C-5B transports; defer produc-
tion of the Advanced Tactical Aircraft; cut back the F- 1 5E
fighter jet and build some B-I B bombers to carry air-launched
cruise missiles.
For the Navy and Marines, the Kaufman plan is to elimi-
nate 2 of the 14 aircraft carrier battle groups; cancel the SSN-
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21 attack submarine program and substitute more 688-class
boats; postpone the Advanced Tactical Fighter; drastically
reduce production of new destroyers, amphibious ships and the
AMRAAM missile; and defer production of the V-22 tilt-prop
Osprey transport.
When it comes to strategic programs, the Kaufman recom-
mendation is to cancel the MX Rail Garrison strategic missile
and the Midgetman missile and focus on maintaining a surviv-
able strategic deterrent based on Trident ballistic-missile sub-
marines. He would continue a limited number of B-IB
bombers and B-52s carrying air-launched cruise missiles and
maintain land-based Minuteman III missiles. He would cancel
the new-generation D-5 Trident II missile.
There are many other supporting voices across the polit-
ical spectrum. Reductions in the Strategic Defense Initiative
are high on many lists. Conservative columnist James J. Kilpa-
trick has concluded, "When do we get out of this madness we
are caught in? We can't keep maintaining this war machine
without a plausible enemy." The three past chairmen of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff have testified before Congress that the U.S.
does not need to deploy the MX and Midgetman missile sys-
tems. Former Reagan Administration Defense official Law-
renceJ. Korb has urged a well-thought-out plan to contract the
.armed forces "in recognition of the political-fiscal realities" in
a changing world. The editors of Business Week observe that,
"In a $4 trillion economy with a $1 trillion federal budget there
is surely room for some shifts in spending" - including a shift
"away from guns and toward people." The conservative Brit-
ish Economist magazine has argued that the U.S. can do without
two more aircraft carriers in "today's slightly simpler world."
The President of the Carnegie Corporation for the Advance-
ment of Teaching reminds us that this reduction would finance
all the inner city education reforms needed for the entire coun-
try. A recent Senate Budget Committee report stated that the
Pentagon has stockpiled at least $30B of spare parts, uniforms
and other equipment that it does not need. The report also
finds that the Defense Department still has orders in for $1.8B
more in supplies that its own auditors say should be canceled.
A recent Harvard Business School study has concluded that
$40B a year can be saved through improved management and
quality control. Yale historian Paul Kennedy has argued in The
Rise and Fall of the Great Industrial Powers that, if too large a pro-
portion of resources is diverted to military purposes, national
power weakens in the long run because of internal decay.
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The federal government now spends about one-sixteenth
as much on all employment. and training activities as it does on
military procurement alone. The costs of a single weapons sys-
tem, the B-I Bomber, in 1987 exceeded the total costs of all
federal employment and training programs. But the massive
numbers in the defense budget look very different when seen
from the perspective of community programs which must hold
candy sales to help finance drug abuse prevention. At current
estimates, the cost of a single MX missile would pay for an anti-
crime, anti-drug program on the scale of the initial Eisenhower
Neighborhood Program more than one hundred times over.
Funded at $500M per year level, the Youth Investment Corpo-
ration costs 5/6 of one B-2 stealth bomber.
Changes of the magnitude proposed by Professor Kauf-
man can significantly reduce the federal budget deficit and
finance the $IOB per year federal youth investment and com-
munity reconstruction plan proposed here. We must resist cos-
metic change and defense number games. Reductions must be
in actual outlays, not merely budget authority. Savings must be
based on actual outlay reductions, not merely smaller increases
in future budget projections.
Redirecting the Military-Industrial Complex to Empower the
Disadvantaged
In the 1990s, we can expect formidable resistance to
reductions from both the military and its corporate suppliers.
Cuts in troops are relatively easy politics, but cancellations of
giant industrial contracts are more complex. The challenge is
to rechannel a reduced military into helping to resolve our
drug and inner city crises. Likewise, the challenge is to avoid
defense contractors plant closing and consequent unemploy-
ment by retooling for other production, including work to help
repair the urban infrastructure (as well as production to
upgrade other industries, like electronics).
After the American invasion of Panama in 1989, we saw
pictures of U.S. forces aiding in rebuilding that country. Mili-
tary personnel advised Panamanians on management, plan-
ning, law enforcement and infrastructure repair. Why cannot
the Armed Forces do the same for the inner city? The Penta-
gon has a role in supply side interdiction of drug traffickers.
But to the extent that the Defense Department now needs to
justify appropriations, even at reduced le'vels, why not play a
role in demand side prevention and treatment? For example,
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the Armed Forces can help design and construct and repair
community-based facilities.
By the same token, defense contractors can construct mod-
ular housing based on space technology. It can be installed for
community based residences, non-residential youth empower-
ment, administrative offices and protective police community
based mini stations-as well, of course, as for sheltering the
homeless. Cooperative ventures can be formed with non-prof-
its for this task. Inspired leadership from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, encouraged by the Congress, can help create such a
metamorphosis.
Retargeting Federal Domestic Programs
The deficit-reducing belt tightening of the 1990s places a
heavy burden on already underfunded domestic programs. But
some reallocations are possible, given what the Foundation has
learned in the last decade. For example, the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984 and the Anti-Drug Act of 1986
granted the Attorney General greater latitude to seize currency
and other property connected with illegal drug trafficking and
money laundering. As a result, the Justice Department's Asset
Forfeiture Fund has grown dramatically-from $27M in 1985
to over $500M in 1989. Most of these monies presently are
used for supply side anti-drug initiatives. We believe that at
least 50% each year should be reallocated to demand side pre-
vention and treatment.
The Secretary of HUD has proposed elimination of HUD
discretionary programs. These monies could be applied to our
proposed $1OB per year in new expenditures. In addition,
because we already have identified many common elements
underlying successful programs for high risk youth, some dis-
cretionary funding earmarked for more experimental demon-
strations at the Department of Health and Human Services
(Office of Human Development Services) and Department of
Labor (Manpower and Training Administration) could be
reprogrammed for implementing operating programs that rep-
licate success. When combined with discretionary Justice
Department funds and monies from the Asset Forfeiture Fund,
these HUD, HHS and DOL resources could finance much of
the $500M per year Youth Investment Corporation operating
program to implement what we already know to work.
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Raising New Revenue
The President's Council on Competitiveness has estimated
that each I-cent increase in gasoline taxes would bring in
roughly $1B annually to the Treasury. A 25-cent per gallon
increase would raise about $25B a year, or roughly 5 times
what the federal government now spends on employment and
training activities of all kinds. That sum could fund an inner-
city program on the scale of the entire four year span of the
Eisenhower Neighborhood Program about every 25 minutes.
And it would leave us with gasoline prices still far lower than
those in most European countries.
We can add several billion dollars a year to that amount by
increasing excise taxes on alcoholic beverages and cigarettes-
while simultaneously decreasing alcohol and tobacco-related
health costs as well as the complex social costs associated with
them. These taxes have decreased sharply, in real terms, in
recent decades; adjusted for inflation, taxes on alcohol are only
about one-fourth of what they were in the early 1950s, taxes on
cigarettes closer to half. It is estimated that doubling them
would raise roughly SlOB each year. An additional $20-30B
could be drawn in by moderate taxes on speculative securities
transactions. What all of the latter strategies have in common
is that they divert monies from unproductive (and often
destructive) consumption to socially vital expenditure. Other
things equal, taxes on gasoline, alcohol and cigarettes tend to
be regressive, falling proportionately harder on the poor than
on the affluent. But targeting the revenues specifically to pro-
grams for low-income communities would surely help offset
that concernm-and would insure that new revenues are actually
spent on the most pressing problems.
The Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee
has in fact proposed new taxes on alcohol, tobacco and gaso-
line that would raise $100B a year. The Senate Minority
Leader has endorsed the proposal.
• . .[O]ver the 1980s, the rich grew richer and their effec-
tive federal tax rate declined. The poor grew poorer, and their
effective tax rate increased. The federal tax system grew less
progressive. These shifts were unprecedented in the post
World War II era.
For example, the tax rate for taxpayers who earn more
than $208,510 a year now is 28%--compared to 33 percent for
those earning between $78,350 and $208,510 annually. At the
least, the marginal rates should be the same. Accompanying
such more equitable taxation, it has been proposed that a 10%
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corporate income surcharge be imposed on the top 10% of all
corporate tax payers, along with a 10% income surcharge on
the top 5% of individual tax payers. Together, these changes
would raise $20B more per year.
In another plan, adding a 38% income tax bracket for sin-
gle filers with taxable incomes of $101,600 or more (and joint
filers with $169,350 or more) would raise $101B in the next 5
years, according to the Congressional Budget Office. This
option would affect only the richest 1 million tax payers. Along
the same lines, the Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committee has proposed an increase in the tax rate of the
wealthiest Americans, whose incomes have grown faster than
their taxes, to bring in $44B more per year. The Senate Minor-
ity Leader also has endorsed this plan.
The Economic Argument Is Also a Moral Argument
In finding revenues from these and other sources, we seek
what really is only a modest shift in priorities. The shift is eco-
nomic as well as moral. How can we find $166B to bail out the
savings and loan industry-but say we cannot find less than
one-tenth that amount per year to invest in our children and
youth who are at risk? How can investments in inner city infra-
structure decline sharply while Federal Housing Administra-
tion losses alone amounted to almost $7B, as part of the HUD
scandal? Will the federal government pay $400B for a mission
to Mars but not invest across the street in crack addiction treat-
ment for pregnant mothers to reduce a District of Columbia
infant mortality rate that is three times the national average?
Our national savings rate is 3% of GNP, compared to 18% in
Japan. Can we continue to pay $185B per year interest on the
national debt and do little to increase the savings that is needed
to finance investment in the economy?
We believe that it is abundantly clear that a policy sensitive
to youth investment can reduce the social deficit while it simul-
taneously reduces the fiscal deficit, by creating a more healthy
and productive economy.
Youth Investment and Community Reconstruction
Are Politically Feasible
Considerable support can be found from public opinion
polls for the positions proposed here. For example, a national
1985 Gallup Poll found that over half believe that police will
not solve the crime problem. A national 1986 New York Times
poll found 87% believe that what we're doing isn't working to
606 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 5
reduce crime. In a 1986 Harris National poll, three quarters of
Americans surveyed said they were prepared to pay higher
taxes to provide more day care and education. In a study of
American attitudes that same year, Mr. Harris concluded that
"people not only want to help children generally, they want
particularly to help the children who are living in poverty."
From 1985 to 1988, the proportion of respondents in a
national New York Times/CBS poll who thought drugs were "the
most important problem facing this country today" rose from
1% to 54%. The proportion of respondents who answered
"war and defense" declined from 23% to 1%. In a 1989 Wash-
ington Post/ABC national poll, 76% believed that spending for
the federal anti-drug program should be increased. The U.S.
Secretary of Transportation has found a willingness among the
public to raise taxes for highway reconstruction. One 1990
New York Times/CBS national poll found 68% to believe that
the nation's education is not improving. Another 1990 New
York Times/CBS poll found that 7176 believe the federal gov-
ernment "hasn't shown enough concern for the homeless."
Still another national 1990 poll from the same organizations
found that 62% of Americans want the peace dividend result-
ing from U.S. military cuts spent "to fight problems such as
drugs and homelessness"-not on various alternatives, such as
cutting taxes.
From the beginning, Sergeant Shriver, first director of the
agency that began Head Start, sought to "write Head Start
across the face of this nation" so that it was immune from polit-
ical destruction. He marketed Head Start by insisting on multi-
ple goals. This insured a diverse constituency. Conservatives
liked the notion of "investing" in children so that they could be
"self-sufficient." Liberals liked early intervention that coun-
tered disadvantage. Shriver succeeded--despite the conven-
tional wisdom that it is hard to rally support for programs
targeted on the poorest Americans. Head Start's broad constit-
uency sustained the program politically until long term evalua-
tion proved its cost-effectiveness-and therefore deepened
support even more.
Because we have been guided by the preschool concept of
multiple solutions for multiple problems, it is equally possible
to construct multiple constituencies for youth investment cou-
pled with inner city. reconstruction. And we need to remember
that the formula simultaneously is a demand side anti-drug
strategy.
Much already is in place. Many of the principles underly-
ing Argus, Around the Comer to the World, Centro, Fairview
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Homes, Umoja, the Dorchester Youth Collaborative, Job
Corps, JobStart, and Project Redirection are the principles of
Robert Kennedy's Mobilization for Youth. Yet the Wall Street
Journal has praised Argus as "an inner city school that works."
Ronald. Reagan met personally with and praised the Founder of
Centro, Sister Isolina Ferre. The Fairview Homes public hous-
ing program was begun in 1979 as a Carter Administration
urban initiative, yet was given awards as a national model pro-
gram by the Reagan Administration in 1985 and 1987. In the
Bush Administration, the Secretary of HHS declared that there
should be "a thousand Umojas." The House Select Committee
on Narcotics Abuse and Control, which has an impressive
bipartisan spirit, has heard testimony from the successful
Dorchester Youth Collaborative in Boston, and similar
programs.
We believe that, today, a broad segment of the American
public has come to agree with these truths: Americans need an
effective defense. And a tough criminal justice system that
works to reduce drugs and crime. But we can respond to
Soviet cutbacks and reduce deficit creating, ineffective weapons
that can't possibly protect us. We can make defense manage-
ment more effective. Military reductions can reduce the true
deficit and still finance domestic reform that will complement
our progress on arms limitations and our victory over Commu-
nism in Europe. Citizens have a right to police protection, not
just volunteer block watches, which don't necessarily reduce
crime in the poorest areas anyway. Police are a crucial public
service, especially to combat the heavy violence associated with
drug street warfare. We should make police more efficient and
train them better. But we also should know that more and
more prisons, above present levels, will not produce less and
less crime. Cheaper and yet more effective in actually reducing
crime is investment in human capital for the future of the
American economy. Corporate executives already have told us
that investment in preschool for poor children is our best
investment in a stronger America. Similar investment in youth
reduces crime more than anything else yet tried. That invest-
ment will also help us create qualified youth for the private and
public labor forces, at a time when the overall population is
aging, there is intense competition from abroad and too few
young people are qualifying for work. By, training and placing
disadvantaged youth, we will also increase the taxpayer base
needed to reduce the budget deficit. We will increase
workforce productivity and create economic growth, which is
itself a crucial source of "national security." We will insure
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that the nation can pay Social Security to older Americans. The
skills of the young can be directed at desperately needed U.S.
infrastructure development-including repair of highways and
construction of housing. This benefits all Americans, not only
the poor.
Visual Imagery and Youth Investment
Part of our task must be to bring these messages more con-
sistently and forcefully to the American people. In this age of
the 30-second sound byte and the simplistic slogan, getting
across the more complex realities of the inner city-and the
potential of programs and policies to invest in our youth-is a
tough challenge. We need to bring to bear the best resources
of the media-visual and print-in an inspiring campaign to
move the priorities of the nation by demonstrating clearly that
there are alternatives to the bleak urban reality that confronts
us today.
The challenge is to "image" the complex notion of "youth
investment and community reconstruction." We have demon-
strated logically through scientific evaluations that the concept
works. But more Americans must understand it. And trust it.
The leaders of successful programs must become household
images, on television, billboards and ads. Persons who already
are known and respected by the general public, or who hold
respected titles, must be visually associated with the success.
MichaelJordan andJoe Montana need to appear with the direc-
tors of Argus and the Dorchester Youth Collaborative. Edward
James Olmos, portrayer of the Mexican-American calculus
teacher who created self-esteem among his students in the film
Stand and Deliver, should join Bill Cosby in communicating how
investment in minority youth will expand the work force for
corporations while it reduces drug abuse. The CEOs of the
corporations should endorse youth investment as a national
extension of pre-school that will avoid greater costs in the
future. New York Police Commissioner Lee Brown should
communicate to much larger electronic publics his often-made
statement that employment is perhaps the best policy to reduce
crime. Pop stars need to dance across Job Corps or Project
Redirection sites on Friday night television videos.
One objective should be to make at-risk youth themselves
aware of real programs that could work for them. A broader
objective should be to educate the adult voting public, legisla-
tors and executive officials-public and private-on what really
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is needed, to create a climate for serious change, not a reliance
on "just say no" slogans or blockwatch ads.
It is said that 10 years are needed before a solid new idea
or positively evaluated program becomes familiar to and
accepted by the mass public. We must begin now with a fresh
collaboration among community groups, government and cor-
porations. Imaginative new ads are needed on the nation's air
waves, cables, and billboards. Much of the media design
should be by community organizations, like the Dorchester
Youth Collaborative (which already has produced several excel-
lent videos). The messages should be transmitted pro bono,
though perhaps encouraged by some new tax credit or other
incentive. The television output needs to be during prime
time, or close to it, not at 2:30 in the morning.
Leadership, Not Small Scale Dreams
Ultimately, federal political leadership is required. The
leadership should not be guided by daily public opinion polls
or media consultants. We speak of the courage of the Republi-
can President who issued the Emancipation Proclamation or
the Democratic President who one hundred years later caused
the Civil Rights Act and the voting rights act to be passed.
John Kennedy became one of our most popular presidents
by urging people to ask not what the country could do for
them, but rather what they could do for their country. Those
words have not become a cliche. The nation need not settle for
incremental wishes and small scale dreams. We believe that, if
the American people again are asked for creativity, energy and
sacrifice to restore our economy, youth, cities, infrastructure,
and education, there will be a tremendous response.
Similarly, even more leadership than at present is required
from the nation's governors and mayors. Such leadership is
illustrated by the New York State Neighborhood Based Initia-
tives plan and the Oregon plan to provide preschool for all who
qualify. Along similar lines, Southern governors have signifi-
cantly reduced infant mortality over the last five years, demon-
strating, in the words of columnist David Broder, that there is
little justification for the defeatist attitude that "social
problems of this dimension are insoluble."
The Two Societies Mirror Challenges From Within
In the late 1960s, the Eisenhower Violence Commission
declared its conviction that "this nation is entering a period in
which our people need to be as concerned by the internal dan-
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gers to our free society as by any probable combination of
external threats." Over 20 years later, some of the external
threats have diminished. Solidarity leader Lech Walesa and
Czech President Vaclav Havel have addressed Congress, the
Berlin Wall has come down, and there is Constitutional change
in the Soviet Union. But the internal threats-what the Vio-
lence Commission called "challenges from within"- have
become even greater, fulfilling the prediction made by the Ker-
ner Commission, of two societies more separate and less equal.
The present, with its symptomatic drug crisis, has never been
more propitious to take up the challenge of the Kerner and
Eisenhower Commissions and to affirm, once again, that "there
can be no higher priority for national action and no higher
claim on the nation's conscience."
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THE YoUTH INVESTMENT ACT OF 1992
(A) The Congress finds that:
(1) Crime and drug abuse in the United States continue at
intolerable levels, despite massive investment in courts
and corrections.
(2). Depending on which definition is used, the number of
truly disadvantaged Americans is between 2 and 10 mil-
lion. The highest rates of crime and drug involvement in
the nation are among young people in this population. A
disproportionate number live in inner cities. These are
high risk urban youth.
(3) Present policy against crime and drugs among high risk
urban youth is short run, fragmented, categorical and
insufficiently coordinated.
(4) The United States is falling behind many other nations in
developing preventive strategies for high-risk youth.
(5) Evaluations suggest that one of the most effective inner
city crime and drug prevention initiatives is early interven-
tion and preschool among the truly disadvantaged, as
illustrated by Head Start, the Perry Preschool Program
and Project Beethoven.
(6) Evaluations have found that the same multiple-solutions-
for-multiple-problems approach that works well for early
intervention and preschool works among high risk urban
youth aged 8-18.
(7) These multiple solutions encompass computer based
remedial education; other special education; mentoring
and discipline via big brothers, big sisters and counselors;
peer pressure; employment training; supportive services
in an extended family sanctuary away from the streets;
and school-to-work transitions to employment in the per-
manent primary labor market-with jobs having upward
mobility. Positively evaluated programs which implement
many of these principles are illustrated by (but not limited
to) the Argus Community in the South Bronx and Job
Corps, Job Start and Project Redirection nationally.
(8) A strategy based on such multiple solutions often creates
many of these outcomes, at the same time: less crime, less
drug abuse, less welfare dependency, fewer adolescent
pregnancies, higher self-esteem, more school completion,
more successful school-to-work transitions, more
employability, more economic and psychological self suffi-
ciency, and greater likelihood of becoming tax paying
citizens.
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(9) Evaluations have shown that inner city non-profit commu-
nity organizations are effective vehicles for implementing
these solutions and empowering high risk urban youth.
(10) Though a strong criminal justice system is essential, pro-
grams which implement the multiple solution principles
identified under article 7 tend to reduce crime and delin-
quency more and at a lower cost than prison.
(11) This "youth investment" strategy needs to be replicated
on a wide national scale-through a private, national insti-
tution for inner city youth reinvestment that is modeled in
part on the success in inner city economic development of
the private sector national Local Initiatives Support Cor-
poration and Enterprise Foundation.
(B) It is, therefore, the policy of the United States to create a
National Youth Investment Corporation in the private sector.
Public sector funds shall be authorized and appropriated
through the Department of Health and Human Services.
(C) The Directors of the Corporation shall consist of three
persons from national non-profit organizations; three from
local indigenous, non-profit, inner city community based orga-
nizations; one member of Congress; one Governor; one
Mayor; two corporate executives; and a Chairperson.
(D) The objectives of the Corporation shall be to:
(1) Finance and technically assist non-profit community orga-
nizations in developing comprehensive youth investment
strategies based on the principles identified in article
(A)(7).
(2) Leverage at least $1 in non-federal cash matches for each
federal $1 committed.
(3) Co-target other federal funds to the same organizations
or neighborhoods, above and beyond funds specifically
appropriated for or matched to the Corporation. In par-
ticular, at the federal level, co-target Job Corps Centers,
Job Training Partnership Act training, discretionary
Department of Education funds, discretionary Office of
Human Service Development funds of the Department of
Health and Human Services, Community Services Admin-
istration funds, Department of Housing and Urban Devel-
opment discretionary and public housing crime
prevention funds, Small Business Administration pro-
grams, and Economic Development Administration funds
to the same non-profit organizations and neighborhoods.
(4) Require as one condition for local grants that, above and
beyond local cash matches, the private and public sectors,
working cooperatively, place high risk youth in jobs that
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lead to permanent stable, primary labor market employ-
ment (not make work) in the immediate inner city neigh-
borhood of each non profit community organization that
receives support from the Youth Investment Corporation.
Encourage a balance ofjob creation in economic develop-
ment and service provision.
(5) Encourage as one condition of local grants that, above
and beyond local cash matches, police be deployed in
problem oriented policing to support the youth invest-
ment strategies specified in article (A)(7) and to stabilize
the target neighborhood to promote economic develop-
ment that will generate private and public sector jobs for
high risk youth.
(6) Require as one condition for local grants that non-profit
community organizations which receive funds from the
Youth Investment Corporation must design initiatives,
like Project Redirection, to keep single teen mothers in
high school, and must employ single fathers on the condi-
tion that they financially support their infants.
(7) Train the employees and trustees of the local non-profit
community organizations which implement local pro-
grams in modem management and leadership methods.
Create a national Youth Training and Management Insti-
tute within the Youth Investment Corporation.
(8) Expand the operating capacity of existing non-profit com-
munity organizations and provide seed financing for new
ones.
(9) Establish for each funded local non-profit community
organization a for-profit entity that can help finance the
non-profit in the future, much like the for-profit Rouse
Corporation helps finance the non-profit Enterprise
Foundation.
(10) Evaluate local initiatives.
(11) Educate legislators and the public on the successes of
model programs and replications of their underlying prin-
ciples. Promote the organization and financing of state
and local Youth Investment Corporations.
(E) Of the funds federally appropriated for the Youth Invest-
ment Corporation, 60% will be targeted as direct grants or
loans to new and existing non-profit community organizations
working to empower high risk urban youth based on the
underlying principles specified in article (A)(7). These funds
must be matched I to 1 with non-federal government funds.
20% will be allocated to management training, youth leader-
ship training and related technical assistance. 20% will be allo-
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cated to planning, coordination, financial leveraging,
evaluation, administration and educational activity by the
Youth Investment Corporation. The Corporation will target at
least 70% of its funds, loans and assistance to those urban
areas with the highest populations of high risk disadvantaged
youth. For any six year planning cycle, no more than 20 urban
areas will be targeted. At its discretion, the Corporation can
target up to 30% of its funds to non-urban areas with high con-
centrations of disadvantaged youth.
(F) The Corporation will provide grants, loans and assistance
directly to local non-profit community organizations. As a con-
dition of non-federal matches, the Corporation will coordinate
with executives of local government, who will be encouraged to
create local networks of appropriate agencies to work in sup-
port of targeted non-profit community organizations.
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